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Friday, September 20, 2024

Russia: Weekly Report (18.09 – 24.09)

This report describes the key events that significantly impacted Russia’s political, economic and social processes.

Based on the results of the past week, the following trends can be summarised:

  • Next year, the Russian authorities plan to increase federal spending on the country’s defence. Costs for these purposes will increase from 3.9% in 2023 to 6% in 2024. In this context, the internal struggle between the main influence groups around Putin, responsible for the military-industrial complex and defence, is becoming increasingly noticeable. Soon, we can expect that conflicts between Shoigu and Zolotov will not only become public but also that contradictions between other actors in this area will intensify.
  • Wang Yi’s visit to Russia confirmed Putin’s plans to visit Beijing in October. Issues related to further steps towards integrating Belarus and Russia and the prospects for the negotiation process on the war in Ukraine may be resolved there. On the eve of his visit to Moscow, Wang Yi met with Advisor to President Biden Sullivan in Malta, where issues of resolving the situation surrounding the war between Russia and Ukraine were also discussed. It is quite possible that after Putin visits Beijing (which will be a mirror image of Vladimir Zelensky’s visit to Washington), the general contours of an agreement on a peace plan that would satisfy all parties and beneficiaries of the conflict can be developed.
  • Despite the demonstration of Sergei Lavrov’s very vigorous activity on the sidelines of the UN, the head of the Foreign Ministry practically did not voice any new theses. However, Russia hinted at the possibility of conducting negotiations regarding Ukraine and even returning to the topic of the territorial integrity of Ukraine – in the event of progress on the issue of the neutral status of Ukraine and guarantees of its non-entry into NATO structures. Of course, such hints should not be taken as a new condition for negotiations. Instead, it is a demonstration of capabilities rather than a statement of readiness.

This digest highlights the following topics that were most relevant for Russia during 18th – 24th of September:

1. Meeting of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission;

2. Meeting of Vladimir Putin with member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Wang Yi;

3. Telephone conversations between Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev;

4. Meeting of Vladimir Putin with permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;

5. Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Iran;

6. Participation of Sergei Lavrov in the UN General Assembly;

7. Attack on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

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This report describes the key events that significantly impacted Russia’s political, economic and social processes.

Based on the results of the past week, the following trends can be summarised:

  • Next year, the Russian authorities plan to increase federal spending on the country’s defence. Costs for these purposes will increase from 3.9% in 2023 to 6% in 2024. In this context, the internal struggle between the main influence groups around Putin, responsible for the military-industrial complex and defence, is becoming increasingly noticeable. Soon, we can expect that conflicts between Shoigu and Zolotov will not only become public but also that contradictions between other actors in this area will intensify.
  • Wang Yi’s visit to Russia confirmed Putin’s plans to visit Beijing in October. Issues related to further steps towards integrating Belarus and Russia and the prospects for the negotiation process on the war in Ukraine may be resolved there. On the eve of his visit to Moscow, Wang Yi met with Advisor to President Biden Sullivan in Malta, where issues of resolving the situation surrounding the war between Russia and Ukraine were also discussed. It is quite possible that after Putin visits Beijing (which will be a mirror image of Vladimir Zelensky’s visit to Washington), the general contours of an agreement on a peace plan that would satisfy all parties and beneficiaries of the conflict can be developed.
  • Despite the demonstration of Sergei Lavrov’s very vigorous activity on the sidelines of the UN, the head of the Foreign Ministry practically did not voice any new theses. However, Russia hinted at the possibility of conducting negotiations regarding Ukraine and even returning to the topic of the territorial integrity of Ukraine – in the event of progress on the issue of the neutral status of Ukraine and guarantees of its non-entry into NATO structures. Of course, such hints should not be taken as a new condition for negotiations. Instead, it is a demonstration of capabilities rather than a statement of readiness.

This digest highlights the following topics that were most relevant for Russia during 18th – 24th of September:

1. Meeting of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission;

2. Meeting of Vladimir Putin with member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Wang Yi;

3. Telephone conversations between Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev;

4. Meeting of Vladimir Putin with permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;

5. Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Iran;

6. Participation of Sergei Lavrov in the UN General Assembly;

7. Attack on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

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