The visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China to Moscow and his meeting with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, is extremely important for all modern politics. Firstly, the visit took place at a challenging time of maximum aggravation of contradictions between East and West (the US and its allies even tried to disrupt Xi’s visit to Russia by issuing a Hague International Criminal Court’s warrant for arresting Vladimir Putin). Secondly, this is Xi Jinping’s first foreign policy visit since he retook his post as President of the People’s Republic of China. Thirdly, this is the first meeting between the two leaders since the Chinese “peace plan” was announced to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Fourthly, this meeting occurred under “nuclear uncertainty” when the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START-3) ceased operating.
The following significant events also preceded the meeting:
- Preliminary visits to Beijing paid by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, as well as a visit to Moscow by a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China Wang Yi;
- visit to Beijing paid by the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko;
- the concentration of all control in the PRC in the hands of Xi Jinping (by removing the Hu Jintao-Li Keqiang group, which was focused on maintaining partnership relations with the United States, from power);
- de-escalation of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia through the mediation of China;
- joint military exercises of Russia, China and Iran in the Persian Gulf;
- strengthening of the Pacific bloc AUKUS, including the decision to increase the number of nuclear submarines off the coast of Australia (the bloc is openly anti-Chinese in nature);
- the decision of the former President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou (who led the country during 2008-2016), to pay a private visit to the People’s Republic of China on March 27, 2023 (obviously, such visits never remain private);
- the banking crisis in the West, which nowadays threatens traditional financial mechanisms.
By and large, the main intrigue around Xi’s visit to Russia consisted of several points:
- Will an updated Chinese plan for overcoming the crisis around Ukraine be announced?
- Will Russia receive Chinese weapons?
- Will trade and economic cooperation between Russia and China be strengthened?
- Will Xi Jinping call Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as such a possibiilty was previously reported by the media?
Later on, one more point was added to the abovementioned four: will China (and its satellites) ignore the decision of the International Criminal Court?
The exceptionally warm welcome given to the Chinese leader in Moscow is notable. On the eve of the visit, the Chinese People’s Daily published an article by Vladimir Putin on the prospects for Russian-Chinese cooperation. At the same time, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Xi Jinping on a similar topic. The experts did not find significant differences in the positions stated by the authors of the articles (except that Xi’s article was written in a more restrained tone).
Vladimir Putin called Xi Jinping a brother and friend several times and stressed that they met forty times when the Chinese leader was in office.
Many experts noted that the Chinese leader did not use the term “strategic partnership” concerning Russia, replacing it with “strategic cooperation.” The word “alliance” was not mentioned either, and instead of “brotherhood” or “brotherly ties”, the calmer term “friendship” was used.
Even more delicate terminology was used by Xi Jinping when he raised the issue of the Ukrainian settlement. Judging by the tonality, there was no particular convergence of positions in this area. Instead, Xi Jinping limited himself to general expressions that China stands for peace and dialogue in Ukraine but simultaneously adheres to a balanced, objective and impartial position. Unlike Putin’s speech, there was not a single anti-Western attack in Xi Jinping’s words. Also, in contrast to past speeches by Chinese leaders, no comment was given that “part of the blame for the Ukrainian conflict lies with the NATO bloc and the West as a whole.” If Xi understands Moscow’s motives and position regarding this conflict, he has not said a word about such an understanding. Nor did he support Putin’s thesis that “negotiations on the Ukrainian settlement were disrupted last spring” and “continue to be hampered under the dictation of Washington and its allies.”
It is noteworthy that the closed meeting of the two leaders lasted more than five hours, and in total, the heads of Russia and China spent at least ten hours together in various communication formats. Obviously, during the talks, points were discussed that did not form the basis of the joint statement. Nevertheless, a lot can be unexpectedly announced during Putin’s return visit to Beijing in the coming months (tentatively – at the end of May-June).
However, a clear anti-Western position can be outlined not in Xi Jinping’s statements but in the two leaders’ final joint statement. The joint statement of the Russian Federation and China on the results of the leaders’ meeting makes it possible to read some of the agreements “between the lines”.
- The Russian Federation and China are sure there can be no winners in a nuclear war, which should never be unleashed. The Russian Federation and China are concerned about the intensification of US activities in the field of missile weapons and call for an end to undermining international security. This confirms the insider information previously voiced by Ascolta that the Russian Federation and China intend to sign an agreement on strategic offensive arms and offer a common platform to the United States of America. That is, to change the paradigm: previously, it was an agreement between Russia and the United States, to which they tried to join China, but now it is a joint platform of Russia and China, to which Washington, London and Paris will be called to join. Naturally, if the latter disagree, they will be declared the main threat to the nuclear security of the planet. A clear hint at a new treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the clause that “the Russian Federation and China believe that all nuclear powers should not deploy nuclear weapons outside their territories.”
- The Russian Federation positively evaluates the position of China on Ukraine, and China positively evaluates the readiness of the Russian Federation to launch negotiations. That is, Russia emphasises that it will propose to take the plan voiced by China as the basis of the negotiation process at all international platforms. Since it is a framework, it can accommodate many “wishes” from Moscow, which formally will not contradict Xi Jinping’s plan. However, Putin later made a reservation: the plan could be implemented in the West and Ukraine after they were ready. In essence, China will push Ukraine to accept the reality of territorial concessions to Russia, perhaps in exchange for investment in the rest of the country. Another significant point is that the Russian Federation and China are calling to avoid the degradation of the crisis in Ukraine and its transition “to an uncontrolled phase”, which can be regarded both as a call to Ukraine to surrender and a hint that the situation may get out of the control of the United States, as a result of which Ukraine will turn into a conditional Somalia.
- The Russian Federation and China are concerned about the risks of creating AUKUS and their plans to build nuclear submarines. Furthermore, the Russian Federation and China call on AUKUS to strictly fulfil its obligations on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the parties confirmed their desire to confront common threats in the Pacific Ocean jointly. Previously, cooperation between China and Russia in the Pacific region was limited – “every man for himself.” It is especially emphasised that the Russian Federation and China oppose forming in the Asia-Pacific region of “closed exclusive bloc structures, bloc policies and opposing camps.”
- Russia and China plan to strengthen their comprehensive partnership in the energy sector. The Russian Federation and China plan to promote mutual and global energy security. This is a response to the West’s energy embargo on Russia. The Washington Post wrote: “China and Russia have agreed to expand natural gas trade and strengthen economic ties through the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which could deliver 50 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to China annually. This represents a new reality: Russia becomes a Chinese resource colony, where the yuan will be their main trading currency by 2023, and Huawei will supply the servers. In addition, Chinese leader Xi Jinping introduced the Global Security Initiative as a new platform for global partnerships to move away from the alliance systems and global security architecture established by the US after World War II. This is reflected in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Biden administration has launched a standoff with China on various fronts, but it is a source of tension for other Southeast Asian countries that want the US to play a balancing role. US dialogue with autocratic governments has also been kept to a minimum, opening up opportunities for China to play a more active role.”
It is clear that the tendentious style of the article in WP is unlikely to reflect the actual state of affairs, but the general mood is clear. In parallel, Bloomberg also draws attention to the energy component of the negotiations: “Xi has been careful not to commit to a significant increase in gas purchases from Russia, as he seeks to avoid imposing tougher economic sanctions that could harm the Chinese economy. China’s balancing act with Russia was underscored in a joint statement that stressed that Sino-Russian ties are “not the military-political alliance of the Cold War. Putin has offered Xi at least 98 billion cubic meters of gas a year by 2030. Although this promise is higher than what Russia sold to China last year via pipeline, it is still far below what Russia supplied to Europe at its peak and is only a fraction of what Putin was counting on. Similarly, while Putin said a new pipeline to China via Mongolia had been discussed and “almost all” of the deal terms had been agreed upon, Xi Jinping did not provide confirmation. The Xi Jinping government is committed to diversifying supplies, and since gas is sold from the US, Qatar, Australia and Turkmenistan, there is competition in the market.” It is also important that the final document states: “The Russian Federation and China will jointly protect international energy security, including critical cross-border infrastructure”. Thereby, the parties pledged to jointly oppose Western sanctions in the energy sector.
- The Russian Federation and China believe that it is necessary to prevent bloc confrontation and incitement of conflict to solve the Ukrainian crisis. This paragraph sounds like a warning: fomenting a conflict can lead to a bloc confrontation, and a military-political bloc between Russia and China (with the possible joining of Iran and other countries) is viable soon. In parallel, the parties also pointed out that “the Russian Federation and China insist that NATO strictly observe the defensive nature of their organisation and respect foreign sovereignty.”
- The Russian Federation and China are concerned about the military biological activities of the United States and demand clarification on this matter. Therefore, Russia and China will now raise the topic of secret US biological laboratories (including on the territory of Ukraine) jointly. Moreover, this is a convenient opportunity for China to take revenge on the United States for trying to accuse China of being the cause of the coronavirus pandemic in the world. Therefore, the ball will now be tossed to the US side.
- Russia and China will expand scientific exchanges to ensure the technological leadership of the two countries. This paragraph shows that China intends to ignore the attempts of the US and its allies to arrange a technological blockade of Russia. Russia will be able to use Chinese technology, while Russia will provide its military technology to China. The moment is also crucial: China will recognise only those sanctions that the UN Security Council will approve. Unilateral sanctions – including from the United States – China intends to ignore or at least will treat them selectively. This is a very bold attack on the United States.
- Russia and China are pushing for the US to expedite the elimination of its stockpile of chemical weapons. Again, this is an attempt to intercept slogans from the United States as the West constantly accused Russia’s satellites (primarily Syria) of using chemical weapons. Also, the United States and Great Britain 2022 tried to show that Russia was using chemical weapons against Ukraine. Ascolta predicts that now the topic of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the United States will be one of the propaganda notes in the Russian and Chinese media.
- Another attack on the United States: The United States must take real action to address the legitimate concerns of the DPRK and create conditions for dialogue. This thesis sounds like outright trolling. The traditional US rhetoric sounds imperative: Russia should, China should, etc. In this situation, Russia and China decided to jointly indicate what the United States should do in the situation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the same time, this signals that the DPRK is under the protectorate of the Russian and Chinese regimes.
- Russia and China will strengthen cooperation in agriculture to ensure food security. The Russian Federation and China will expand mutual access to agricultural products and enhance investment cooperation in this area. The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China aim to cooperate in the mutually beneficial supply of essential goods and mineral resources. Obviously, we are talking about new markets for Russian grain and mineral fertilisers, in which China is interested. Theoretically, from the moment of signing the agreement on food cooperation with China, Russia generally loses its incentive to extend the “grain agreement” – especially if the West does not agree to Russia’s conditions regarding the revision of sanctions on many goods of the Russian agricultural sector.
- Russia and the PRC will increase the scale and optimise the trade structure, including through the development of electronic commerce. In addition, Russia and China are going to increase the level of financial cooperation and strengthen cooperation in the financial markets. These matters aim to create a joint economic base that would allow gradual reducing dollar settlements, getting out of dependence on the SWIFT system. As a result, it might lead to burying the petrodollar system, which has been carefully built since the time of R. Nixon. We are talking about systematic work to ensure the invulnerability of national financial systems from the influence of the Federal Reserve System and other global financial mechanisms. In fact, this is the most painful topic from Washington’s point of view. Putin also stressed that Russia supports settlements in Chinese yuan when trading with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This was especially important because shortly before this, as if specially for the visit of the head of China, information appeared that the Indian authorities recommended that their companies avoid settlements in yuan in trade with Russia and instead use UAE dirhams.
- Two more topics are openly anti-American: “The Russian Federation and China are against the imposition of values by one state on other countries, as well as the use of democracy as a pretext for pressure” and “The Russian Federation and China intend to increase cooperation in law enforcement to counter colour revolutions and other threats”.
- The desire to work together in the area of space research while simultaneously combating the militarisation of space was confirmed: “The Russian Federation and China are against attempts to use space for armed confrontation and will oppose such activity.”
- A significant point: “The Russian Federation and China oppose the militarisation of IT; they are for multilateral, equitable and transparent global governance of the Internet.” Obviously, in the near future, we will see a new struggle between East and West for control over the Internet, attempts to create “sovereign Internets”, militarise the Internet space, and use the IT sphere in confrontation (hacks, hacker attacks, etc.)
- It is also important that China and Russia do not challenge the United Nations as a negotiating platform and see in it the potential as a tool for resolving conflicts on a global scale. “The Russian Federation and China reaffirm their readiness to resolutely defend the international system with the central role of the UN,” the final document says. The parties also confirmed: “The Russian Federation and China strongly condemn the politicisation of multilateral platforms and attempts to supplement their agenda with non-core issues.”
- The final document included a significant issue for China: “The Russian Federation considers Taiwan an integral part of the PRC and opposes its independence in any form.” That is, Russia does not object to any form of resolving the Taiwan issue by China since, from the point of view of the two leaders, this is the sovereign territory of the PRC. In exchange, China supported an essential topic for Russia: “The Russian Federation and China are in favour of conducting an objective, unbiased, professional investigation into the explosions at Nord Stream.” Ascolta assumes that soon, in the United Nations, Russia and China will jointly try to push consideration of the “Hersh Report”.
- Russia agreed to China’s involvement in Arctic development projects, redirected the lion’s share of its gas exports to China until 2030, and committed to increasing the yuan’s share in bilateral trade.
Some experts mistakenly believe that Xi Jinping’s visit was evidence of China’s dominance over Russia and the transformation of Russia into almost a colony of China. In fact, China does not need to turn Russia into a colony: the incommensurability of economic potential is obvious, and Russia itself is trying to enlist maximum support from China. The PRC sees the need to build partnerships with Russia since the “shareholder” principle in this situation is more beneficial – given China’s ambitions in confrontation with the United States (partnership in this regard is always better than suzerainty). From the point of view of China, Russia plays the role of a trigger in the American direction, just as from the point of view of the United States, Ukraine plays the role of a trigger in the Russian direction.
The American Institute for the Study of War, even though it can hardly be attributed to authoritative and objective organisations, gives its vision of the meeting, which is typical for the assessments of most Western experts: “Based on the joint statement signed by Xi Jinping and Putin on March 21, the obligations China turned out to be more restrained than Putin expected. The President of the Russian Federation announced measures indicating Russia’s continued dependence on China in the energy and economic sectors. Xi, however, reiterated his commitment to supporting Russia in the UN Security Council and stressed the need for a political settlement of the situation in Ukraine. The language used in the diplomatic reports indicated that the deal did not contain a final and substantive agreement.”
A caveat should be made: it is worth talking not so much about what Putin was counting on but about what the West was counting on in the hope that Putin also believes in the same way. That is why the “Institute for the Study of War” approach is incorrect and tendentious.
In this regard, Bloomberg’s position is more accurate: “Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Russia was perceived as a political victory for both leaders since they strongly opposed the United States.”
Based on the results of the meetings, both the Chinese and Russian governments were instructed to develop a plan for developing key areas of economic cooperation. This issue was considered during a separate meeting between Xi Jinping and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. As a result, at the intergovernmental level, a “Plan-2030” will be prepared, which soon should be approved by Mikhail Mishustin and the new Premier of the State Council of China, Li Qiang. Dmitry Chernyshenko, who also heads the commission for the preparation of regular meetings of the heads of government of Russia and China, will be responsible for overall coordination. The strengthening of Chernyshenko’s administrative role is the simultaneous strengthening of his patron Gennady Timchenko and Sergei Kiriyenko (with whom Chernyshenko has excellent friendly ties).
As a result of the meeting between Mikhail Mishustin and Xi Jinping, new large-scale tasks were received (and therefore strengthened their influence): Andrey Belousov – development of investment cooperation; Alexander Novak – energy interaction; Tatyana Golikova – humanitarian cooperation; Yuri Trutnev – the development of interaction between the Far East, the Baikal regions of Russia and the North-East of China. On the other hand, it is interesting that Marat Khusnullin, Denis Manturov and Alexei Overchuk have not yet received their blocks of tasks. However, the areas they oversee are key in cooperation between China and Russia and are present in the joint statement and several signed documents.
Obviously, the visit left many questions, the answers to which we will be able to see soon. Putin’s forthcoming visit to Beijing will show some of the current arrangements and provide an opportunity to understand the essence of the game. Until then, making guesses and conclusions based on indirect indicators will be possible.
But it is very important how Xi Jinping himself assessed this trip. According to the Chinese leader, relations between Russia and China “have gone beyond bilateral relations and are of great importance for the world order.” That is, we should expect some global initiative in the near future, which was definitely discussed in Moscow but still kept secret by Russia and China.
