65 years ago, on 1 September 1969, a group of officers led by 27-year-old communications captain Muammar Gaddafi came to power in Libya. A week later, this almost unknown man from a poor Bedouin family would rise to the rank of colonel and rule the country for 42 years. Muammar Al-Qadhafi was wrong to believe that the people were on his side. But the people of Libya were wrong to think that the dictator’s death would bring them relief. After a three-year ceasefire and attempts to establish a government legitimate to all factions, the country fell back into the chaos of a civil war that lasted until 2020. Today Libya has a fragile peace and two governments, in the west in Tripoli and in the east in Tobruk.
The first presidential elections in Libya’s history were to be held in December 2021, but due to the ‘unstable situation’ they never took place. And there is no prospect of them taking place in the near future. The Libyan political crisis, consistently moving from stagnation to transformation, is preventing the normal development of statehood, the restoration of civil peace and the economic prosperity of the rich North African country. Let us try to understand why this happened, what influence the internal elite struggle has on the situation in the country, and what is the role of external players in these processes.
In this article Ascolta analyses the internal political situation in Libya after more than a decade of war, as well as attempts to establish and maintain a fragile peace. Such a look at Libya – once one of the most developed and stable countries in the region – allows us to understand a number of political, social and economic processes that have an impact on both North Africa and the geopolitical situation as a whole.
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Gaddafi’s legacy
The personality of Muammar Gaddafi has always been shrouded in mystery. On 1 September 1969, taking advantage of the long absence in the country of King Idris, as well as information that the king intends to abdicate and transfer power to his son Hassan, ‘Free Officers’ with the support of Egyptian intelligence seized key military and civilian facilities in Libya and announced the deposition of the king. That same day, hundreds of thousands of Libyans heard for the first time the voice of their new leader, whom they had not chosen. Captain Gaddafi – he would not be promoted to colonel until a week later – addressed his fellow citizens by radio. Having taken control of barracks, airports, radio stations and the royal palace in Tripoli, the rebels also captured the heir to the throne, Hassan. The latter did not tempt fate and immediately recognised the legitimacy of the new government.
Omar Shalhi, who managed to escape abroad, tried to persuade the British and Americans to intervene, but without success. King Idris himself prudently decided never to return to Libya again. He settled in Cairo and, enjoying the hospitality of the Egyptian authorities, lived safely until the age of 93. The almost bloodless coup did not provoke protests in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica or Fezzan, the three historic regions of Libya that had enjoyed considerable autonomy and competition under Idris. ‘The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) – as the self-proclaimed Libyan government was called – immediately declared that all of the country’s international treaties would remain in force, just as the property of foreigners would remain intact.
To finally deprive the ‘Western partners’ of the temptation to interfere, a Soviet squadron approached Libyan shores – the USSR leadership, which was actively developing its presence in Africa, had its own views on this country. As a result, the proclaimed Libyan Arab Republic quickly gained diplomatic recognition, and the informal leader of the SRC, Muammar Gaddafi, was able to assemble a truly united Libya out of three disparate parts.
Since antiquity the land of pastoralist tribes, in medieval times a colony of the Ottoman Empire, then Italian, later British in the middle of the last century, it gained independence under the symbolic rule of its first and last king, Idris. In reality, all the seaports and airfields were used for military purposes by Britain, in the suburbs of Tripoli – the US military base, France has bridgeheads in the south of the country. But the main value is Libya’s oil. It ranks first in Africa in terms of reserves. In the 1950s, the Americans explored and started pumping, and they made huge profits from production.
In 1970s, the backward semi-wild country became the most developing in Africa – 95% of its economy was built on oil exports. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a blessed time for Libya. A time of unprecedentedly high oil prices. Gaddafi nationalised the banks and all oil production. Every self-respecting Libyan kept a small or medium-sized business: a shop, a shop, manufacturing. Trade missions grew like mushrooms. Wages were high, taxes were low or non-existent. Subsidies to buy big things, flats, sometimes free of charge. Utility bills were completely absent, free medical care, excellent medicines, because falsification of medicines is a capital offence. During Gaddafi’s rule, hundreds of thousands of people moved from slums and tents to sturdy stone houses, got access to education and modern health care. Under Gaddafi, Libya doubled its GDP and entered the Guinness Book of World Records as the country with the lowest inflation.
The country is small – only six million people, but there is a lot of money, and Gaddafi began to implement his foreign policy fantasies – to take the neighbours under the wing of some kind of united Libya. He demanded negotiations from Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan and even Malta. It did not arouse enthusiasm, it came to clarification of relations and even small local wars. He expelled Italian colonists from the country and took their fertile plots, but never made the country’s agriculture independent of state subsidies. He fought tribal chiefs and redrew the boundaries of their domains, but only undermined the social structure and destroyed the remnants of civil society.
Fearing a military coup, he disbanded the army and special services, replacing them with a popular militia, but actually relied on mercenaries. Finally, he abolished the traditional institutions of power – the government and parliament – and proclaimed the Jamahiriya, a state of absolute people’s power. It was supposed to be governed by people’s committees, but in practice it degenerated into a totalitarian personal dictatorship. According to the ‘Charter of Honour’ adopted in 1997, any assistance to perpetrators of crimes against the regime or lack of zeal in catching them could be punished not only by the family of the perpetrator, but also by the whole village or town. Those accused of treason were executed by hanging, often with the execution broadcast on television.
The country’s economy was extremely dependent on world oil and commodity prices, and Tripoli, with its huge oil reserves, never became a second Dubai. By the early 2010s, with a population of just over 6 million and annual oil revenues of about $32 billion, Libya’s unemployment rate was as high as 30 per cent. Muammar Gaddafi’s unquestionable successes were in two areas only: continuous self-aggrandisement and personal enrichment. Huge portraits of the leader stared at Libyans from building facades, banners and lampposts. Smaller portraits adorned hotel lobbies, school offices, T-shirts and even wristwatches. Pages carved in stone from the Green Book – Gaddafi’s main work, compulsory reading for all Libyans – were installed along the roads. Against this backdrop, discontent was maturing in the country, with food prices soaring and youth unemployment reaching prohibitive levels. Other Libyan grievances against Qaddafi were related to a desire for democratisation and an investigation into the gross human rights violations that had occurred under Qaddafi, in particular during the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre in Tripoli, which, according to various estimates, killed between 1,200 and 1,700 people.
In February 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, mass demonstrations began in Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city and the capital of Cyrenaica province. The demonstrators demanded democratisation of political life and the removal of Muammar Gaddafi from power. Soon enough, the protests spread to other cities. In less than a month, the protesters managed to take control of the territory of Cyrenaica and launched an offensive in other regions. Government forces used artillery, tanks and aircraft. Under these circumstances, on 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya. On 17 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which provided for the imposition of a no-fly zone over the entire territory of the country and protection of the local population by ‘all necessary measures’.
This document was used by Western countries and their Arab allies as a basis for military intervention in the Libyan conflict. Already on 19 March, the French Air Force carried out the first airstrikes against Gaddafi’s forces. On 23 March, NATO’s full-scale military operation ‘Unified Protector’ began. Thanks to the support of Western countries, the opposition managed to establish control over almost the entire territory of the country. Muammar Gaddafi’s last stronghold was his hometown of Sirte, where he was captured and killed by rebels on 20 October 2011. On 31 October, the NATO operation was completed.
Dual power
The coalition of various tribes and groups opposed to Muammar Gaddafi, collapsed almost immediately after his death. The war of all against all began in the country. In August 2012, the Transitional National Council handed over power in the country to the General National Congress (GNC), whose elections had been held a month earlier. The main forces were distributed around the Alliance of National Forces and the Islamist Justice and Construction Party, close to the Muslim Brotherhood religious-political association. By 2014, Libyans decided to replace the congress with a permanent parliament, the House of Representatives. However, a split emerged among parliamentarians. Representatives of Tripolitanian elites disagreed with the fact that the House of Representatives was decided to be based in the east in Tobruk, and began boycotting parliamentary sessions. In addition, in 2014, Field Marshal General Khalifa Haftar attempted a coup and seized power in eastern Libya, exacerbating the west-east split.
In parallel, an armed struggle between pro-Haftar and anti-Haftar forces in the west in Tripoli resulted in the latter winning and proclaiming its own parliament, which also elected its own government. In November 2015, the Supreme Court in Tripoli ruled that the House of Representatives in Tobruk had been irregularly established and cancelled its elections, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the Tripoli authorities. The international community and the House of Representatives did not recognise the court’s decision. UN-sponsored negotiations in 2015 led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli. It was headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, a representative of a wealthy and influential family from Tripoli.
The House of Representatives in the east refused to approve his candidacy, but the international community recognised him as Libya’s prime minister anyway. Western Libyan elites and Tripoli factions supported the new government, while Haftar’s forces and the House of Representatives in the east did not. In Tobruk, their own government led by Abdallah al-Thinni, supported by Khalifa Haftar and his ‘Libyan National Army’ (LNA) units, continued to operate. Attempts by the UN and external players to bring the two parts of the country closer together and form a single compromise government ended in failure. The conflict of jurisdiction between the Government of National Unity (GNU), established during the implementation of the Skhirat Agreement (2015) in the Northwest (Tripoli), and the House of Representatives (HoR), elected in 2014 by the parliament in the Northeast (Tobruk), only increased the polarisation of the regions. This is how dual power became established in Libya.
External actors were also divided in their support for the warring parties. Haftar’s forces were supported by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Greece, Chad and France, while Italy, the US, Britain, Algeria, Morocco, Qatar and Turkey supported the LNA in Tripoli.
In April 2019, LNA units under the command of Khalifa Haftar made an unsuccessful attempt to take Tripoli by force. The defeat of the LNA forces was due to both an underestimation of the military situation and the military intervention of Turkey, which sided with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and even brought in its own troops. In the end, the 13-month siege of Tripoli ended in failure and Haftar’s forces were pushed back as far as the city of Sirte. After the battle for Tripoli, a truce settled in Libya for a while. A line of demarcation was drawn near the city of Sirte and the Al-Jufra airbase, where the opposing sides stopped.
Turkey, which supported the Tripolitanian forces, did not want to enter into a direct military confrontation with Egypt, Russia and the UAE, which supported Haftar and the eastern Libyan elites. Therefore, a UN-brokered ceasefire agreement was signed on 23 October 2020, which is still in force today. The ceasefire paved the way for further de-escalation and a renewed attempt by external players to bring everyone to the negotiating table and reach a political compromise. Following the signing of the ceasefire, the parties to the conflict also agreed to form a bilateral military commission in the 5+5 format, comprising five military representatives each from Eastern and Western Libya.
The commission began work on improving the ceasefire and served as a forum to discuss emergencies and contingencies, as well as to establish mechanisms to further freeze the conflict along the line of demarcation near Sirte. It must be said that after the battle for Tripoli, the influence of external players has only increased. In exchange for their military intervention, Tripoli’s elites signed two crucial agreements with Turkey, which legalised the Turks’ military presence and at the same time allowed them to divide the maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean in their favour. On the other hand, the defeat of Haftar and his retreat to Sirte led to an increase in military assistance from Egypt and the UAE, which even dared to draw a ‘red line’ here, threatening to introduce their troops if the fighting continued. Therefore, after 2020, intra-Libyan processes became even more dependent on foreign policy agreements.
In November 2020, the UN managed to organise a congress of representatives of different clan and tribal groups in Libya within the framework of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF). For 3 months, delegates to the forum worked to agree on a unified and compromise roadmap that would end the 10-year war. The forum ended with participants agreeing to: hold general elections for parliament and president; elect a unified government headed by an interim prime minister and a three-person Presidential Council to run the country and organise elections while the elections are held.
One of the important factors pushing the peace process on Libya was the regional situation in the Middle East, which began to change in 2021. Many states became willing to try to find a compromise or at least divide spheres of influence in Libya. This coincided with the beginning of a gradual regional thaw in the relations of key rivals. Turkey began a gradual process of normalising relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which immediately pulled Egypt along with it. The financial crisis of the second half of 2021 only accelerated events – Ankara needed serious injections into the economy. At the same time, cautious negotiations between Iran and the Saudi-Emirati bloc began, when it became clear that the U.S. was again turning 180 degrees and would come to an agreement with Tehran on the ‘nuclear deal’.
Moreover, in early 2021, one of the main regional conflicts was resolved: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt agreed to lift the 5-year blockade on Qatar and restore diplomatic relations with the emirate. In short, the changes in the situation in the region entailed adjustments in the foreign policy course of a number of states involved in the Libyan war. Accordingly, there was a ‘backlash’ for another major attempt at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, which turned 10 years old in 2021 and which was a real disaster for both Libya and its neighbours in the region.
In February 2021, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva voted for a new, unified Government of National Accord and Presidential Council. 75 delegates chose from four lists of candidates. There were disagreements among the participants about the voting mechanism and the counting of votes, but despite this, the meeting took place. And it should be noted that its result was a surprise for many. Two lists made it to the second round. In the first one, Aguila Saleh claimed to be the head of the Presidential Council, and Fathi Bashaga was the prime minister. They were considered the favourites.
It was assumed that the alliance of such colourful politicians, representing the east and west of the country and supported by Moscow and Cairo on the one hand and Ankara on the other, could not lose. However, a sensation occurred. The other four won. Misrata-born Abdel Hamid Dbeiba, chairman of the board of directors of the Libyan Development and Investment Holding Company (LEDCO) and founder of the Libya of the Future movement, became prime minister. The Presidential Council was headed by Mohammed al-Manfi, who represents Cyrenaica. He was previously ambassador of the Government of National Accord in Greece. He was declared persona non grata by Athens in December 2019 after Tripoli and Ankara signed the Maritime Zones Memorandum.
Being from Tobruk, he nevertheless did not support Khalif Haftar. The vice-presidents were Musa al-Quni (from Fezzan) and Abdallah Hussein al-Lafi (Tripolitania). The task of the new Libyan authorities was to bring the country to the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 24 December, and to hold a referendum on the constitution before then. The new government had 35 seats in addition to the presidency: two deputy prime ministers, 27 ministers and six ministers of state. Five portfolios were given to women. In particular, Najla Mohammed al-Mangoush became the first Libyan to head the Foreign Ministry and the fourth woman in that position in Arab history, after two Mauritanian women and a Sudanese woman. She is a lawyer by training, studied in the United States and has lived there for the past few years.
At the same time, two parameters were decisive in the approval process: none of the new ministers should have worked in previous governments, and nothing should prevent them from travelling to all parts of the country. The government was not supposed to have a single headquarters for the time being. The prime minister and six ministers would be based in Tripoli, with the rest distributing their activities between Sirte, Tobruk and Benghazi. The defence minister’s portfolio, however, remained in the hands of the prime minister. Dbeiba said the post had caused the most controversy, with each of Libya’s regions wanting to hold its own candidate, with ‘international parties’ also trying to exert influence.
‘Everyone wants the defence ministry and we cannot allow war a second time. The war must stop,’ Abdel Hamid Dbeiba said. The post of defence minister was also a bone of contention during the previous attempt at a unified government. Field Marshal Haftar, among others, claimed it. It was hard to imagine that the LNA commander would be willing to submit to anyone, even though he recognised the decision to form new Libyan authorities. The result was a compromise Cabinet with representatives of different social groups. But most of the newly minted ministers were inexperienced, which allowed Dbeiba and his inner circle to close most of the affairs.
The figure of Abdel-Hamid Dbeiba was regarded with caution by all. He was almost unknown as a politician and came from nowhere, although his business empire was one of the largest in Libya. He had made his fortune as a major property developer during the time of Muammar Gaddafi, becoming a confidant of the latter. For this he once headed the State Investment and Development Company, which supervised all major construction projects in Libya, which is hundreds of millions of dollars. He was also the manager of the Al-Ittihad football club. In short, Dbeiba was a typical big property developer from Tripoli with extensive connections in other cities. Many believed that Dbeiba would be a technical prime minister, an interim administrator who would help organise general elections at the end of the year and then leave. As a matter of fact, he himself promised to leave and not to file as a candidate in the elections.
Then in March 2021, it seemed to many that the formation of the new interim government signalled the long-awaited end of the divisive era and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation. But as it turned out, this was only a temporary lull.
Dual power 2.0
Over the next 9 months, the new Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Dbeiba did not just not keep the promised neutrality, but began to gradually consolidate his power, build his vertical and launched an independent election campaign.
Using administrative resources, Dbeiba actively gained political points and popularity among the people of Western Libya and Tripoli. Finally, at the end of 2021, despite his commitment not to file for elections, he registered as a presidential candidate, thus finally breaking all the schemes of the other Libyan heavyweights. Dbeiba’s political ambitions, his desire to play his own game, and the presumed external support from the US, which was betting on him, led to the outbreak of yet another disagreement with eastern Libyan elites. Most notably with the eastern Libyan parliament led by Aguila Saleh.
In September 2021, the House of Representatives withdrew its mandate of confidence in the prime minister, but left the government in place as an interim administration until elections are held on 24 December. Abdel-Hamid Dbeiba did not recognise this decision, and opposed parliament and Saleh. On top of this, the PNU and parliament were at odds over elections and the overall implementation of the agreements. It was not clear whether the referendum on the new constitution (which was already ready in 2017) should be held before the elections or after? Should presidential elections be held together with parliamentary elections or separately? What kind of election law should be adopted? There was no agreement even on whether to make the vote for president ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’, or on which law to base the referendum, let alone on the boundaries of the electoral districts (which redrew the ‘historic tribal boundaries’ of Libya’s three regions).
The FLPD participants in March 2021 agreed only on general principles, and left the rest to be ‘finalised’ by the new government. They failed to do so, and disputes over elections have only exacerbated the divisions between west and east. Another issue that has not been resolved is the unification of the armed groups into a single military structure and the building of a single army command centre. There are still different military structures in Tripoli and Benghazi, and the powers of the new authorities have not been fully defined. Therefore, Tripoli still has a whole coalition of factions defending and effectively controlling the city, while the east has been dominated by Khalifa Haftar’s ‘army’.
On the eve of the general elections scheduled for 24 December 2021, disagreements between the representatives of the three regions of the country have become more and more frequent, despite the attempts of the international community to achieve consensus among Libyan politicians. Thus, two presidential election laws have appeared in Libya at once, and parliamentarians have decided to declare a vote of no confidence in the Government. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, started talking about his presidential ambitions. However, part of the political elites of Libya was not ready to see the Field Marshal at the head of the state, moreover, considering his nomination illegal. The second son of the former leader of the country Muammar Gaddafi – Seif al-Islam Gaddafi – also announced his nomination as a presidential candidate. There was active talk about the participation in the presidential election of PP speaker Aguila Saleh, who, like Khalifa Haftar, represents the east of the country.
Unlike the Field Marshal, Saleh’s figure is more acceptable to politicians in western Libya, who cannot forgive the LNA commander for his march on Tripoli and accuse him of war crimes. From the western part of the country, former Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga was preparing to enter the presidential race. Gradually, the upcoming elections began to turn into a farce. The necessary legislative framework had not been adopted. The State Council did not approve the rules proposed by the parliament, primarily because they would allow Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who left his post as commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army for three months to run as a candidate for the Libyan presidency. The Council of State has called for the election to be postponed until 2023. The conflict between Dbeiba and eastern Libya reproduced Libya’s split into two camps, and pushed the situation back to 2018-2020. And when elections were finally postponed indefinitely due to the impossibility of holding them (which external forces insisted on anyway), hopes for the formation of permanent and unified authorities vanished in an instant. The situation began to change, as well as the position of internal players.
Realising that the figure of Abdel-Hamid Dbeiba was dangerous for everyone, Libyan heavyweights decided to unite against him. This is how the unexpected situational alliance of Bashaghi-Maitiga and Haftar-Saleh came about. This was also facilitated by their external patrons, primarily Turkey and Egypt, which since 2021 have set a course to find a compromise on Libya. In a sense, it was due to the normalisation of relations in the region that Dbeiba’s PNU was recognised by all parties.
But then aggravation and a return to dual power began again. In February 2022, Libya’s House of Representatives voted by a majority to appoint former Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga as Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. Bashaga has promised that he will not run in the upcoming presidential election if he takes over as head of the new government. He also waived ‘any legal immunity’ for himself and future ministers should any legal charges arise. Fathi Bashaghi’s statement essentially meant a guarantee for Aguila Saleh that he would not have such a significant rival for the presidency in future elections.
The Saleh-Bashaga tie-up should have worked a year ago, when the two men were on a single list of candidates for the heads of the Presidential Council and the government. That list enjoyed the simultaneous support of Ankara, Moscow and Cairo. But it unexpectedly lost to candidates little known to the public at the time – businessman Abdel Hamid Dbeiba and diplomat Mohammed al-Manfi, who headed the Presidential Council. Bashaghi’s election essentially returned dual power to Libya. He was never accommodated in Tripoli and announced that his government would start in the city of Sirte. Nevertheless, forces loyal to him remained in Tripoli. All this time, the two prime ministers were trying to share power and at the same time to establish control over the country’s financial flows and the National Oil Corporation.
Each side had its advantages. On the side of Dbeiba, who did not want to give up his powers and remained in Tripoli, is certainly his legitimacy. He was elected according to the procedure according to all the rules and this decision was supported by all the major internal and external forces. Moreover, his mandate, as decided by the Forum, clearly stipulates that his term of office will end only after the elections in Libya. Moreover, he had the heads of the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation on his side, which gave him access to serious financial resources with which he could ‘gift’ people and gain popular support. Finally, his power resource is his ties to some of Tripoli’s powerful armed groups, with whom Dbeiba has established contact in recent months.
On the side of the eastern elites serious power resources are Haftar’s LNA units, as well as parts of groups loyal to Bashaga from Western Libya. In addition, the new situational alliance in the east is capable of pulling other tribes and clans to its side, and also enjoys the support of many regional countries.
The election of Fathi Bashagha has rekindled the confrontation between the two parts of the country in Libya. Fortunately for Libyans, however, it did not affect the fragile truce. The parties were in no hurry to wreck what allowed them to play their political games in peace. Nevertheless, the eastern elites did not abandon their attempts to remove Dbeiba, constantly raising the stakes.
Thus, two months after Bashaghi’s election, the Libyan National Army (LNA) announced it was suspending its participation in the 5+5 joint military committee. LNA negotiators accused Abdel Hamid Dbeiba’s Government of National Unity (GNU) of worsening the situation in the country and violating the ceasefire agreement. The military considered that the head of the Cabinet was obstructing the elections under far-fetched pretexts. This whole situation provoked protests. In July 2022 in Tobruk, thousands of people marched to parliament and called for the dissolution of the current political forces and the holding of elections. Demonstrations also took place in several other major cities in Libya, including Tripoli and Benghazi. Young people then joined the protesters. The lack of electricity was one of the main issues that forced young people to take to the streets. The youth movements demanded the resignation of all power structures – the Presidential Council, the Supreme State Council, the House of Representatives and the two governments of Abdel Hamid Dbeiba and Fathi Bashagi.
In late August, the two prime ministers once again exchanged messages to each other in absentia. First, Mr Dbeiba said Libya had ‘no other way but elections’. Fathi Bashaga then sent a letter to his rival, demanding he hand over power immediately. In doing so, he referred to Mr Abdel Hamid Dbeiba as a former prime minister. The response was not long in coming. ‘Former interior minister, spare yourself the repeated messages and threats to spark a war. If you are interested in the lives of Libyans, go to the polls and give up the illusions of military coups, their time has passed,’ Mr Dbeiba wrote on Twitter, addressing his political opponent. Within 24 hours, this exchange of barbs erupted into clashes on the streets of Tripoli. The clashes left 32 people dead and more than 150 injured. At the same time, Dbeiba’s supporters claimed that the fighting began after negotiations to prevent bloodshed failed, while Fathi Bashaga assured that no one had negotiated anything.
Osama Juwaili, the most influential of the warlords supporting Bashaga, said in an interview with Libyan media that the fighting was caused by friction between factions and that there was no crime in trying to bring to power the head of the government elected by parliament. However, the result was different. As a result of the fighting, forces loyal to Bashaga were forced to abandon their positions in the centre of Tripoli. The reinforcements coming to their aid from Misrata turned back. After Bashaga failed to take power in Tripoli on 16 May 2023, the House of Representatives mandated NTC Finance Minister Osama Hammadou to serve as Prime Minister in place of Fathi Bashaga. Hammadou’s mandate is in place until a new unified government is elected.
The difficult road to unity
On 10 March 2024, a conference was held in Cairo at which participating Libyan politicians from both sides agreed on the ‘need’ to form a new unified government to hold long-delayed elections and to establish a technical committee to ‘study the points of contention’. The event was attended by Aguila Saleh Isa as speaker of the House of Representatives, Mohammed Takala, chairman of the Supreme State Council, and Mohammed Manfi, chairman of Libya’s Presidential Council. However, as experts point out, the statements in Cairo have little to do with reality. Fair and competitive elections, as they did three years ago, could mean the removal from their positions of those who now hold important positions in various segments of the Libyan state machine and control the funds and resources of the wartime economy.
The rotation of elites, which is seen by election supporters inside and outside Libya as an indispensable measure to restart the political process to restore legitimacy to state institutions, threatens the interests and positions of many of those currently at the top of Libyan politics. Those who have accumulated their weight, capital and influence in the context of the civil war are able to protect and increase them by the same means in the context of continuing legal uncertainty and the dictates of ‘wartime laws’: whoever is strongest is right. In this sense, there is no reason for these same individuals to promote and hold elections or to take real progressive steps towards a ‘new normal’ unless their legal, economic and political immunity is guaranteed.
Despite the significant successes of the Dbeiba clan in consolidating PNU power in the north-west of the country, the region continues to be a space of fierce competition between different paramilitary groups for control over sources of revenue. The main resource is the transport infrastructure, which includes not only the pipelines that pump oil, but also the roads that carry the vast majority of cargo traffic – both legal goods and contraband, which includes arms, drugs and human trafficking. Groups associated with the PNU, but not under its total control, have consistently sought throughout 2023-2024 to deprive local elites of their dominant position on transport and trade routes. From the militias, PNU Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi took an active part in the redistribution of spheres of influence in Tripoli in favour of Dbeiba, and the formations acting on his behalf were active in the spring of 2024 in ‘cleansing criminal and terrorist elements’ around the city of Zintan and in areas densely populated by Amazigh Berber tribes.
Previously, Zintan and the Amazigh had been able to maintain their autonomy by controlling the roads connecting the interior of the country to the state border. But growing claims from rivals operating under the auspices of the PNU Interior Ministry provoked mixed reactions from local leaders, who began to make loud public statements of a political nature. For example, fervently calling for early elections and demanding full participation rights for Seif-al-Islam Al-Qadhafi. The green flag of the Jamahiriya reappearing in Libya’s media space is an acute indication of the readiness of local elites to defend their economic interests with determination and publicity.
The key source of income for the Libyan rulers is oil revenues. In this regard, the ouster of the Minister of Oil and Gas Mohammed Aoun at the end of March and beginning of April 2024 was a significant event. In his place, Khalifa Abdul Sadiq, a former deputy oil minister close to the prime minister’s nephew Ibrahim Dbeiba, was appointed as interim minister. The appointment of a well-connected new minister allowed for the unblocking of major hydrocarbon projects, but also demonstrated the vulnerability of the oil and gas sector to the country’s chronic political instability. This was clearly illustrated when Khalif Haftar’s allies attempted to shut down a Spanish oil field in response to a Spanish arrest warrant for his son, a suspected arms smuggler. Saddam Haftar, a key figure in his father’s Libyan National Army was detained at Naples airport and questioned over the Spanish charges.
Oil production at the El Sharara field immediately slowed. It is one of Libya’s largest fields, capable of producing more than 300,000 barrels a day. Dbeiba’s government called the move ‘political extortion.’ Haftar’s forces, which control eastern and southern Libya, where most of the oil fields are located, have denied all accusations, saying the facility suffers from recurring problems with workers’ working conditions. However, as The Guardian notes, there are reports that Saddam Haftar immediately instructed by telephone, without the use of military force, to shut down the facility in response to an attempt to arrest him.The episode has once again highlighted the vulnerability of Libya’s oil sector and its dependence on the realisation of the personal and political agendas of Libya’s elite. The oil-rich country is in the absurd position of having to import most of its fuel, which is then sold domestically at subsidised prices.
In addition to the oil complex, the struggle continues over control of the Central Bank structures. In the spring of 2024, Central Bank governor Sadiq al-Kabir entered into an open confrontation with Dbeiba, publicly pointing out the government’s mistakes. In recent months, Kabir has become an outspoken critic of the government’s excessive spending in Tripoli, saying that profligacy is adding pressure to the exchange rate and fuelling inflation.
Kabir, who had previously ignored parliamentary decisions, citing public doubts about the legitimacy of the House of Representatives, has begun a rapprochement with its speaker, Agila Saleh. Dbeiba responded by putting pressure on the leadership of the Central Bank. First, the head of the bank’s IT department was kidnapped in Tripoli and threatening messages were sent to its executives. Before that, a group of armed men besieged the Central Bank’s headquarters, local media said, to force Al-Sadiq al-Kabir to resign. In response, the Central Bank said it was ‘suspending all operations’ following the kidnapping of its bank employee. In turn, Dbeiba’s government retaliated by firing Central Bank Governor Kabir, who refused to resign.
In an attempt to justify sacking Kabir against the will of US and European diplomats, Libya’s Dbeiba-affiliated Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, said it understood the concerns but believed the decision would strengthen the rule of law and lead to the appointment of a new head with integrity and competence. He also said he would ensure the formation of a board of directors for the first time in many years, putting an end to the one-man theatre of Kabir. Menfi said the board has the constitutional right to sack the Central Bank governor.
The US embassy was forced to intervene in the situation, supporting UN efforts to convene an emergency meeting of the concerned groups. The embassy said, ‘Reports of arbitrary arrests and intimidation of central bank officials are of particular concern – those responsible must be held strictly accountable.’ The West, including the IMF, has been concerned for years about the central bank’s lack of accountability but has opposed Kabir’s unilateral removal, fearing it would slow down the unification process. The British ambassador to Libya, Martin Longden, condemned ‘unilateral decisions that will only destabilise the country’ and stressed that the UK ‘supports a solution through legal means without jeopardising Libya’s financial position internationally’.
Abdel Fattah Ghaffar, the new interim governor of the central bank appointed by the Tripoli-based government said he is able to alleviate the current liquidity crisis, pay outstanding salaries within two days and report to the board of governors. He called on Kabir to hand over secret codes that would make payments possible, showing how far from resolution the practical struggle for control of the bank’s operations is. Osame Hammadu’s eastern government opposed Kabir’s sacking and said it would continue to ‘suspend all oil production and exports until Kabir is reappointed’, citing ‘force majeure’.
The affected oil fields account for about 90 per cent of the country’s oil fields and terminals. Hammadu’s NTC linked its move to ‘repeated attacks on central bank executives, staff and administration’ and blamed ‘criminal gangs’. Kabir himself said the bank could not operate because of threats from militants and the kidnapping of four employees. He warned that salaries for August may not be paid. His statement also said the bank’s ability to send emails had been illegally terminated by those trying to overthrow the bank’s leadership, implicitly alluding to Dbeiba.
Libya’s latest plunge into chaos follows nearly a decade of infighting over state resources within Libya’s fractured political elite, which has repeatedly postponed national elections since 2014, fearing that democracy could cause it to lose its privileged access to Libya’s vast oil revenues.
External contour
Against the backdrop of the Covid-19 epidemic, the recession in the global economy, and the war waged by Russia against Ukraine, the Libyan crisis has lost the prominent position in world politics that it gained after the escalation of armed conflict in 2019-2020. A number of external players that had become prominent in the Libyan field in the previous period have either lost interest in Libya or significantly reduced their activity in this area for various reasons. The activity of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt in Libya has decreased commensurately and proportionately, although the countries have never refused to support the parties to the Libyan confrontation in their negotiation initiatives. A number of African states, including Libya’s Maghreb neighbours Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, which actively promoted themselves as mediators of the negotiation processes under the auspices of the UN and the Arab League for various reasons, failed to assert themselves as a significant and independent stakeholder in the Libyan crisis.
At the same time, in 2020-2023, the activity of the US and the UK in Libya increased significantly, and they not only monopolised the negotiation process under the auspices of the UN, but also became actively involved in Libyan political life. The outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine prompted the US side to exert direct pressure on its counterparties. On the one hand, in order to publicly condemn Russia, and on the other hand, in the interests of increasing oil production and oil and gas exports to Europe.
Since 2019, Turkey’s influence in Libya has grown so unprecedentedly fast and steadily that Ankara in the early 2020s could confidently claim to be not just the strongest or key player, but a hegemon in the Libyan space. The PNU in Tripoli, in the face of the LNA military threat, uniquely empowered Turkey with a politico-military and economic presence in Libya in exchange for operational assistance in repelling the offensive of Haftar’s forces. But engagement with the UAE, Egypt, and Russia on other regional and global policy fronts in recent years has allowed Turkey to markedly reduce tensions and improve relations with the LNA and Khalifa Haftar in the east.
Turkey, long associated with elite clans in Tripoli and Misrata, has a ‘permanent presence’ at the al-Watya airbase near Zintan and naval bases in Misrata and Homs, as well as direct contact with some militia groups in Tripoli. Turkish goods can be found on shop shelves in all parts of the country, and Turkish companies are involved in major reconstruction, construction and infrastructure projects in both the West and the East. Nevertheless, Turkey’s growing influence cannot help but also provoke opposition. In August 2023, mass actions were held in Tripoli against the establishment of a new Turkish military base in Homs, as well as the presence of Turkish-affiliated Syrian mercenaries in Libya. In February 2024, the 2019 Memorandum on the Delimitation of Maritime Zones in the Mediterranean Sea, a major achievement of Turkish policy in Libya and a major tool in its geopolitical struggle to control natural gas exports from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, was not ratified.
Russia is also trying to increase its influence in Libya. In August 2023, at the invitation of the commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar, a delegation from the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Deputy Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov arrived in Libya. The outcome of the talks has not been reported, but according to US publication The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Russia is trying to gain access for its warships to ports in Libya. According to Libyan officials, the Russian side has requested permission to access the ports of Benghazi or Tobruk to refuel, repair naval ships and resupply. WSJ notes that these two ports already have infrastructure capable of meeting Russia’s demands. However, the WSJ writes, it is still unclear whether Russia wants to develop these ports, station personnel there, stockpile ammunition or store other cargo.
In addition, Russia’s negotiations with Haftar over access to the ports indicate Moscow’s desire to increase its influence in Africa and ‘outplay’ the United States, which has been urging African countries to join anti-Russian sanctions, the WSJ writes. In addition, the Russian military is seeking to take control of the African-based military units of the PMC Wagner and assets belonging to them after the death of PMC founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.
A month after the visit of the Russian delegation, Khalifa Haftar travelled to Moscow. He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and then Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. The Qatari publication Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, citing its sources, reported that Khalifa Haftar hopes to sign a defence and security agreement under which he wants to receive more Russian military equipment, including air defence systems and drones, and also expects to open repair bases for its maintenance on Libyan territory.
According to the Atlantic Council report, Libya ‘is emerging as a critical hub for Moscow’s missions in Africa.’ The report also said that Libya, strategically located at the crossroads of Africa and Europe, provides Moscow with a gateway for Russian operations in Sudan, Chad, Niger and other countries in the Sahel and Central Africa. Libya’s rapprochement with Russia has caused serious concern in Washington and London. Thus, the White House warned the head of the Libyan National Army and all Libyan leaders against ‘relying on Putin.’ Former Conservative Party MP Nicholas Soomes said the West ‘needs to realise the political games that Putin is playing in Libya’.
‘This new friendship has allowed him not only to move his mercenaries in and out of the country and destabilise much of sub-Saharan Africa in the process, but has also allowed him to begin negotiations to build a new Russian nuclear submarine base in the Libyan port of Tobruk,’ he wrote. According to him, it resembles the scenario of the Cuban Missile Crisis, only this time with Europe in the crosshairs, and the Mediterranean Sea is a possible new battlefield for Europe. And while Ukraine is important and needs our support, we can’t think Putin has only one military campaign in mind.
Thus, while external actors are keen to play a more substantial role in the Libyan settlement, they often have different foreign policy priorities and, over the decade of the crisis, have preferred to predominantly buy risks and gain short- to medium-term benefits rather than take responsibility and pursue an active peacekeeping policy. The limited resources and lack of political will – both of the Gulf States and Libya’s neighbours in North Africa – make it impossible to identify any regional actor capable of dominating Libya on its own.
All this makes the internal level of the conflict significant, where the main parameter of the inter-elite balance is agreements on redistribution of oil revenues. One can note the growing pressure of the House of Representatives and the LNA on the Dbeiba government, which in turn seeks to undermine its rivals from within. At the same time, a new trend has also emerged – the increasing presence in the public space of a new generation of elite clan representatives. Dbeiba and his family members, as well as Haftar’s sons, are increasing their influence not only in the economy and security sector, but also in politics. Despite the tactical arrangements that have allowed for some kind of status quo in recent years, the parties still see them as temporary. This explains why these arrangements do not work when there are struggles over the National Oil Company, the Central Bank and other structures.
Revisiting the informal arrangements that emerged after the 2019-2020 armed confrontation only leads to a redistribution of property and turns the political crisis into a protracted and permanent state of Libyan society with no chance of overcoming it. The situation is exacerbated by the Libyan elites’ lack of interest in holding elections, which could at least be a façade to consolidate political agreements between the parties and the various clans. However, today the elites are not interested in this, and unfortunately, an external factor is not capable of catalysing such a process.
