Moldova: elections with geopolitical overtones and a referendum of internal fracture

Intrigue and unexpected results

For most experts, the main intrigue, on the eve of the October 20 elections, was whether Maia Sandu would win the first round of the presidential election or achieve a convincing advantage over all competitors that would allow her to easily beat anyone in the second round. However, the result of the first round threw many people into confusion and surprised them. Maia Sandu was the winner with 42.45% of the vote, while her closest pursuer ex-Prosecutor General Alexandru Stoianoglo got 25.98%. 

However, by 2 a.m. on October 21, the numbers for Sandu were catastrophic, and panic gripped the incumbent president’s headquarters.  The result on the website of the Moldovan Central Election Commission showed 38.17%. The victory in the first round could be forgotten. And the gap from her nearest pursuer was much smaller than predicted, only 10%. And only in the early morning the situation for the incumbent president began to improve. The processing of diaspora votes began. The last polling stations in the United States and Canada, which closed, established the final result. 

To put it mildly, Sanu’s unimpressive result in the first round has its own explanation. In his election campaign, Sandu bet on European integration, and its brainchild, the constitutional referendum, was supposed to “delineate” the upcoming success, mobilizing pro-European supporters as much as possible. It is worth noting that the European integration bid was not born out of nothing. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kiev and Chisinau submitted official applications to join the EU. Already in June of the same year, the countries were granted the status of candidates for EU membership. 

In November 2023, the European Commission recommended to the Council of the European Union to start negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova on accession to the EU. The finale-apotheosis of the europeanism was February 7, 2024, when official negotiations on Moldova’s accession to the European Union began. The Moldovan authorities tried to convert the decision of Brussels to include an increased speed of European integration in their favor. Sandu’s team did everything to be associated with progress on Moldova’s path to the EU – the incumbent president assured that the republic would become part of the European Union by 2030.

Of course, it is difficult to deny the European integration successes of Moldova under the leadership of Maia Sandu. However, they seem to have played a cruel joke on her. The fact is that at the presidential elections in 2020, Sandu offered voters not a distant European perspective, but more down-to-earth and quite tangible things – the fight against corruption, improving people’s welfare, reforming the justice system. And in this area, despite her loud promises, she has nothing to boast about in four years. Voters turned out to be more inclined to evaluate the real achievements of the president, the state of their wallet and the number of corrupt officials behind bars.  

Sandu justified that there was not enough time for radical reforms and that the decades-long flawed system is fiercely resistant to change. Interestingly, even in her home district of Falesti, Sandu came only third with 23.5%, trailing Our Party leader Renato Usatii with 34.6% of the vote and Alexandru Stoianoglo with 27,.48%. 

Former Prosecutor General and Maia Sandu’s rival in the second round of the presidential election is a no-name in big Moldovan politics. He tried to be elected head of Gagauzia twice – in 2006 and 2015 – but lost both times. In 2019, he won a contest for the post of prosecutor general, but was fired on corruption charges after Sandu came to power. Stoianoglo contested the charges in the European Court of Human Rights and won the trial, but he was still not reinstated in office. He has come to symbolize the current government’s problem in upholding the rule of law in dealing with political opponents within the country. This history has given the former prosecutor-general the image of an honest official who suffered at the hands of a pro-European government, which apparently prompted the Party of Socialists to nominate him for president instead of Dodon, with his high anti-Russian rating and a trail of corruption scandals. 

It is difficult to say how the Kremlin viewed this nomination. Stoianoglo has never been considered an overtly pro-Russian politician and has supported Moldova’s European integration. He has made no secret of the fact that he holds a second Romanian citizenship. After the start of his election campaign, he condemned the war in Ukraine and called Crimea and Donbass occupied. Unlike the Eurocentric Sandu, the former prosecutor general positioned himself as a sovereigntist politician, defending Moldova’s neutral status and advocating even relations with the EU, Washington, Beijing and Moscow. An attempt to make him a unified opposition candidate failed. 

For many politicians, the presidential election is an opportunity to increase their visibility and prepare for the parliamentary campaign, which is just over six months away. His election campaign is neither expensive, nor spectacular, nor creative. Experts called it boring and inexpressive. Nevertheless, the final result of almost 26%, the unqualified victory in his small homeland in Gagauzia – 48,67% with 2,26% for Sandu, the second round – is a good asset for a newcomer politician with excellent prospects for the future parliamentary election campaign. 

Renato Usatii, who came in third place with a result of -13.77%, is now considered the holder of the “golden share” in the second round of the presidential election. In 2016, he supported Igor Dodon in the presidential election, which helped him win. In 2020, the support of Usatii, who also finished third in the first round, was honored by Maia Sandu. So far, he says he has not decided who he will support, likely implying he is open to “bidding.” He said on Facebook that he would make this decision after discussions with Our Party members and citizens. 

However, it is unknown to what extent he can control his electorate and influence their choice. Earlier, Usatii stated that he would not support any of the candidates in the second round. On the other hand, the votes of Irina Vlah, the ex-bakshan of Gagauzia, who got 5.38% (83,226 votes), will probably go to Stoyangolo. Vlah has a reputation as a pro-Russian politician, although she herself denies it. She is not against Moldova’s European integration, but calls for it to be done without jeopardizing friendship with Russia. Her campaign has focused on criticizing Sandu, whom she accuses of dragging the country into war. Vlah promises to become a peace president and to initiate a referendum on remaining neutral. 

The sources of funding for Vlah’s campaign are unknown. In informal conversations, she claims that she is partially supported by Turkey, which is traditionally friendly to the Gagauz. However, Ankara has good relations with the current Moldovan leadership, and it is not clear why it would support Sandu’s opponents. In this election campaign, Irina Vlah has achieved the main thing – her promotion before the parliamentary elections in 2025.  

As for the fourth-place winner, Victoria Furtune, former prosecutor of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, her result of 4.45% can be called an undoubted success. She came second in the presidential elections in Gagauzia with 28.8%. This is the only region where Furtune took the second place. However, as experts note – this result was achieved thanks to the efforts of the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, or rather his “nets”. 

The Kremlin’s main ally in Moldova managed to create a huge network of paid activists and supporters in Moldova. According to the Moldovan police, this structure included at least 130,000 Moldovan citizens who received “rewards” for their political activity in accounts in the Russian Promsvyazbank. In addition to Furtune, according to Moldovan media, there was another candidate in Shor’s “pocket” – former Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev. Moldovan journalists managed to prove the connection with Shor of candidates Victoria Fortuna and Vasili Tarlev, who received 4.5% (69 thousand votes) and 3.2% (49 thousand votes) respectively. The total of 116 thousand votes, according to investigative journalists, is close to the size of the network of Shorov activists “on the payroll,” as the police claim. However, this is impossible to prove, and Ilan Shor himself has not publicly named the candidate he supports. Perhaps fearing that public support will become a kind of “black mark”, which will allow to remove them before the elections. But it is quite possible that instructions on how to vote could well have been sent out through their channels of communication with activists.

Another interesting fact from the results of the first round was that four presidential candidates: Octavian Cicu, Andrii Năstase, Natalia Morari, and Tudor Ulyanovski, got less than 1% of the votes than they collected signatures for the registration of presidential candidates.

Now Moldova is waiting for the second round, which will be held on November 3.  According to experts, the significant gap between the candidates should not be misleading and it is too early for Maia Sandu to rest on her laurels as the winner of the presidential election. It is difficult to say which of the candidates has more resources to expand the electoral field. Although in the absence of other ranking pro-European candidates who could support Sandu, the incumbent president actually has nowhere to get the missing votes in the second round. According to the crudest estimates, Sandu can be supported in the second round only by the voters of Octavian Tsyku and Andrei Nastase, who received less than one percent in the election. And if we take into account the fact that 100 thousand voters who supported Moldova’s European choice at the constitutional referendum did not vote for Sandu, her victory in the first round may have the flavor of future defeat. 

The attempt to spin the fork in the second round as Sandu for Europe and Stoyangolo for Russia will not work. The former attorney general has never said that he is a “fan” of Moscow, but emphasizes that he is also for Europe, but without the kind of authoritarian policies that Sandu is pursuing. There will be no return to the 2020 scenario, as was the case with Dodon. “Non-Moldavian Moldovans,” as the diaspora is called, not feeling an existential threat in the face of an openly pro-Russian candidate, may not be so active in the second round, and this will affect both the turnout and the result. Especially since this time there will be no referendum on the European future of Moldova, for the sake of which many of them came to the polls.

One way or another, the heat of passion in the second round will be maximum. Both candidates will throw all their forces to mobilize their voters. Ilan Shor with his “net” can also play a role from Moscow. Now the opponents of the incumbent government already have a moral advantage. In the first round, they mobilized in such a way that the seat under Maia Sandu was seriously shaken, and this should add motivation to her opponents.

A divisive referendum

In the referendum, which was held on the same day as the presidential election, Moldovan citizens had to answer the question: “Do you support the amendment of the Constitution in order for Moldova to join the European Union?”. The law proposed to be voted on would make two amendments to the Constitution: – two paragraphs would be added to the preamble: “Recognizing the European identity of the people of the Republic of Moldova and the irreversibility of Moldova’s European course” and “Declaring integration into the European Union as a strategic goal of the Republic of Moldova.” Also, a section will be added to the Basic Law stating that Moldova’s participation in the EU founding acts will take precedence over contradictory provisions of domestic laws. 

The plebiscite initiated by Sandu, according to the plan of the initiators, was to solve two tasks. The first, purely political-technological, was to link Sandu’s re-election for a second term with the process of Moldova’s European integration and to mobilize pro-European voters in the first round. This linkage was to ensure the conversion of the European integration rating into the incumbent president’s rating, which was and remains much lower than support for the EU accession course. The second goal was to demonstrate the final victory of the supporters of European integration on the domestic political field. 

Maia Sandu has outlined an ambitious goal – full membership of Moldova in the EU by 2030. This plan has received support from European leaders. The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, visited Chisinau in October and demonstrated the seriousness of Brussels’ intentions. She said that the EU is ready to invest 1.8 billion euros in the Moldovan economy over three years. The European Commission called this package the largest financial aid to Moldova since independence. According to the plan, it will stimulate the country’s economy and bring it closer to EU membership by accelerating reforms.

When Sandu put forward the idea of a referendum, many people said that the idea was quite dangerous, since it does not actually affect anything. Brussels would not accept Moldova into the EU any faster. It was more of a demonstration move aimed at an internal audience to show the popularity of Sandu and her ideas. However, the first figures on the referendum on the website of the Central Election Commission shocked everyone. There were considerably more people who voted “against” European integration (56%) than those who voted “for” it. The situation began to change when the processing of protocols from foreign polling stations began. As a result, the final vote recorded a victory of 50.49% for the supporters of European integration, while the “against” vote was -49.57%. Many called this victory a “pyrrhic” victory, and the plebescite itself a referendum of division that split Moldova in two and made the country’s European aspirations an instrument of subsequent internal conflicts. Such referendums should end with a crushing victory with a result of 80-90% and demonstrate consensus, the unity of society and elites. 

And the politically minimal preponderance of the supporters of European integration, especially after its opponents had been leading for a long time during the vote counting, became an undeniable proof that the Moldovan society is not burning with a unanimous desire to go to Europe. Moreover, the vote showed that Moldova, as such, voted against European integration and that it is being “pulled” to Europe by “non-Moldovan Moldovans”, as migrants living in Europe, the USA, Canada and Russia are called in the country.

There were districts in which Sandu (the initiator and main promoter of the referendum) came first, while in the referendum the majority voted “against”. Only in eight districts the number of supporters of the European vector exceeded the number of opponents. All districts of Chisinau and suburbs supported the amendment of the Constitution. Only in Botanica, a district of the capital, where the old Soviet buildings are built and where mostly pensioners live, there were more opponents of the introduction of the EU course in the Constitution. The southern and northern parts of the country, the so-called “deep Moldova” were mostly against the amendments to the Constitution. It is noteworthy that there are more voters from the Left Bank who supported the amendments to the Constitution than in some northern regions and in Gagauzia. In the autonomy, 94.8% of voters voted “against” the constitutional amendments. Transnistrian residents, to whom polling stations were opened on Moldovan territory, close to the border, also voted “against” (62.56%).

As we can see from the results of the vote for the referendum on European integration, the Sandu team’s bid to mobilize its pro-European supporters and come to the elections, even if they were not happy with the results of Sandu’s first presidential term, failed. She attributed her less-than-convincing results and the problems of the referendum on European integration to the fact that Moldova allegedly faced an “unprecedented attack on freedom and democracy” that was a manifestation of an external conspiracy. “Criminal groups, working together with foreign forces hostile to our national interests, attacked our country with tens of millions of euros, lies and propaganda, using the most shameful means to keep our citizens and our country trapped in uncertainty and instability,” Maya Sandu said. 

She said law enforcement agencies have “clear evidence that these criminal gangs sought to buy 300,000 votes by committing fraud on an unprecedented scale.” “Their intent was to undermine the democratic process. Their intention was to sow fear and panic in society. We will not back down from defending democracy and freedom. We are waiting for the final results and we will respond with firm decisions,” proclaimed the Moldovan President. Of course, to justify almost 50% of the “NO” votes in the referendum only by bribery on the part of Shor is, to put it mildly, not a very convincing argument. The problems are much deeper. 

Firstly, the idea of European integration should not serve as a political-technological support for one politician, who represents only one segment of Moldovan society, even if it is a large one. Secondly, as the famous theater classic Konstantin Stanislavsky liked to say: “The public is a fool, but it cannot be deceived”. The Moldovan voters did not believe Sandu, who sold a happy future in a warm, bright and safe European Union. Only a blind man cannot see what is happening to the EU: economic stagnation, its inability to ensure its security without US help, the election victories of right-wing and left-wing parties that defend national interests rather than globalist ones. And there are many other factors that do not make Brussels a magnet that attracts the countries of Europe, as it was in the 90s. 

The examples of Turkey, which aspires to join BRICS, having put, in fact, on pause the process of European integration, or Georgia, which today clearly demonstrates its “indifference” to the EU, being in search of geopolitical compromises, may have made Moldovan citizens reconsider their attitude towards the EU.  It is no secret that the voters were also helped in this by Russian propaganda, which, in the absence of its candidate, concentrated mainly on the referendum. A large-scale campaign to discredit European integration was launched in Moldovan social networks, on YouTube and in leaflets distributed in mailboxes. There were three storylines. The first was that Moldova’s accession to the EU would lead the country to war with Russia, which was reinforced by the experience of Ukraine, which brought war to its home after seeking closer ties with the EU. The second line was related to the identification of accession with the EU as an attack on “traditional values”. There were fakes on the web that after joining the EU, Chisinau would regularly hold gay parades, legalize same-sex marriages and close Orthodox churches. And the third story was that the country’s accession to the EU would automatically lead to an increase in prices for all goods and services without exception, and European rich people would buy up the country’s national wealth – Moldova’s fertile land – for nothing. 

It is unknown to what extent Russian propaganda influenced the opinion of the country’s residents, but the attempts of the authorities, as in the case of Shor’s “nets” to explain the high percentage of “PROTESTS” at the referendum only by the influence of Russian propaganda look superficial. Yes, indeed, Russian propaganda worked, which means that the Moldovan authorities counteracted it insufficiently successfully. The result obtained by the Moldovan authorities at the referendum sends the strongest political signal to the European Union, where there are more than enough opponents of enlargement. Undoubtedly, the EU will not curtail cooperation, but it is unlikely that the negotiation process on Moldova’s membership in the EU, which has already begun, will be significantly accelerated. On the whole, Moldovan society, which recently was considered to be overwhelmingly in favor of integration with the EU, has split and outlined a potential fault line within itself. And it is a matter of time to predict when it will actualize and what consequences it will bring to Moldova.

Battle for Moldova

Undoubtedly, the presidential elections in Moldova and the referendum on its European future are perceived as having geopolitical overtones. And there is nothing surprising in this. Despite the weakening of pro-Russian sentiment after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow, having recovered from its first setbacks on the Moldovan front, is not abandoning its attempts to regain its influence in Chisinau. The bet on Moldova’s old pro-Russian forces – the Party of Socialists of former president Igor Dodon and the Communist Party of another former president Vladimir Voronin – seems to have been played out. New forces and players are being sought. So far, Moscow has bet on Ilan Shor, but not as a politician. In Moldova, he himself could not run for the presidential elections – not only because of the criminal case, but also because of his high anti-rating and reputation of a swindler. In Russia, he was evaluated as an experienced political manager with influence and resources. 

Shor’s structures in Moldova are numerous and effective. In 2023, the candidate he supported, the previously unknown Eugenia Gutsul, was elected head of the Gagauz autonomy in southern Moldova. Moldovan media wrote extensively about how Gagauz voters were financially motivated to vote for Gutsul.  Besides, Moldova is a fertile political ground: the sentiment towards Russia in the society is considerable and many Moldovans in everyday conversations connect the same price rise with the turn of the authorities “away from Moscow”.

First, Ilan Shor creates the “Victory” bloc in Moscow, which, like Shor’s main candidate, Vasil Bolu, is not allowed to participate in the elections by the Moldovan authorities. This does not stop Shor. Several politicians from the list of presidential candidates are associated with him. The media, in particular, wrote about Vasile Tarlev and Victoria Furtune. Ilan Shor did not openly support anyone, and on October 19 called to vote for any candidate except Sandu. However, Shor’s main task was not the elections, but the referendum on European integration, which had to be torpedoed. And for this he has an effective tool, the so-called “electoral network”, which is a huge pyramid of illegal financing and bribery of voters. 

According to Moldovan law enforcement agencies, Shor’s team organized a large-scale voter-bribery scheme: only during September this year, $15 million was transferred to Moldova from Russia to bribe 130,000 voters. Although the real size of the network may be many times larger. People are actively recruited through numerous chatbots in Telegram, offering them for financial rewards to join the activities of the “Victory” bloc: to agitate against the EU and Maya Sandu, to participate in anti-government street actions, and so on. 

The network was so large that law enforcement agencies were unable to cope with it. Despite the reports of law enforcement officers about blocking dozens of telegram channels associated with Shor and his political structures, new ones appeared immediately and it was possible to become part of the “network” in a few clicks.  Shor himself denied all accusations, calling the authorities’ actions “an absurd spectacle and “an attempt to divert attention from the real problems: poverty, corruption and police brutality”.

Seeing that the Moldovan authorities are unable to cope with Russia’s “offensive”, the heavy artillery – the USA and the EU – joined the process. And although when asked whether Maia Sandu accuses Russia of interfering in the elections, she did not name it, but said that she accuses “criminal groups that bribe voters with dirty money”. Russia’s interference in the election was reported by Moldova’s senior partners. US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby warned ahead of the election: “Russia is actively working to undermine Moldova’s elections and its European integration. Over the past several months, Moscow has allocated millions of dollars to influence Moldova’s presidential election. We estimate that this money has gone to fund its preferred parties and spread disinformation on social media in favor of their campaigns.” 

According to the United States, Ilan Shor invested tens of millions of dollars per month in nonprofit organizations that disseminate election narratives aligned with Russian interests. These nonprofit organizations promoted pro-Russian content in traditional media, on local websites, and through social media applications. “The United States will continue to support Moldova and the Moldovan people, and to expose and counter Russia’s attempts to undermine Moldovan democracy,” Kirby said. The initial results of the vote were also followed by reaction from Brbsel. “We have been closely following the voting in the Moldovan presidential election and referendum. This is an important partner of the European Union,” EU foreign policy spokesman Peter Stano said at a briefing in Brussels. According to him, the Moldovan elections “took place under unprecedented pressure” and “intimidation by Russia and its proxies”.

The Kremlin rejected the version about a “Russian trace”. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov urged Chisinau to present evidence of foreign interference in the election through some criminal groups. “If she (Sandu) says that she is short of votes because of some criminal groups, then she should present evidence, and it is probably not a bad idea also for Mrs. Sandu to explain such a number of votes disagreeing with her line. Are these also criminal groups? Or does she mean that the citizens of Moldova, who do not support her, are associated with criminal groups”, – said Dmitry Peskov. 

He added, “the first thing we see is, of course, such, let’s say, mechanical, difficult to explain rates of increase in votes for Sandu and in favor of those referendum participants who are in favor of orientation towards the European Union”. “Actually, any observer who understands the essence of political processes can detect these anomalies,” Putin’s spokesman said. 

In general, the main external “interested parties” have exchanged “courtesies” and each of them will continue to bend its line. And if in the case of Western partners it will be only words of support, Russia in Moldova acts not only in words, but also in deeds. And what will be in the end, we will see already on November 3, and most likely already in 2025, when parliamentary elections will be held. This battle is important because the country is a parliamentary republic, and whoever controls the legislature is the power. So the current campaign is a warm-up and a test of strength before the real battle.