On October 16, Brussels hosted the first-ever summit between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
This organization was established on 25 May 1981 as a platform for interaction between the states of the region. The main objectives of the organization are political coordination and economic integration between the participating states, as well as interaction in the field of regional security and defense in the Persian Gulf. The General Secretariat of the organization is located in Riyadh.
The summit was co-chaired by Charles Michel, Head of the EU Council, and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of Qatar. The forum’s agenda includes economic interaction, green policy and geopolitical challenges. The announcement of the summit noted that the EU would like to build “more strategic relations” with the Gulf countries at a time of “complex geopolitical environment.” This predetermined the meeting’s discussion of such issues as the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. And while in this discussion Arab leaders mainly focused on discussing Middle East conflicts – Israel and Hamas’ war in Gaza, as well as the Israeli military operation in Lebanon – Brussels, according to Politico, tried to persuade the Gulf monarchies to reconsider relations with Russia and join sanctions against Moscow. In essence, the twenty European heads of state present and their six Gulf partners had many complex issues to discuss, but not necessarily obvious common answers.
In this piece Ascolta analyzes the results of the first summit between the EU and the Gulf countries, and examines the positions of the parties on the most resonant geopolitical challenges in order to capture possible points of convergence and fundamental disagreements on key issues on the global agenda.
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Signs of real change
The European Union began actively building relations with other regional associations in 2022. In December of that year, European leaders met with colleagues from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and in 2023 – with representatives of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Now it is the turn of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Representatives of the six monarchies of the region arrived in Brussels for the first ever joint summit. Bahrain was represented by Prime Minister Crown Prince Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Kuwait by Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Saudi Arabia by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Oman – Deputy Prime Minister for International Cooperation, Asad bin Tariq Al Said; UAE – Deputy Emir of Dubai and Minister of Finance, Sheikh Maktoum bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum; Qatar – Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
The fact that Brussels welcomed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman or the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, was already an event in itself and a sign of real change. The visit of one of the most influential leaders of the Persian Gulf to Brussels was not confirmed until the last minute. Only on the eve of the summit it became known that 39-year-old bin Salman is expected among the participants. The last time Mohammed bin Salman was in Brussels was in 2015, when they discussed the creation of a global coalition to fight ISIS.
The ground for the current visit was prepared by the head of the European Council, Charles Michel, who visited the kingdom this summer (for which he was criticized in the European Union). In 2021, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that the Saudi crown prince approved the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist who lived in exile in the U.S. and was one of the regime’s fiercest critics. The murder, torture and dismemberment of the dissident in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul caused worldwide horror, briefly making the kingdom an international pariah. Riyadh blamed it on rogue agents and rejected U.S. intelligence reports.
Prince Mohammed’s rehabilitation was well underway in mid-2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine when Joe Biden traveled to Saudi Arabia. Then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and French and German leaders Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz also held talks in the kingdom with Prince Mohammed. Macron hosted the crown prince in Paris in July 2022, after Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis rolled out the red carpet in front of Prince Mohammed in Athens.
By the way, it has become known that bin Salman will not take part in the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan. Of all the participants of the organization, only Saudi Arabia will not be represented at the summit this time – the kingdom will send Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud to Kazan.
As for Qatar, the EU had unpleasant memories associated with Catargate, the corruption scandal that rocked the European Parliament in 2022.
The war in Ukraine and then the conflict in the Middle East changed the situation, bringing the Gulf states back to the center of the economic and geopolitical game. With their gas and oil reserves, they helped the Europeans, who were deprived of Russian hydrocarbons. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar began to play an increasingly important role as mediators in various conflicts. For example, the Emirates have helped organize eight rounds of prisoner-of-war exchanges in two years (the last ones took place in September and October, when Russia and Ukraine returned 198 prisoners each). Doha has also become, along with Turkey, the main mediator in the return of Russian and Ukrainian children to their families.
However, the main interaction between the EU and the GCC relates to economic cooperation. The EU is the second most important trading partner of the GCC countries. Their mutual trade in 2023 was estimated at €170 billion. Since 2020, energy imports from the GCC countries to the EU have more than tripled due to changes in supply chains after the start of Russia’s military full-scale invasion of Ukraine (GCC countries accounted for 75% of energy imports in 2023).
In part, the approaches to economic cooperation between the EU and the GCC were defined in a cooperation agreement signed back in 1989. This agreement, among other things, called for regular dialog on climate change and energy issues. At the same time, the EU-GCC Council was established, within the framework of which regular meetings at the level of foreign ministers take place. One of them, held in February 2022, adopted a joint cooperation program for 2022-2027. In 1990, the EU and the Gulf countries launched negotiations on a free trade agreement, but the consultations were suspended in 2008 due to disagreements.
Nevertheless, the EU is confident that cooperation with the GCC on trade and investment is possible. According to Reuters, in March, the UAE tacitly urged the EU to start negotiations on a separate trade pact. And in July, UAE Foreign Trade Minister Abdullah bin Tuq Al-Marri expressed hope that negotiations on a free trade agreement between the EU and the GCC would resume this year. In addition, the Gulf countries are interested in visa liberalization with the EU (currently, only UAE citizens do not require visas for short-term stays in the Union).
Emphasizing the importance of engagement with the Gulf, in June 2022, the EU for the first time appointed its special representative to the Gulf, Luigi Di Maio. On the eve of the summit, he said, “This joint summit did not arise suddenly because of the (Middle East) crisis, but was planned in advance to ensure cooperation in any kind of multilateral cooperation,” and added: “The main message is the summit itself: we need each other more than in the past to confront this new world order.”
In addition, Di Maio emphasized that strengthening ties between the European Union and the Gulf region will be key to countering the growing alliance between Russia and Iran and managing Middle East crises. “We are not only looking at regional security in the Gulf, but certainly our main common challenges are the Red Sea, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Iran and its behavior towards Israel and Russia,” Di Maio told Euractiv.
A look at the Middle East
Yet the main topic for discussion was geopolitics. In his opening speech, Charles Michel noted that today global stability is “once again threatened” by dramatic events in the Middle East and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which is why the EU and the GCC need to join forces. Al-Thani, referring to the crisis in the Middle East, noted that the Gulf countries cannot accept the fact that Israel “has made war crimes something legitimate.” He said an early solution to this conflict based on a two-state formula should be found and a ceasefire should be immediately established in Gaza and Lebanon.
The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jassem Mohammed al-Budeiwi, said he appreciated Brussels’ efforts to persuade the Israeli side to refrain from its actions against the Palestinian people and now also against the Lebanese: “The EU has been helping the Palestinians. There are countries that we really admire, we appreciate the fact that they recognized the Palestinian state. We hope that EU members, all 27 states, will work to recognize Palestine.”
By the way, the final communiqué of the summit included a paragraph on support for the two-state formula for resolving the conflict. At the same time, the European Union does not have a unified concept of overcoming the crisis in the Middle East by implementing the principle of “two states for two peoples”. In the EU’s understanding, it is, on the one hand, the state of Israel and, on the other hand, the state of Palestine within the borders that were roughly outlined more than 30 years ago in the agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has repeatedly emphasized that although Brussels is officially committed to the two-state solution, it is becoming more and more difficult to implement it every day.
The head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated the need for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. According to her, it is important to ensure both the protection of civilians in Gaza and the release of all Israeli hostages from Hamas captivity. This was also reflected in the communiqué.
Another item that was included in the outcome document was Iran, and more specifically, the importance of diplomatic contacts with Iran to de-escalate the Middle East and ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. According to al-Budeiwi, the GCC called on all players in the region to de-escalate. “We have asked everyone to refrain from any action that will fuel conflict, whether it is Iran or anyone else. We are trying to talk to Tehran, to send a signal to the authorities to de-escalate. Last week we had our first-ever meeting with the Iranians at the GCC ministerial level. Iran was clearly told that we want stability in the region, and we are hearing the same from Iran, which is calling for de-escalation,” the GCC Secretary General said.
Despite a number of points of convergence in views on the crisis in the Middle East, disagreements also emerged. As Politico noted, the Gulf states disagreed with a provision that condemned Iran for providing Moscow with missiles and drones. As the Financial Times noted, pro-Israel sentiment in Europe, especially in the Czech Republic and Hungary, showed that there is no unified approach in the EU on the issue. “It’s no secret that even within the EU there are different positions on these topics,” a senior European official told the publication.
The day after the meeting with the Persian Gulf countries, the EU leaders gathered for their two-day summit, which was devoted to migration policy. They did not ignore the Middle East, which once again demonstrated the difference of approaches within the EU. It was about the “freeze” of military cooperation with the Netanyahu government. The day before, Meloni announced the toughest among partners restrictions imposed on arms exports to Israel. The call to stop exporting weapons used in the Palestinian enclave was made, in particular, by French President Emmanuel Macron.
He said it is “morally impossible” to help Israel and call for peace talks at the same time. He also said Netanyahu should not ignore UN decisions and added: “He must not forget that his country was created by a UN decision.” Macron’s words then drew an angry reaction from Netanyahu, who said the French president was “disgraceful.” The French president then, in his typical style, went on the back foot, accusing his ministers and journalists of “unprofessionalism” for publicizing his controversial remarks about Israel, made in a closed-door cabinet meeting.
But the Saudi ambassador to Britain, Prince Khalid bin Bandar Al Saud, is not going to back down from his words. They called on the U.S. government to fulfill its threat and suspend arms deliveries to Israel, if the delivery of additional humanitarian aid to Gaza will not be allowed within the next 30 days. Recall that in a sharp letter, Washington issued an ultimatum, warning that future support for the country could be restricted if the growing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip is not resolved. Khalid bin Bandar criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s actions in the Gaza Strip as well as the escalating fighting in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah militants, saying America should “take a firm stance” and demand a comprehensive ceasefire.
The outspoken remarks by a close relative of Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, highlight the growing estrangement between the kingdom and Israel, despite hopes by the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government that the Abraham Accords – a series of US-brokered treaties signed between regional states four years ago – would normalize diplomatic relations between Arab states and Israel. In addition, Khalid bin Bandar called the threats from Iran, which were constantly talked about in the EU, exaggerated.
It can already be said that the issue of Western arms deliveries to Israel has become a debatable issue in the EU. European diplomacy chief Josep Borrell was more categorical, noting that the EU is split on this issue – some countries, on the contrary, are calling for an increase in deliveries. However, no collective decision on this issue was made at the summit. As explained by the representative of the European foreign policy service Peter Stano, it is not in the competence of the European Union to impose an embargo on arms supplies to any country. Such decisions are always taken at the level of individual states. In the final statement, the heads of state and government of the European Union condemned Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, but never used that word in relation to Israel.
Even in the EU’s “condemnation” of the attacks on UN personnel, there was no direct mention of Israel. A few quotes: “The European Council condemns in the strongest terms Iran’s attacks on Israel on October 1, 2024 and Iran’s serious destabilizing actions throughout the Middle East through terrorist and armed groups, including the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas, which pose a serious threat to regional stability,” the document reads. The EU summit then “condemns the attacks on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, which resulted in several peacekeepers being injured” – again without mentioning Israel. “The European Council reaffirms its full and unwavering support for UN Secretary General António Guterres. Nowhere should the UN Secretary General be declared persona non grata,” the EU leaders continued, alluding to Israel but, again, without mentioning it. This is such a “multi-purpose” from the EU.
Ukrainian “apple of discord”
There was even more disagreement between the parties regarding Russia. Al-Thani, commenting on the war in Ukraine, noted that the position of the GCC countries “is based on the principles of international law and the UN Charter, which uphold the sovereignty of states, their territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries.” According to him, the Gulf countries support all mediators who are trying to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
It is worth noting that the GCC countries take a neutral position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. On the one hand, they did not join the Western sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, all six countries voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution of March 2, 2022, which condemns Russian aggression against Ukraine and demands the “immediate, full and unconditional” withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the neighboring state.”
On the eve of the summit, Politico noted with a draft of the final communiqué that the parties were unable to form a unified approach to the war in Ukraine. In particular, the Gulf states disagreed with a provision that called for an end to aid to Russia and condemned Iran for providing Moscow with missiles and drones. Instead, they proposed more general language calling on all countries to stop supplying weapons to the conflict zone. In another section, the GCC countries proposed removing a paragraph pledging to increase cooperation to combat the circumvention of anti-Russian sanctions.
The United Arab Emirates has been a particular irritant for the West in this matter. In May, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU demanded that the UAE more actively fight companies that are trying to circumvent sanctions by supplying Russia with dual-use equipment. However, the Emirates did not officially confirm that they had received such demands from the West. At the same time, the UAE emphasized at the time that it had imposed a ban on the supply of certain dual-use goods to Russia.
The Gulf countries tried to emphasize in every possible way that they are “equidistant” from Russia and Ukraine, and that they are and will be in favor of a political settlement of the conflict. Although, as we have already noted, none of them has imposed sanctions against Russia, the Gulf states are actively sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine (Saudi Arabia alone has sent more than 130 tons of cargo). At the same time, the countries act as platforms for various negotiations. Thus, in August 2023, an international conference convened at the initiative of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was held in Saudi Jeddah. In June this year, the kingdom took part in the “peace summit” organized in Switzerland at the initiative of Kiev. However, the Saudi delegate refused to sign the final communiqué, considering it unbalanced. Kiev considered the possibility of involving Riyadh in the organization of the second “peace summit”. However, the plans were postponed, particularly because the Saudis insisted on Russia’s participation.
Overall, however, these disputes generally reflected the continuing difficulties faced by the EU and its Western allies in enlisting other countries in their coalition to support Ukraine and contain Russia. However, the sides did find common ground on a number of issues. According to the final communiqué, the sides condemned the massive missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is a pressing concern ahead of winter, although Russia was not explicitly mentioned in the text. This paragraph can also be regarded as a quite neutral statement, which practically duplicates earlier statements of this kind made at the UN level.
Meanwhile, the Brussels summit agenda was not limited to geopolitical issues. Both sides reaffirmed their growing partnership on energy, citing renewable energy, hydrogen, the annual climate summits and the 2015 Paris Agreement to keep global warming well below 2 degrees Celsius. Environmental issues are a sensitive and delicate topic for Gulf countries, given the Gulf’s oil wealth and the EU’s desire to divest from fossil fuels.
In this regard, it was surprising that the final document made no mention of deepening the EU’s fossil fuel relations with Qatar, a Gulf state that is selling increasing amounts of liquefied natural gas to Europe in an attempt to divest from Russian energy sources. But on the issue of a free trade area agreement with the EU, the Gulf states have not shown unanimity. After an attempt to strike a deal with the entire region failed in 2008, the EU has sought bilateral trade agreements with various Gulf countries. However, for the most part, this has been met with resistance from Gulf countries, which oppose the EU’s turn toward a case-by-case approach. Saudi Arabia, for example, is more interested in a region-wide agreement, while the United Arab Emirates is actively seeking a bilateral agreement with the EU, hoping to start trade talks with Brussels before the end of the year.
In general, commenting on the results of the summit, the Qatari edition of The New Arab skeptically assessed the results of the talks in Brussels, noting that they are unlikely to bring “anything more than general words about commitments to improve cooperation”.
Oil-scented friendship
But it is not only the EU that is courting the Gulf states. The Russian Federation is also in this game. In September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Riyadh, where he took part in a ministerial meeting in the format of the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council. Sergey Lavrov held talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and GCC Secretary General Jassim Mohamed al-Budeiwi. The Russian minister noted how important it is for Moscow to develop relations with the Gulf countries, particularly in the fields of economy, technology and trade. Mr. Al-Budeiwi reiterated: “All Gulf countries view the task of strengthening cooperation with Russia as of paramount importance in light of the important historical and strategic relations that bind us.
The format of the strategic dialog between Russia and the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Oman) was launched in 2011. But only the seventh meeting of foreign ministers has now taken place – it’s all about the 2016-2022 pause, which was caused by an internal conflict between the council members: Qatar on one side and the Saudi-led coalition on the other. Riyadh and the rest of the GCC countries, as well as Egypt and Jordan, imposed an air and ground blockade on Doha. Saudi Arabia also tried to isolate Qatar in the diplomatic arena. However, in 2021, the countries announced reconciliation. Meetings of the GCC-Russia Council resumed in 2022.
Trade and economic relations between Russia and the GCC countries today have good dynamics. This is especially true for oil products, food and agricultural products. The volume of food trade between Russia and the GCC countries in 2023 exceeded $1.6 billion. This figure has increased 1.7 times since 2017. In general, the level of trade turnover between Moscow and individual Gulf states has increased by tens of percent. Thus, in 2023, trade between Russia and the UAE reached $11.2 billion, while in 2021 it was $5.3 billion. With Saudi Arabia, the trade turnover in 2023, according to the kingdom’s media, reached $3.3 billion.
In May of this year, Oman’s Minister of Economy Saeed bin Mohammed al-Sakri announced that relations between Moscow and the Gulf monarchies were reaching a fundamentally new level. In addition, the oil aspect is certainly important in Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia’s possible decision to increase oil supplies against the backdrop of falling demand in the world could undermine Russian military power. Saudi Arabia’s energy minister has warned that oil prices could fall to $50 a barrel if OPEC+ member countries, which are violating the agreements, do not adhere to the agreed production limits. Since Russia is already selling its oil at a reduced price and with increased production costs, low oil prices could negatively impact its ability to finance the war in Ukraine. Russian oil is both a source of strength from which the war is financed and a potential weakness – because of its sensitivity to price fluctuations on the world market.
Saudi Arabia has become increasingly frustrated over the failure of other oil-producing countries to coordinate supply cuts to boost oil prices to around $100 a barrel (now around $70). Traders predict that Saudi Arabia may respond by increasing oil exports to capture more market share and make more profits even if prices fall. Riyadh is well aware that Russian companies are not complying with production cuts, so they are developing their own plans. Therefore, the goodwill of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries is extremely important for Russia.
During Putin’s visit to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in December 2023, oil prices were the key issue of the talks. As far as the Gulf countries are concerned, Putin’s priorities remain ways of circumventing sanctions and building economic ties. Again, aimed at reducing the negative impact of the same sanctions. For Moscow, the war in the Gaza Strip itself is just a fortunate event that distracts the world’s attention from its actions in Ukraine and allows it to promote its diplomatic capabilities in the “global South”. The Kremlin wants to be on the same political page with the GCC countries, advocating an end to escalation in the region. Russia maintains contacts with both Israel and various Palestinian factions, including Fatah (which runs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank) and Hamas.
Hamas delegates have already visited Russia four times since the beginning of the war in Gaza: the last visit to Moscow was by the group’s deputy politburo chief, Musa Abu Marzouk. In mid-August, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited Russia. Moscow’s relations with Israel can hardly be called warm, but they remain at least working – the last telephone talks between the leaders of Russia and Israel took place in December 2023. It is no coincidence that Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdurrahman Al-Thani openly states that Doha endorses “Russia’s position in support of a just solution to the Palestinian problem, especially during the recent developments in the Gaza Strip.”
There is a growing rivalry of powers in the world, and the United States or the European Union no longer look like a force that can manage everything. So the Saudis, the Emirates, Qatar, and other Gulf countries are doing exactly the same thing as Turkey, for example: they are saying, “You are not satisfied with something? Fine – then we go to your competitors”. Therefore, the main geopolitical players have less and less “stick” and more and more “carrot” in their attitude towards them. Russia, like China, does not have a powerful military presence in the Persian Gulf, unlike the United States, and its leverage over the GCC countries is relatively small. Therefore, the monarchies can always show the West how strongly they are disposed toward Moscow and Beijing, for example, by joining the BRICS and concluding certain agreements with them in various spheres in order to encourage Washington and the West in general to show more courteous attention to the Gulf monarchies.
The same way they act towards Russia, blackmailing it with falling oil prices and showing Moscow its dependence and vulnerability. Take the situation with Saudi Arabia’s “accession” or “non-accession” to BRICS. When it was profitable for the Saudis, they applied to join the organization and then quickly put the issue on pause, leaving many puzzled: did Saudi Arabia join BRICS or not?
Any alliances and agreements in the Middle East are only temporary and situational. Therefore, the Gulf monarchies will not dance to anyone’s tune, but will maintain an even distance from all big states, without sending any signals that could be misinterpreted.
