Vietnam: behind the scenes of the intra-party struggle

A multifaceted legacy

Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam and former President of Vietnam, who died on 19 July 2024 at the age of 80, was undoubtedly the country’s most influential leader since Ho Chi Minh.

Trong was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 2011 and was re-elected to the post in 2016 and 2021. He became the country’s president in 2018, breaking party tradition following the death of then-President Tran Dai Quang. Chong left the presidency in 2021, but his election that same year for a rare third term as secretary-general made him the party’s longest-serving leader since Le Zouan, who held the post from 1960 until his death in 1986.

Speaking of Nguyen Phu Trong’s extensive political legacy, the anti-corruption system, nicknamed the ‘blazing furnace,’ is particularly noteworthy. A massive anti-corruption campaign in the spirit of ‘no no-go areas, no exceptions, whoever it is’ was launched in the early 2010s and is still ongoing. During the campaign, two presidents, five of the 18 members of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee, the head of the National Assembly and two deputy prime ministers were sacked. In 2021, the CPV reaffirmed its commitment to fighting corruption at its 13th congress. Later, in 2023, it adopted the National Anti-Corruption Strategy until 2030. The Communist Party of Vietnam considers preventing and combating corruption activities as an important task in the country’s renewal to protect the Party and the ‘socialist rule of law’, building a more efficient and fair public administration. As a result of the anti-corruption fight, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s (SRV) ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index increased by ten points between 2013 and 2023, bringing Vietnam to 83rd place out of 180 countries and territories. 

The toughness of the campaign was positioned as an attempt by Vietnam to increase its attractiveness to foreign investors in the face of intense competition between the US and China, as well as to ensure the party’s legitimacy in the face of numerous scandals. However, this campaign also had the opposite negative effect. Fear among bureaucrats caused them to procrastinate in making decisions and approving legal documents necessary for business development.

Another significant achievement of Vietnam in recent years that can be safely credited to Chong is the success in the economy. Under his leadership, the country’s GDP per capita more than doubled. He was the initiator of opening up the once isolated country to foreign investment. Vietnam has become one of the most trade-dependent economies in the world, signing a number of free trade agreements with both the West and Asian countries. As of the end of 2023, the value of Vietnam’s exports was roughly equal to the size of its economy, and the former enemy of the United States has become its largest export market. 

Today, Vietnam is a developing country that has chosen the path of progressive development and thoughtful reforms. Unbiased observers who have first-hand knowledge of Vietnam know that it has been making significant progress over the past few years, becoming one of Asia’s fastest growing economies. Its gross domestic product in 2023 surpassed $430 billion, ranking 5th among ASEAN countries and 35th in the world. Since 2009, Viet Nam’s GDP per capita has almost doubled, and poverty rates are declining markedly. Health insurance coverage has increased from over 81 per cent in 2016 to 92 per cent in 2022, demonstrating the government’s strong focus on the social sector. 

A key indicator such as the country’s Human Development Index has steadily improved – almost doubling in thirty years. In 2022, Vietnam’s score was 0.726, moving the country into the high human development group and ranking 107th out of 193 countries. It cannot be overlooked that the impressive economic results were achieved against the backdrop of an active foreign policy. 

Since 2016, Vietnam has called its foreign policy ‘bamboo diplomacy’ in honour of a plant native to East Asia that has a trunk and flexible branches growing on strong roots. Vietnam chose this name to emphasise the distinctiveness of its foreign policy approach. The ‘bamboo diplomacy’ was first proposed by Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, at the Vietnam Diplomatic Conference in 2016, and later and put forward as a core principle of foreign policy at the first National Congress on Foreign Affairs in 2021. 

In his speech, Trong made the following statements about ‘bamboo diplomacy’: ‘Vietnam’s diplomacy is soft and wise but persistent and resolute; flexible and creative but consistent, valiant, steadfast, united and humane but resolute and patient in upholding national interests; flexible and creative but consistent, valiant, steadfast, united and humane but resolute and patient in upholding national independence and people’s happiness.’ In this regard, it can be said that Vietnam’s foreign policy is formed within the framework of national interests and is far from ideological approaches, having a realistic orientation. Therefore, Nguyen Phu Trong was more interested in relations with the outside world than his predecessors and built relations with both US presidents, Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

In 2015, Chong became the first party leader to visit the United States, where he met with former President Barack Obama at the White House. At the time, Obama said the ‘complicated history’ between the US and Vietnam was being replaced by a relationship based on mutual economic and defence interests in a region increasingly wary of China’s rise. For his part, Trong told Obama that the US and Vietnam have managed to rise above the past and become friends. US President Joe Biden echoed these sentiments. He visited Vietnam during his trip to Asia in 2023 to record Washington and Hanoi’s relationship reaching a new level. 

During the White House chief’s visit, the two sides signed a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ agreement, which in Vietnam is considered the highest degree of co-operation with a foreign country. Until recently, it had such agreements with China, India, South Korea and Russia. And so, as Western media noted, there was plenty of symbolism in the move: some 50 years after the last American soldier left Vietnamese soil, the US president came to the country and signed a document that will bring the former enemies as close as possible. ‘We can trace a 50-year path of progress between our countries – from conflict to normalisation and now to this new elevated status,’ Joe Biden could not hide his joy at the work done. 

In his opinion, the level of interaction with Hanoi, which has been put on paper, should demonstrate to the US Indo-Pacific partners, as well as to the whole world that ‘the United States is a Pacific nation and is not going anywhere’. Nguyen Phu Trong, with whom Mr Biden had his main meeting in Hanoi, fully agreed with the American guest and rejoiced with him that his country’s relations with the US had ‘reached the highest level’. Despite the general conclusion of the Western media that the insistence on rapprochement with Vietnam is caused by Washington’s desire to find a new counterweight to China in Southeast Asia, Mr Biden hastened to assure that the US steps are not at all aimed at containing or isolating China. 

Biden was very cautious about China for a reason. After all, this country, with which Vietnam once fought a war, remains its largest trading partner, but at the same time, relations between the two countries are again experiencing bad times. In particular, there are unresolved territorial problems between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea. Therefore, the leader of the local Communist Party and the White House host ‘emphasised their unwavering support for the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, without threats or use of force’, while calling for ‘freedom of navigation and flight and unimpeded legal trade in the South China Sea’. Following Joe Biden, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also rushed to Vietnam. 

In November 2015, when Xi Jinping visited Vietnam for the first time as China’s leader and leader of the Communist Party of China, he promised that reciprocal visits by the two countries’ general secretaries would be held annually. But Beijing and Hanoi have subsequently gone off schedule. For example, Mr Xi’s own previous trip to Vietnam took place six years ago. But in 2022, a long break in face-to-face communication, partly related to the coronavirus pandemic, was interrupted with a visit to Beijing by Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

As early as 15 years ago, China and Vietnam had established a comprehensive strategic partnership relationship. But since then, Beijing has wanted more – to include Vietnam in its concept of a ‘community of common destiny’. And Hanoi agreed to ‘support the initiative to build a common future community for humanity.’ Although some media outlets wrote at the time that with the current visit, Xi Jinping is trying to cement the importance of Sino-Vietnamese relations and even show their greater significance than Hanoi’s ties with Washington. In other words, China wants to demonstrate a special relationship with Vietnam that is separate from the comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and the United States. However, Vietnam has always preached the idea of a flexible foreign policy based on the four no’s: no military alliances, no support for one country against another, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory, and no use of force in international relations. 

So, even after joining the ‘community of common destiny,’ Hanoi will continue to have absolutely equal and equal relations with all the countries it needs, no matter how much China seeks to be a special partner. After Chong’s death, the Chinese Communist Party called him ‘a close comrade and sincere friend,’ China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Chong and President Xi Jingping ‘actively promoted the continuous development of China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic co-operation and partnership. The CPC, the Chinese government and the Chinese people will always miss Chong.

Another strategic partner of Vietnam is Russia. President Vladimir Putin arrived in Hanoi 6 months after Xi Jinping’s visit, and 9 months after Joe Biden’s visit. This was Putin’s fifth visit to Vietnam. The Russian president received a much more subdued welcome in Hanoi than in North Korea, where Vladimir Putin received an unusually lavish reception and from where he travelled to Vietnam. On 20 June, Putin held talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Tho Lam and Vietnamese Communist Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong. As a result, more than a dozen agreements on bilateral co-operation in education, medicine and energy were signed. In addition, the parties decided to establish a nuclear science and technology centre in Vietnam, which will be built by Rosatom. None of the documents made public are related to defence, but Vietnamese President Tho Lam said other agreements were reached that will remain secret. 

According to the NYT, however, Putin’s visit was an opportunity for Vietnam to strengthen ties with Russia, its most important defence partner. Despite improving relations with the United States, last year Vietnam was still looking for clandestine ways to buy Russian military equipment in defiance of US sanctions. Russian weapons make up 60 to 70 percent of Vietnam’s defence arsenal. Russian T-90 tanks, which were the last known major Russian arms purchase by Vietnam in 2016, form the backbone of Vietnam’s armoured forces. This means that Vietnam will continue to depend on Russia in the coming years. In recent months, Hanoi has turned to countries such as South Korea, Japan and the Czech Republic as alternative sources of weapons. 

It is also trying to build up its own defence industry. The US has been active in offering Vietnam more weapons and senior officials have visited the country in recent months. But analysts say the top echelons of Vietnam’s military leadership remain suspicious of Washington. Separately, Putin met with Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, at whose invitation the Russian president arrived in Hanoi. At the meeting, Putin said that relations with Vietnam are among the priorities of Russian foreign policy and expressed gratitude to Vietnamese friends for their balanced position on the Ukrainian crisis. As part of its neutral foreign policy, Hanoi has consistently abstained from voting in the UN on all resolutions condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine, demonstrating its neutrality on the conflict. 

Vietnam is one of four Southeast Asian states that declined to attend the peace summit in Switzerland. The Russian leader’s visit to Hanoi drew condemnation from Washington, with the US saying that Vietnam welcoming Putin would normalise ‘blatant violations of international law’ referring to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Not even two days after the end of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink arrived in the country. During the meeting with the distinguished guest, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, in particular, said that Hanoi considers America a strategic partner and is ready to develop this partnership in every possible way. The representative of the State Department, for his part, noted that US-Vietnamese relations ‘have never been stronger than now’, because ‘a successful Vietnam meets America’s national interests’. Actually, it is not a secret that the USA, as well as Russia, are strategic partners to Vietnam. And this does not embarrass anyone at all. Even special terms have been coined for this – diversification and multi-vectorism.

Nguyen Phu Trong’s meeting with Putin was the last of his meetings, and not only at the highest level. After that, he could not attend official events, including the official presentation of the book, which contains some of his speeches. The day before his death, the Vietnamese government said Trong needed time to focus on active treatment. During this time, President Lam would take over the duties of running the party’s central committee, politburo and secretariat. On the same day, the government awarded Chong the Order of the Gold Star, Vietnam’s highest honour.

Chong’s death, according to most experts, marked the end of the era of Chong’s version of socialism. Now the big question is: how will his legacy be managed by Vietnam’s new leadership? 

Presidential rumpus or the choice of a successor

Supreme power in Vietnam is organised in such a way that it is distributed among the so-called ‘four pillars’ – the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the Prime Minister, the President and the Chairman of the National Assembly. The most powerful of these four is the General Secretary of the Communist Party. The position of president is representative in nature, yet the head of state is also vested with considerable power and largely provides balance within the Communist Party. This balance of power is dictated by the tradition of the CPV to make decisions on issues of principle, by consensus, taking into account the opinions of various political groups of influence.

However, the stability of political power in the country has clearly broken down over the past almost two years. Vietnam has changed three presidents of the country. There were talks about the depressurisation of the country’s one-party political system and even the possibility of plunging it into a new phase of political turmoil. However, this did not happen, simply against the backdrop of the General Secretary’s deteriorating health, there was a struggle for power within the party top brass. In many respects it reminded intra-party struggle in the Soviet Union in the 20s of the twentieth century, though with Vietnamese specifics.

The first thunder rumbled in January 2023, when Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigned. The resignation of Vietnamese President Suan Phuc, who was appointed to his post in April 2021 and had not even served as head of state for two years, was a major political sensation in the life of the 95-million-strong Southeast Asian nation, a big surprise to many. According to leaks that later appeared in Vietnamese media, the CPV Politburo at its closed-door meeting voted in favour of removing Nguyen Xuan Phuc from the presidency. This prefigured his resignation, which was described as voluntary. Nguyen Xuan Phuc ‘assumed the political responsibility of the leader when many officials, including two deputy prime ministers and three ministers, committed irregularities and shortcomings’ in the Vietnamese state’s COVID-19 epidemic prevention and control campaign. 

Although details of the corruption scandal in Hanoi, of which the head of state was a victim, have not been disclosed, more than 100 senior and mid-level officials, including former Health Minister Nguyen Thanh Long and former Science and Technology Minister Chu Ngoc Anh, have previously been prosecuted. In addition, in the first days of 2023, the scandal led to the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam and another deputy prime minister, Pham Binh Minh. As experts point out, interpreting Vietnamese politics is never easy – the Communist Party makes all its decisions behind closed doors. There were several versions of Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s resignation. According to one of them, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was ‘stressed’ by high-ranking officials who were considered pro-Western and were closely linked to domestic business circles. According to another, he was clearing the way for his new protégé Vo Van Thuong, whom he saw as his successor. 

It should be noted that Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-corruption campaign was not only aimed at eradicating corruption. Nguyen Phu Trong’s favourite technique was to intensify the purges in the CPV and turn the corruption issue into a tool in the struggle for power. Thus, Le Hong Hiep, a researcher at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said Phuc’s resignation could also be linked to political infighting. ‘It is mainly related to corruption investigations, but we cannot rule out the possibility that his political rivals also wanted to remove him from office for political reasons,’ he told Agence France-Presse, adding: “Communist Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong, is due to step down in 2026. Some politicians will try to get the top prize and because of the competition from their rivals, in this case Mr Phuc is one of them, they may want to remove him to clear the way for another candidate to get the top post.”

Following the resignation of former President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, a protégé of the CPV General Secretary, his eventual successor, Vietnamese Communist Party rising star Vo Van Thuong, became Vietnam’s new president.

On taking office in March 2023, Mr Thuong, who at 53 became Vietnam’s youngest president, was adamant that he was ‘determined to fight corruption’. But he appears to have been the one who got caught up in it. At the time, Vietnam labelled the second presidential resignation in a short period of time as another political earthquake and a new phase of political uncertainty in the fifty-year rule of the Communist Party. According to official language, he was sent down for ethics violations and certain ‘shortcomings’ that ‘caused negative public reaction, which negatively affected the reputation of the party, the state and him personally.’ Analysts did not ignore the fact that the departure of Vietnam’s 12th president came just days after the arrest of the former head of Quang Nai province on suspicion of corruption and the start of an investigation into a ‘financial scam worth several billion dollars’ in Ho Chi Minh City, where Mr Thuong had held a number of positions in the past. And this spring, Parliament Speaker Vuong Dinh Hue also lost his post due to unnamed ‘irregularities and shortcomings’. 

However, there were a number of questions about Vo Van Thuong’s resignation. Firstly, how did the protégé of the powerful General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and his potential successor become the shortest-lived president and ‘caught up’ in corruption?

Many saw the hand of General Tho Lam behind it. He became Minister of Public Security in 2016, and in 2021 he was inducted into the Central Committee Politburo and is also the deputy head of the party’s anti-corruption steering committee. It should be said that in 2019, during Trong’s illness, when he suffered a stroke, the reins of the anti-corruption campaign were taken over by To Lam, who had already charted his way to the top of Vietnamese power. It cannot be ruled out that the ‘corrupt’ resignation of ex-president Nguyen Xuan Phuc in January 2023 was also his handiwork, and so to speak, the first test of strength in an attempt to clear the way to the top. Later, social media reported that after Phuc’s resignation, Tho Lam ran as a rival to Thuong for the presidency, but lost the vote. 

However, as they say revenge is a dish served cold. After waiting for time, To Lam gave Vo Van Thuong a blow that sent him into a ‘political knockout’. He brought to light dirt from 12 years ago, when Vo Van Thuong was secretary of the party committee in Quang Ngai province. There, allegations of fraud and bribery surfaced, against officials and representatives of property companies. “We still don’t know who wanted to remove Thuong. But all eyes are on the public security minister because he is quite ruthless in eliminating rivals. He is clearly seeking the top post,’ Zachary Abuza, an expert on Southeast Asia at the National War College in Washington, D.C., said of Tho Lam in March. ‘I doubt that when the secretary-general launched the anti-corruption campaign, he had the foresight to foresee that it would lead to such punishment of such high-ranking officials,’ Linh Nguyen, a leading analyst on Vietnam at Control Risks, said in a Bloomberg commentary. ‘I have a feeling that Nguyen Phu Trong is losing credibility by delegating more and more powers to the Anti-Corruption Committee and the Ministry of Public Security.’

It must be said that Tho Lam himself, as it turns out – is far from ‘saintly’. He too is remembered for a high-profile scandal. In 2021, when Vietnam was under strict coronavirus restrictions, the minister flew to London on a business trip and was filmed there eating a steak covered with edible gold in a fashionable restaurant of the famous and extremely epathetic Turkish chef and restaurateur Nusret Gokce, also known as Salt Bae. The cost of the dish was about $2 thousand, that is not only many times more than the average monthly salary of a Vietnamese resident in $150, but also more than the salary of the minister himself for a month: the heads of Vietnamese departments receive about $600-800 without taking into account a number of allowances. The scandal caused a storm of outrage in Vietnam at the time, with many questioning how a high-ranking official could afford extravagant meals during an anti-corruption campaign and in the midst of a pandemic. However, Lam not only steadied himself and remained in office, but also became a presidential candidate. 

According to party regulations, the new president had to serve a full term as a Politburo member, which meant that among the potential contenders were, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, National Assembly Speaker Vuong Dinh Hue, CPV Secretariat permanent member Truong Thi Mai and Public Security Minister Tho Lam. Chinh and Hue were hardly interested, as their current positions give more power than the presidency. That left To Lam and Mai as the most likely options. 

At 66, Lam was very much interested in the position, as it could potentially allow him to secure an exception to the party’s age limit rule and run for the top post in 2026. It would seem that his current position as minister of public security is extremely influential, especially in the context of the CPP’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign. In contrast, the role of the president is largely one of ceremonial duties. Still, the presidency is seen as a possible stepping stone to the party leadership role that Chong has held. And given his health condition, the post of president became even more appealing. 

Another option would be for the party to change its own rules and appoint another politician who had not yet completed a full term as a Politburo member, but who could potentially bring stability to the system. In this scenario, potential candidates could include Ho Chi Minh City Party Secretary Nguyen Van Nen or Defence Minister Phan Van Ziang. However, the potential candidates to replace Trong and consequently their factions would never have supported such a decision, as they did not want to see the emergence of a new and viable challenger who could potentially hinder their own aspirations for the party’s top post in 2026.

In the end, the intra-party struggle was won by To Lam. He was nominated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam for the presidency in May 2024. The entire top leadership ‘must be truly united, truly exemplary, sincere and devoted to the common cause,’ the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee said in announcing Tho Lam’s nomination. And a few days later, Vietnam’s National Assembly passed a resolution to elect General Tho Lam as president to serve until 2026. According to the law, the head of state, the speaker of the National Assembly and the prime minister are elected by the parliament.

Tho Lam: at the pinnacle of power

Political life in Vietnam takes place mostly behind closed doors, and even experienced observers sometimes cannot give an accurate forecast of the development of certain political events. The division of the Communist Party into reformers, technocrats, conservatives, party ideologues, security forces, and groups based on foreign policy orientations is quite acceptable. At certain periods, the struggle between these factions does become more intense, especially in the run-up to the CPV congresses. Nevertheless, the common goal that unites them is to preserve the leading role of the Communist Party, the existing political system and to implement the decisions of the CPV congresses aimed at building a developed, socially oriented Vietnam. 

The country’s new President Tho Lam is no different from his predecessors in this regard. In his inaugural speech, Tho Lam said Vietnam ‘has never had such resources, reputation and international standing as it has today’, which are the most important things for him to fulfil his duties. He cited ‘a prosperous people, a strong country, democracy, justice, civilisation’ as his main goals. Tho Lam reaffirmed the country’s course of diversifying foreign relations and promised to pay special attention to the national defence and security strategy.

The election of To Lam as president was greeted with wariness by Vietnamese human rights activists. As head of the Ministry of Public Security, human rights organisations criticised Vietnam for persecuting and intimidating critics of the government. Now, in their view, the country’s ruling politburo is dominated by security officials and they expect further repression and censorship in Vietnam. It must be said that criticising the government is one of the gravest crimes in Vietnam. It is the policy of the ruling party. Therefore, whoever is appointed president only implements the party line drawn up by Nguyen Phu Trong. 

Vietnamese President Tho Lam is considered a supporter of the conservative line who often appeals to Ho Chi Minh’s legacy and opponents accuse him of ruling with a ‘hard hand’ and suppressing dissidents in such a manner. When a scandalous video emerged in 2021 showing Lam eating a steak encrusted with gold, the Vietnamese noodle seller who spoofed the scene was accused of spreading anti-state propaganda and jailed for five years. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 160 people are currently imprisoned for peacefully exercising their civil and political rights. According to the organisation, in the first 10 months of 2023, courts have convicted at least 28 human rights activists and sentenced them to long prison terms.

The anti-corruption campaign conducted by the ‘hard hand’ of To Lam had the downside of paralysing the government bureaucracy, which, fearing accountability, began to delay obtaining the necessary permits for businesses. The delay in business expansion due to bureaucratic delays threatens to weigh on an economy struggling with uneven export growth and sluggish consumer activity, which has led some companies to downsize or even cease operations altogether. The death sentence handed down to the head of Van Thinh Phat, a major property developer, Thuyong Lan, who was found guilty of embezzlement, bribery and banking irregularities has shocked the country. The total embezzlement amounted to $12.5bn (£10bn), equivalent to almost 3% of Vietnam’s gross domestic product, but prosecutors claimed the total damage caused by the fraud was $27bn. 

Lan was found guilty of defrauding Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB) of money for more than a decade. She was tried along with 85 others, including former central bankers and government officials, as well as former SCB executives. All these events have alarmed foreign companies and investors who were in a state of confusion. According to Bloomberg, one of the energy company’s executives said that investigations and sudden resignations of top executives make it difficult for him and other foreign investors to realise business plans. This is because government officials, fearing scrutiny, are afraid to approve legal documents and expected new regulations. In eloquent evidence of this, Vietnam used less than a third of its budget in the first half of 2024, even slower than the previous year.

As president, Tho Lam established himself as a proponent of a softer approach to fighting corruption, which aims not to hinder economic growth, Such efforts should not lead to the ‘wrongful conviction’ of the innocent and should create conditions for a stable environment for the country’s development,’ local media quoted him as saying. 

The death of Nguyen Phu Trong in July 2024 opened the way for Tho Lam to the highest office in the country. And already on 3 August, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam elected President To Lam as General Secretary of the Central Committee. He became the third leader of the country to combine the highest state and party positions. The position of general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and president of the country was previously combined by Ho Chi Minh, founder of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The two top posts were held by Nguyen Phu Trong from 2018-2021. The decision to elect Lam was made unanimously, Vietnam+ newspaper said. The election took place at a meeting in Hanoi. Tho Lam promised to ‘inherit and adhere to the revolutionary achievements’ of former president and general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. The new general secretary will lead the Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat until 2026. 

In economic policy, the top priority will be to stimulate the economy as the government increases public spending and attracts foreign investors. ‘The government needs to solve one important problem: how to discipline and punish people for corruption without harming markets and the economy,’ said Tran Dinh Tien, a member of Vietnam’s National Advisory Council on Financial and Monetary Policies. According to most experts, there will be no change in economic policy and it will remain as it has been for the past twenty years. As for foreign policy, Lam continues his policy of ‘bamboo diplomacy’ in an attempt to balance geopolitical tensions. Deepening ties with Washingtonos, Lam is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June during a visit designed to build on the longstanding Hanoi-Moscow relationship. 

Vietnamese media have recently reported that Tho Lam will relinquish his role as president, thereby strengthening collective power sharing. According to National Assembly spokesman Bui Van Cuong, parliament will vote on a new president as early as October. By reducing Lam’s role to party leader – the most powerful political role in the country – Vietnam will revert to its ‘four-table’ governance structure, with individual leaders holding the positions of general secretary, prime minister, president and National Assembly speaker. This means that Vietnam’s consensus-based system of governance will continue in both foreign and domestic policy matters, albeit perhaps with less ideology and ideals.