The study of internal political processes shows that in the modern Russian Federation there is an awareness of the “crisis of the elites”, which can hardly be resolved in the near future. At the same time, it is important to note that this crisis is not a consequence of the invasion to Ukraine. Quite the contrary: Russia’s invasion and the announcement of the so-called “special military operation” is a direct expression of the crisis that has emerged in recent years. The following key problems can be recorded: a) an outdated, incapable of innovation, model of public administration; b) a lack of career and social lifts and real competition, and as a result – isolation of authorities from real life, lack of new ideas and new activities; c) technological lag; d) unreliability of built political alliances and dominance of “bluff and audacity” approach in foreign policy instead of a well-thought-out policy.
These days Putin is being quite often compared to Nicholas I in the last years of his reign (the Tsar’s desire to declare the Ottoman Empire the “sick man of Europe” and take part in the division of the inheritance of this “sick man” resulted into a war against the European coalition and defeat in the Crimean campaign, as well as to his sudden death in 1855-1856). It is important to take into account that Russia’s defeat in the Crimean campaign set in motion “reforms from above” in the empire. It also led to the territorial losses, which Russia experienced after the Crimean War (the loss of Alaska). Now there is nothing to lose, and the enemy is not interested in reform, but the maximum weakening of Russia. Therefore, paradoxically, for the US, Great Britain and other countries, it is beneficial to keep Putin’s regime as a guarantor of the further degradation of Russia.
Political scientist Igor Dimitriev, who reflects the interests of the “new Chekists” (the group of Korolev and Co. within the FSB), published an interesting text reflecting the mood of a new group of elites surrounded by Putin (a group that may be relied upon in the near future):
“We need to honestly answer ourselves the question: why has the Russian Federation degraded over these eight years and Ukraine has greatly improved? The secret of Ukrainian success lies in the fact that the Western world – that part of it that was interested in creating a strong counterweight to us – was able to oust the oligarchic nest from power in Kyiv, all these Poroshenkos, Tymoshenkos, Akhmetovs, Firtashs, Medvedchuks, and equally less significant characters who have been grimacing on the local stage for 20 years – and replace them with little-known guys of an average hand, without big money in their pockets and Soviet-post-Soviet mafia garbage in their heads, who simply and diligently began to work according to someone else’s standard and someone else’s technology. Like at McDonald’s. They took the staff – and completely trained it from scratch. And only this – the diligent copying of the methods and knowledge of the main world countries in their “student notebook”, instead of the endless circus of Komsomol veterans, the Communist Party and the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR – gave a lot of benefits to Ukraine.
The Russian Federation totally missed and did not comprehend the fact that it is not dealing with the regime that formed in Kyiv after the Maidan. That this is a completely different government, and in 2019 there was an imperceptible, but much more significant revolution.
Now about Moscow. What happened to us is what happens to a person who, for example, lies motionless for months. Many useful functions of his body are out of order as unnecessary. Our system has degraded. After all, it stopped fighting for survival because it was opposed only by complete nonentities and it lost any will to act, motivation to do business, and not just reports and salutations. There was a puppeting of officials convinced of their own greatness, invulnerability, known omniscience and the guarantee of any success because the lackeys who compose court certificates always promise these successes. Yeltsin’s system was strong because it fought for life and death literally every couple of years, and the early Putin system, although it lived in conditions of gradual appeasement, still made its way through Kursk, Nord-Ost, and Beslan, regularly receiving terrible blows. And then the Kremlin fell asleep sweetly – and in the Kharkiv region, we all saw what these happy dreams lead to. Can you get up and go? – or our sleepy power, having fallen from the bed, will now only crawl?
I would like to believe that the current knockdown will help the authorities somehow shake themselves up, understand that the “SVO” announced by them is not United Russia elections, not rallies on Bolotnaya Square, that no one here plays giveaway, and that for free, nothing without doing, here you can only fly into the abyss. But it also happens that degradation has gone too far – and the worse the news, the more dangerous the reality, the stronger the desire to roll over on the other side and sleep on.”
The Russian Federation totally missed and did not comprehend the fact that it is not dealing with the regime that formed in Kyiv after the Maidan. That this is a completely different government, and in 2019 there was an imperceptible, but much more significant revolution.
Now about Moscow. What happened to us is what happens to a person who, for example, lies motionless for months. Many useful functions of his body are out of order as unnecessary. Our system has degraded. After all, it stopped fighting for survival because it was opposed only by complete nonentities and it lost any will to act, motivation to do business, and not just reports and salutations. There was a puppeting of officials convinced of their own greatness, invulnerability, known omniscience and the guarantee of any success because the lackeys who compose court certificates always promise these successes. Yeltsin’s system was strong because it fought for life and death literally every couple of years, and the early Putin system, although it lived in conditions of gradual appeasement, still made its way through Kursk, Nord-Ost, and Beslan, regularly receiving terrible blows. And then the Kremlin fell asleep sweetly – and in the Kharkiv region, we all saw what these happy dreams lead to. Can you get up and go? – or our sleepy power, having fallen from the bed, will now only crawl?
I want to believe that the current knockdown will help the authorities to somehow shake themselves up, understand that the “SVO” announced by them is nor elections of “Edinaya Rossiya”, neither rallies on Bolotnaya Square; that no one here plays giveaway, and that you can only fly into the abyss for doing nothing. But it also happens that degradation has gone too far – and the worse the news, the more dangerous the reality, the stronger the desire to roll over on the other side and sleep on.”
“Voenkor” Vladlen Tatarsky (focuses on military groups, dissatisfied with the military authority) writes:
“Here is an important difference between post-Maidan Ukraine and the Russian Federation:
• The average age of decision makers in Russia is 63.4 (actually 69).
• The average age of decision-makers in Ukraine is 44.7 years.
But it’s not just about age. But also in the recruiting system itself. Everyone, including me, was annoyed by the leapfrog and loudness of Ukrainian politicians. But as a result, over the past years, they have raised a new generation of politicians from activists, much more toothy than all these Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko that they had. So are other scopes. For example, in the army:
The average Ukrainian general is 47 years old;
The average age of a Russian colonel is 53 years. Generals are usually 56-58 years old.
That is, these damned Western curators simply created an alternative social elevator in the form of their grant organizations and let activists into it. And football fans were driven through the army. Here is the result. While the Russian Federation was busy with stability and continuity of power. Protecting any official post from the encroachments of various self-mades.
Analyzing these publications, we conclude that a group of young and ambitious officials and security officials has formed in Putin’s entourage, who demand reform and rejuvenation of the apparatus. This group includes First Deputy Director of the FSB Sergei Korolev, Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov, Presidential Aide Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Venediktov, and partly Sergei Kiriyenko and his team. They try to emphasize the need for reform and change.
The most serious blast to the positions of the old team that had been formed around Putin since the St. Petersburg era was the flight abroad (to Greece) of one of the most trusted persons – Konstantin Goloshchapov (known as “Putin’s massage therapist”). Upon learning of Goloshchapov’s flight, Putin made claims to Bortnikov, Rotenberg and Naryshkin, who actively patronized the fugitive oligarch, and also ordered criminal cases to be opened against everyone who was connected in business with Goloshchapov, his son Dmitry and wife Iraya Gilmutdinova. The joke in Russia is that Putin now has his own Rudolf Hess.
It is the “Goloshchapov incident” that shortly may become a factor in a radical change of elites (most likely this will happen after Putin’s 70th birthday – in October-November 2022).
