Apparently, Russia is further relying on Erdogan as an intermediary in communications with the West. Viktor Orban, Emmanuel Macron and Finnish President Niinistö are also considered mediators. President of Kazakhstan Tokaev may also be a possible negotiator from Russia. For this reason, some “liberties” are forgiven him (according to separate sources agreed with Putin in advance).
Putin’s big bet is on supranational organisations. The priority is set on the development of the BRICS and the SCO (although India is considered a big problem, taking an ambivalent position in this direction). It is important that on September 6, 2022, during the Eastern Economic Forum Arkady Rotenberg said: “The Eastern market has been of interest to us from time immemorial, it must be mastered, although, of course, this is a risk,” arguing about whether Eastern economies could compensate for losses Russian business from Western sanctions. In particular, Rotenberg stated that China is a difficult negotiator and will not do anything without its benefit. “In India, partners are more talkative, but no less complex,” he added and stressed that, in general, the turn to the East has already taken place. “The world has changed today, it will not come back. There will no longer be a unipolar world like it used to be. Globalization is over,” concluded Rotenberg.
Russia is also trying to maintain its interests in Afghanistan (the role of Special Representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov, who is personally acquainted with almost the entire leadership of the Taliban, has significantly increased here).
The opportunities of Ramzan Kadyrov are actively used to communicate with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Possibly, Kadyrov’s forthcoming transfer to Moscow will be associated precisely with the Arab direction in the development of foreign policy.
The concept of enhancing Russia’s presence in the Caucasus and the Caspian region (especially in Iran) is also foreseen.
Also, Russian political circles actively discuss that the so-called “Family” – a group of people oriented towards Putin’s daughter Ekaterina Tikhonova – is beginning to strengthen. First of all, this group includes the former Kyiv resident Kirill Dmitriev and the Minister of Economy Maxim Reshetnikov. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin partly belongs to this group via his common-law wife Anastasia Rakov (at first, Sobyanin promoted Reshetnikov, and also largely contributed to the business of Putin’s daughter). It is important to emphasize that Reshetnikov today acts as an antithesis to the policies of Mishustin and Belousov: while Belousov gives rather pessimistic forecasts for the development of the Russian economy, Reshetnikov promises economic growth by 2030 at the level of 17%, and the growth of real incomes of the population at the level of 20%.
Interestingly, the “Family” today is the main ally of the “young wolves” from law enforcement agencies.
The situation inside the Russian military apparatus is very tense. The high command is mired in intrigues. Three decision-making centres have been formed. The first is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with his clientele. He has access to Putin, and Putin trusts him, but Shoigu is opposed by a group of military generals who are grouped around the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the chief of military intelligence, is acting in alliance with Gerasimov. At the same time, there is a third group on which Putin may bet shortly. This is the group led by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Nikolai Pankov. In July, Pankov managed to unite under his control the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces (Viktor Goremykin, Pankov’s closest associate, was appointed to this position instead of General Gennady Zhidko, who was sent to lead the SWO). Pankov has been Putin’s trusted man since the 1990s. The President of the Russian Federation trusts Pankov – the latter’s duties included eliminating any dangers from the Armed Forces (most of the current generals received their positions and ranks thanks to Pankov).
At the same time, the officers of the middle command level express the greatest dissatisfaction with the situation. They directly speak about the inability of the generals to win the war in Ukraine, and about the need for new approaches to the situation. Obviously, some texts by Igor Dimitriev can be considered as the opinion of “thinking officers in law enforcement agencies” who do not agree with the high command.
“- Force – multiple superiorities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
– Troops state (motivation, defence stability) – the superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
– Means of obtaining intelligence – the unequivocal superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
– High-precision weapons – the superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at a distance of up to 200 km from the front line. The calibre flies, of course, further, but we have an order of magnitude, or even two, fewer of them than the Himers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
– Barrel artillery – the superiority of the Russian Federation (now levelled by strikes on warehouses with high-precision weapons);
– Tanks and armoured vehicles – the superiority of the Russian Federation (the gap is shrinking every month due to NATO supplies).
There is every reason to believe that in the coming months, the AFU-NATO will completely demolish the superiority of the Russian Federation in all areas.
This alignment may change significantly in the event of the announcement of Martial Law and Mobilization, but this will not happen with a 90% probability.
Authorities’ perception that the SWO is likely to be lost did not occured yesterday. It is the negative forecast of its development that explains the absence of strikes on infrastructure facilities (don’t talk about humanism: no one dies from strikes on the power system and bridges.) The explanation is simple: the less infrastructure is destroyed, the fewer reparations and the likelihood of the Hague Tribunal.
At the moment, the following scenario is highly probable. After the destruction of all the key bridgeheads of the Russian Federation in the north of Ukraine, the attack on Kherson will be resumed. The first stage, despite the heavy losses, gave certain results. A bridgehead was created in the area of Sukhiy Stavok, and the supply of troops on the right bank of the Dnieper was disrupted. Being a resident of Kherson, I would either get yellow-blue flags or head towards Melitopol.
The next stage will most likely be the Melitopol-Berdyansk operation. Its goal is to access the Sea of Azov. Whether the Russian Federation will be able to defend Crimea in the event of the destruction of the Crimean bridge is a big question. There is no positive example in history of holding Crimea in the event of a blockade.
The tragedy lies in the fact that the liberal bloc in our power is ready to sacrifice any territories for the sake of their well-being and security guarantees for themselves and their children. Under what conditions can the US guarantee them? I think the list will be something like this:
– USD 5-10 bln in reparations. The US investment should pay off. War is business;
– Complete withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine, including the “DPR” and “LPR”;
– Transferring Crimea to Ukraine, subject to the preservation of “fictitious autonomy”;
– Refusal of nuclear weapons and/or demilitarization of the European part of the Russian Federation;
– Governance reform. Formation of a government that conforms the United States;
– Privatization of all state corporations (oil and gas production, aircraft industry, metallurgy, etc., etc.) and their purchase by “Reliable” European companies at a “fair” price.
The alternative to all this is martial law, mobilization and real war. In this case, victory is possible.
The reason for what is happening in the first place is not the lack of people, but their careless use – that is, the organization of the process. If this approach is maintained, the shortage will be constant, no matter how much you mobilize the people, and Russia will be overwhelmed by a wave of funerals in the absence of the desired result, which will lead to a serious crisis. The shortage is just formed by a simplified approach, and to continue to cultivate it is just to grind our resources in the meat grinder of war. I’m sorry that clever people write rash words.
Mobilization of the economy, and society, the formation of a people’s militia from volunteers, partial mobilization of specialists in narrow specialities – YES! Combat units need to be filled with those who served in them earlier and are qualified… But declaring a general mobilization only using the military means that events that you never dreamed of will start. This will be a powerful smash to the country, which it will not withstand.
Keep in mind that the main scourge of the military department, about which I wrote earlier, is an attempt to create complete secrecy. That means a lack of control: everything that happens a mile away remains a mile away, and we will only give up what is not disturb anyone’s sleep. Therefore, military officers are not permitted into positions, and if they are, then a person with a camera walks behind them and takes pictures so that the military commander does not say anything superfluous … And not because the enemy will see it – the enemy is aware of us better than ours – but because that the first leader will see it.”
Thus, in the near future, Putin’s entourage will become more pragmatic, and imaginative, but at the same time more aggressive, as a result of which they will claim to spread the power of the Russian Federation in the federation. The defeat of Russia in the war with Ukraine will accelerate as many processes of the division of Russia as the processes of changing the elite and the attractiveness of the “Russian Young Turks”.
Some sources claim that this autumn Shoigu may be assigned to another job (according to the source, “they will appoint some kind of all-Union headman”). The question of a new minister remains open.
Information was also received that the issue of assigning Ramzan Kadyrov to Moscow was practically resolved – not to give some kind of influential chair, but to put his proteges in Chechnya (“special operation” was solved by one of the human rights activists from Putin’s point of view) – the destruction or weakening of the “Kadyrov’s guard”, now it is possible to take Chechnya without Kadyrov’s intermediacy).
Generally, the impression is that Putin was prepared to recognize the need to leave after 2024 and transfer authority to a successor – and a struggle unfolded between the old and selected elites, a real casting for the role of successor. At the same time, Putin must carry out the transfer, appoint a successor and make the transfer of power as smooth as possible.
