Russia: Weekly Report (31.07-06.08)

1. Telephone conversation between Putin and President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan

On Wednesday, August 2, Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This conversation was the first after the return of the Azov commanders from Türkiye to Ukraine (they were held on the territory of Türkiye by a prior agreement between Ankara and Moscow), as well as after the stoppage of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (the “grain deal”).

Key statements of the parties:

• The Russian side said that during the conversation, Putin outlined Russia’s principled position regarding terminating package agreements on exporting Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea ports and unblocking Russian food and fertiliser supplies. It was noted that in the conditions of a complete lack of progress in implementing the Russian part of the “grain deal”, its next extension has lost its meaning. Readiness was confirmed to return to the Istanbul agreements as soon as the West fulfilled all the obligations to Russia recorded in them.

• It was emphasised that considering the needs of the countries most in lack of food, reliable Russian grain supply options, including on a gratuitous basis, are being worked out. This issue was substantively discussed at the second Russia-Africa summit recently held in St. Petersburg. The mood was expressed for cooperation with the Turks and other interested states in this area.

• When discussing the agenda of the Russian-Turkish partnership, the leaders focused on the prospects for the further development of trade and economic ties, the implementation of joint strategic projects in the energy sector, and cooperation in the tourism industry. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the steady growth in trade, which almost doubled in 2022.

• Russian media, citing the administration of the Turkish president, said that Erdogan and Putin agreed on the visit of the Russian President to Türkiye. It may take place in the near future.

• In response to media reports about the Russian President’s visit to Turki, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, “Putin and Erdogan agreed to continue contacts at various levels, including in the context of preparing for a possible meeting between the two leaders.”

• It is noteworthy that the official press release on the conversation with Putin was never published on the official website of the Turkish President.

Outcomes and outlook:

Recently, the Russian-Turkish relations are not going through the best period. A huge number of contradictions have accumulated – the situation in the South Caucasus, Syria, Türkiye’s consent to Sweden’s entry into NATO, the position on the “grain deal”, the repatriation of the “Azov” and other issues make Russian and Turkish diplomats increasingly see each other as competitors and not allies. Under these conditions, a personal meeting between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan is essential for both sides.

For Putin, visiting Ankara can also be a revealing moment: he visits a NATO state. This state claims to be a member of the European Union without any problems, and he is not afraid of any international arrest warrants. It is also important that this meeting may take place on the eve of the BRICS summit. In this case, the inclusion of Putin online in the work of the BRICS may also have a symbolic meaning: Putin can appeal not only to his personal opinion but also to the opinion of the Turkish President. Thus, the meeting between Putin and Erdogan may have a significant strategic nature.

2. Putin’s meeting with the Chairman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko

On Tuesday, August 1, Putin met with the Chairman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, in the Kremlin. The head of the upper house of parliament reported on the results of the work of the Federation Council during the spring session.

Key statements:

• Matviyenko: “We studied about 500 laws, and, very importantly, the activity of senators has increased: 70 [laws] were either initiated by senators or adopted with the participation of other participants in the legislative initiative.”

• Matviyenko: “The second main priority for us was also the adoption of laws to support the participants in the special military operation and their families. We have adopted about 60 laws. And they worked very quickly, responded quickly.”

• Matviyenko: “One of the priorities for us was also the adoption of laws in this session to integrate [the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine] new subjects of the Federation into Russia’s legal, economic, and social space. I know that you keep these issues under your control. Quite a lot of laws have been adopted, although the process has not yet been completed.”

• Matviyenko: “In September, there will be a single voting day: 20 governors and 26 legislative assemblies will be elected. The composition of senators will be updated by about 40 per cent of the composition of senators from these regions. Every September, during the days of unified voting, new, fresh people come to us, and new blood is poured in; as they say: these are the most worthy and respected people from the regions, each with their own school and experience. This allows us always to discuss any issues, problems that are acute in a wider field.”

Outcomes and outlook:

The meeting itself is ritual in its essence, given the fact that the influence of Valentina Matviyenko on the processes in the country is very nominal. However, a picture is being created in the public mind of the influence of the upper house of parliament, the importance of decisions made there, as well as the importance of the figure of Valentina Matviyenko herself, who is more of a relic of an old era in Russian politics than a truly influential statesman.

At the same time, it is important to note that at the end of July, Valentina Matviyenko visited China, where she held talks with Xi Jinping and met with several Chinese politicians. It is possible that during the meeting with Putin, Matviyenko also reported on the visit results, which can also be used as another contact line between Beijing and Moscow.

3. Putin’s meeting with heads of Russian manufacturing enterprises on industrial development

On Thursday, August 3, Vladimir Putin met with heads of Russian manufacturing enterprises in the Kremlin. According to the Russian president, the meeting in an expanded format (with the involvement of the heads of Russian manufacturing enterprises) was held on his initiative. Also, the meeting was attended by the Deputy Prime Minister-Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, Denis Manturov.

Key statements:

• Putin: “Overall, the situation is stable and sustainable. Employment in the manufacturing sector remains at the same level as in 2021… “It is about ten million people – 14 per cent of all employed in our economy. That’s a decent level.”

• Putin: “Now the Government is attempting, and not without success, to create a system to increase labour productivity.”

• Putin: “Which industries demonstrate the highest and best indicators? This is the production of computers, electronic and optical products – 30.4 per cent, excellent. The output of finished metallurgical products – 29.7 per cent, almost thirty. Electrical equipment – 22 per cent. Vehicles, excluding cars – 22.1 per cent.”

• Manturov: “We found a Russian beneficiary, a Russian enterprise, for almost every enterprise, and they selected industrial partners. An example of this is Moscow – “Moskvich”; in St. Petersburg, there is now a new site at AvtoVAZ, and “Avtotor” has resumed work in Kaliningrad, as well as the Sollers plant in Tatarstan. That is, they have not just restored work; they are already working – a resourcefor the future.

• Manturov: “We managed to get through the acute phase of external pressure with virtually no losses. You have indicated employment indicators. Indeed, the manufacturing industry is the largest of all sectors of the economy.”

• Manturov: “Trade missions play a special role in their promotion. Five years ago, you decided to transfer this to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and over this time, we have managed to do a lot to improve this institution. If we take a year for non-commodity, non-energy exports, this is $ 9 billion, carried out under the auspices of our trade missions. In the last year alone, we have opened five new outlets in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In total, we are now present in 78 countries.”

Representatives of a number of industrial companies also attended the meeting:

• Company “Faraday”, which produces footwear and clothing (city-forming enterprise).

• Polyplastic Group of Companies, the largest manufacturer of polymer pipeline systems.

• Group of companies “Katyusha” – IT sector. Creation of Russian software.

• Diarsi Group of Companies, one of the leaders in producing innovative oral care products, cosmetics, medical devices, ingredients and pharmaceutical substances.

• “Transmashholding”,  which focuses on the production of electric trains.

• St. Petersburg’s Sredne-Nevsky shipyard.

• St. Petersburg’s Tractor Plant and the Kirovsky Zavod.

• Volzhsky Automobile Plant.

• Commercial and industrial holding “Rusklimat”, focuses on the production of climatic equipment: household and industrial ventilation systems.

• Metalloinvest, the largest Russian producer of iron ore.

Outcomes and outlook:

The Russian leadership is trying to show that Russia is developing economically, despite the sanctions. Special emphasis is placed on the search for new markets in the Third World. It also indicates in every way the unity of government and business, the absence of contradictions, paternalism and protectionism on the part of the state, and attempts to compensate business owners for the damage from leaving traditional markets. Actions of this kind will be regular shortly: with the approaching presidential elections, the people (as well as representatives of the business elite) will try to sell the picture of Russia’s great success and the failure of the West’s actions aimed at imposing tough sanctions against Russia.

Also, it is important to note that the meeting was in many ways similar to the presentation of Denis Manturov’s achievements (it is important that at one of the recent meetings, Manturov succumbed to Putin’s demonstrative criticism): industry representatives praised Manturov. They thanked him for his help in highlighting loans. Earlier, Ascolta repeatedly wrote that Manturov is considered one of the possible successors to the post of President of the Russian Federation. Such an action may be part of Manturov’s PR campaign.

4. Joint statement following the meeting between the President of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the African Peace Initiative

On Friday, August 4, the website of the President of the Russian Federation published a joint statement following the meeting between the President of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the African Peace Initiative. The statement appeared almost a week after the Russia-Africa forum held in St. Petersburg. The very discussion of the peace initiative of the African states took place on July 28.

The meeting on July 28, 2023, was attended by African leaders: President of the Union of the Comoros Azali Assoumani as Chairman of the African Union, President of the Republic of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of the Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdelfattah Sisi, President of the Republic of Senegal Macchi Sall, President of the Republic of Uganda Yoweri Museveni and Zambian Foreign Minister Stanley Kakubo.

Key statements:

• The leaders noted the progress made on the proposals discussed at the first meeting on June 17, 2023, on humanitarian issues, particularly those related to children’s rights in war zones and prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine. They agreed that humanitarian efforts would continue to bear fruit.

• The leaders called for concrete steps to remove obstacles to exporting Russian grain and fertilisers, which will allow the full implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Black Sea Package Initiative, approved on July 22, 2022, in Istanbul, to be fully resumed.

• The leaders also urged the UN to take the necessary steps to release the 200,000 tons of Russian fertiliser blocked in European Union seaports for immediate and free delivery to African countries.

• The leaders agreed to continue the dialogue on the African Peace Initiative to pave the way for peace.

Outcomes and outlook:

The final document of the Russia-Africa summit did not fully support Russia’s current policy. First of all, the call for the resumption of the “grain deal”, from which Russia withdrew in mid-July, is striking. Considering China’s influence on the processes in Africa and the fact that China was the largest recipient of Ukrainian grain, it can be assumed that the summit ended with the announcement of a “Chinese warning” by Russia.

At least now, we can assume that the PRC is beginning to pressure Russia to correct Moscow’s foreign policy, especially in the Ukrainian direction. A number of indirect points show that Moscow and Beijing are beginning to diverge in their vision of a future strategy regarding Ukraine. Some hints of a strategy change came from the lips of African leaders (who actually act as China’s heralds).

The way Russia tries to get around sharp corners shows it cannot be completely independent. The summit demonstrated that Russia cannot afford to quarrel with China and its satellites. Instead of a triumph for Russia, Putin got a rather modest result: he had to de facto buy the loyalty of most African leaders – with promises of cheap grain, weapons, and contracts that are most unprofitable for the Russian economy. At the same time, some presidents quite eloquently demonstrated that they disagreed with Putin’s policy (an example is the public demarches of the President of Zimbabwe).

5. Signing of the law on increasing the military age in Russia

On Friday, August 4, Vladimir Putin signed a law on raising the upper limit of the military age from 27 to 30 years; the document was published on the official legal acts website. The amendments will come into force on January 1, 2024. Putin also signed a law that imposes a ban on leaving Russia for a citizen from the moment a summons is served on him. The ban will take effect from the moment the agenda appears in the state register of military records, the decision to create which was made in April. The military commissariat will form the decision to ban the conscript from leaving the country on the day the summons is sent to him.

Outcomes and outlook:

Putin decided to increase the strength of the armed forces without declaring a new wave of mobilisation. Laws of this kind are an attempt at covert mobilisation. Experts say that if the law comes into force, the Russian army can receive 50 to 100 thousand recruits without focusing on mobilisation actions.

At the same time, one should not forget that the decree on partial mobilisation signed by Putin last year has no expiration date, which retains its effect at present. The recent wave of arson attacks on military registration and enlistment offices in many regions of Russia demonstrates that mobilisation is taking place. Still, it is not being talked about in the media.

Ascolta has repeatedly said that Putin’s actions are reminiscent of preparations for a global war, which may also consist of a direct clash with NATO. The actual mobilisation figures may be much more significant than what is claimed in the reports of the Western intelligence communities.

6. Putin’s meeting with permanent members of the Security Council

On Friday, August 4, Vladimir Putin held an operational meeting via videoconference with the Security Council’s permanent members. According to official statements, issues of strengthening internal stability in today’s conditions were discussed during the meeting. Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin and Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev made presentations.

The meeting was also attended by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, Speaker of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Anton Vaino, Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, Special Representative of the President for Environmental Protection and Ecology and transport Sergey Ivanov.

Outcomes and outlook:

It is striking that Putin’s meetings with the permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation have become almost weekly. Moreover, the latter was devoted directly to issues of internal security.

This meeting was held against the backdrop of several events in Russia – strikes on the Crimean bridge, strikes on ships in the Kerch Strait, drone arrivals in Moscow City, and the explosion of an oil storage facility in the Bryansk region created the appropriate backdrop. Obviously, from the point of view of the Russian authorities, all this requires a reaction and retaliatory measures. That is why the issue of strengthening internal stability and countering targeted strikes by Ukraine comes to the fore when discussing issues. It is quite possible that the result of such a discussion could be a series of resignations in the military environment.

7. Visit of the Russian military leadership to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine

Last week, the Russian media announced two visits by the top military leadership to the territory of the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine. So, on Tuesday, August 1, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation stated that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, allegedly visited the temporarily occupied territory of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, where he checked the forward command post of the group of troops in the Zaporizhzhia direction. It was also reported that Gerasimov heard a report from the commander of the group, Colonel-General Alexander Romanchuk, on “the current situation, the nature of the enemy’s actions and the performance of combat missions by Russian troops in the Orekhovsky tactical direction.”

Already on Saturday, August 5, some media outlets announced the visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to the Liman direction in the Luhansk region of Ukraine. Later, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation officially confirmed this information. They stated that Shoigu talked with the command of the group of Russian troops in this direction and also handed out awards.

Outcomes and outlook:

The latest activity of Shoigu and Gerasimov may indicate that, in the light of recent events, both the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces managed to maintain their positions and, apparently, received a complete carte blanche from Putin. In addition to the intensification of public activity, it is essential to pay attention to the reduction in criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov by several war correspondents. Yevgeny Prigozhin is also practically inaudible, who, apparently, has retained his position in Putin’s entourage but has clearly ceased to criticise the military leadership.

Many observers drew attention to the fact that Shoigu was in very high spirits and was particularly active during his visit to the front, which may also indicate his stable position. The resignations previously predicted by many analysts are being cancelled or postponed later. From the point of view of Ukraine, such a situation can be considered very optimistic since the preservation of the current military leadership of the Russian Federation will most likely serve to preserve the corruption system, which significantly worsens the effectiveness of the Russian military machine.

At the same time, the question of the future fate of General Sergei Surovikin and his several deputies, who completely disappeared from the information space after the “Prigozhin’s riot,” remains open.