Among the potential hotbeds of confrontation in Eastern Europe, Moldova is increasingly mentioned. It is a small country located between Ukraine and Romania, which has (thanks to Ukraine) access to the Black Sea and the status of a candidate member of the European Union. In fact, for many years, Moldova has been a thing of interest to four parties: Romania, which takes an active part in the internal politics of Moldova (Maia Sandu, Natalia Gavrilitsa, and several other high-ranking officials and politicians in Moldova have Romanian citizenship); Turkey, which actively supports the Gagauz Christian Turks living in the southern regions of Moldova (in 2020, Turkey financed the restoration of the presidential palace in Chisinau, which was damaged due to protests); the United States, which is trying in every possible way to neutralise Russia’s influence in this region and secure maximum control over the Balkan region; as well as Russia, which does not want to lose influence either on Moldova itself or on a number of processes in the region, actively using energy blackmail and the Transnistrian factor.
Recently, the political situation in Moldova has deteriorated considerably. In 2022, many protests and rallies related to the energy crisis and social or political processes occurred. Similar trends persist as of the beginning of 2023: opposition forces continue to gather demonstrations against the current government, supporting protest moods in every possible way against the backdrop of rising utility tariffs, the energy crisis, or even the liberalisation of legislation. Of course, such protests have their organisers and beneficiaries, and they also pursue revanchist ideas in political terms.
In this article, Ascolta analyses the situation in Moldova to identify the main parties to the conflict that affect not only the internal political situation in the country but also the geopolitical situation both in Eastern Europe and the Balkan region.
Modern Moldova: Historical and Political Overview
Like most Eastern European states, by the end of the 1980s, Moldova faced a severe crisis of foreign policy guidelines. The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union led to the rapid strengthening of the pro-Romanian movements within Moldova, which provided more and more confident competition to Moscow. An attempt to abruptly change the foreign policy vector and the recognition by the Moldovan parliament of the “illegality” of the creation of the Moldavian SSR led to an aggravation of the Transnistrian conflict, which escalated into an armed confrontation (in 1990, the unrecognised Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (the PMR) declared its independence from Moldova).
Under the pretext of resolving the situation, in July 1992, Russia sent regular troops to the cities of Bendery and Dubossary bordering Ukraine, and the self-proclaimed authorities of the PMR unilaterally announced a complete separation from Moldova. But the conflict has frozen, and any attempts to resolve it still do not give any results.
At the same time, at the household level, there is a significant decrease in tension between the residents of Moldova and the PMR. For more than thirty years of the existence of the unrecognised republic, the situation on both sides of the conditional border has changed dramatically. Due to the large difference in the cost of several goods, residents of Chisinau go to the markets in Tiraspol (the capital of the PMR), and in the border settlements (between Moldova and the PMR), contacts are maintained, and even joint business is conducted.
In addition to the frozen conflict in Transnistria, Moldova also has an unresolved territorial dispute with Ukraine. Back in the early 90s, Kyiv and Chisinau agreed on the exchange of territories, in connection with which Moldova received 430 meters of the coast of the Danube River, where the port of Giurgiulesti was built. In return, Ukraine received territory in the Stefan-Vodsky district, where the section of the Odesa highway passes -Reni. In 1997, an additional protocol was signed to resolve the misunderstandings that had arisen (it is noteworthy that Petro Poroshenko signed it from the Ukrainian side).
However, after some time, Moldova announced that it did not plan to transfer any territories to Ukraine since the section of the coastline in the Giurgiulesti region already belonged to Moldova since 1940, and all documents were previously signed (including the recognition of the inviolability of the borders between the two states) are wrong. Also, the Moldovan side stated that Ukraine received only the roadbed but not the territory according to the previously reached agreements. Despite the fact that it is officially believed that this conflict was finally resolved in 2012, many still consider it controversial. In 2015, a petition even appeared on the website of the President of Ukraine demanding to find those responsible for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian territories to Moldova (however, it received only 227 votes).
At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR, Chisinau retained fairly close relations with Moscow. For a long time, local politics was dominated by pro-Russian forces forming the majority in the parliament. Since 1998, the control in the country has been formed around the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), founded and led by Vladimir Voronin. Since 2001, the PCRM has been the ruling party, gaining a majority in elections. In turn, Voronin was twice elected president of the country. The situation changed only in 2009 when the PCRM lost the lead to the Alliance for European Integration, which included the main pro-Western parties of Moldova (the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Our Moldova Alliance).
After the re-elections in 2010, Moldova faced an intensification of the confrontation between pro-Western and pro-Russian groups of influence, which significantly intensified their struggle for dominance in the Northern Balkans.
True, for several years in power, the alliance of pro-Western politicians has come across several internal contradictions and conflicts, making it possible for Igor Dodon to come to power in 2016. But despite close ties with Moscow and a wide field of like-minded people (both in politics and among the population), Dodon’s positions were not as strong as the Kremlin believed, which in 2020 led to the defeat of the pro-Russian forces and the coming to power of Maia Sandu’s team – more coherent, newer, more united and more pro-Western.
The Western lobby in Moldova
Undoubtedly, it is strategically necessary for Washington to expand its influence on the states of Eastern Europe. Moreover, according to the American territorial classification, which in certain respects differs from the European one, Moldova belongs to the Balkan region and is its northernmost region. At the same time, strengthening its own positions in Moldova for Washington can also be seen as a strengthening in Romania, which has recently become noticeably more active in the European political arena. Therefore, it is not unnatural that the US has been building strong ties and educating its elite over the years, using the entire arsenal of “soft power” technologies and an extensive network of international funds and grant organisations for this.
The result was short in coming. At the end of 2020 – the first half of 2021, Moldova experienced a major political transformation. Maia Sandu, who won the presidential election in November 2020, achieved early parliamentary elections on July 11, 2021, in which her supporters received a record 52.74% of the vote, forming (as in Ukraine) a pro-presidential mono-majority. Although the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova provides for more than modest powers of the president (under a parliamentary form of government), Maia Sandu gained control of the parliament, which was headed by her longtime colleague Igor Grosu (in 2012-2015, Sandu’s deputy as Minister of Education). On August 6, the parliament voted for the candidacy of the new prime minister of the country, Natalia Gavrilitsa, also a longtime associate of Sandu.
It is indicative that almost all persons in the new government of Moldova come from an environment brought up on Western grants and are the conductors of the interests of Western funds and corporations. This factor caused heated discussions on the Russian side, where, realising the scale of their defeat, they decided to recoup as much as possible with the help of loud statements about the “triumph of Soros and the US State Department.” At the same time, several logical connections are worth noting: Natalya Gavrilitsa graduated from the School of Public Administration. John F. Kennedy worked at the US Embassy in Moldova and later – in the structures of the European Commission in Brussels. Igor Grosu worked for Amnesty International and later founded several grant-based public organisations under the auspices of Western foundations. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nicolae Popescu worked for a long time in Brussels at the European Council on Foreign Relations, heading the Wider Europe program there.
Sandu’s opponents turned out to be unbalanced and disoriented. The pro-Russian forces (the socialists of Igor Dodon and the communists of Vladimir Voronin) managed to gain a little more than 27% in the elections, which makes it impossible to play an active political game and dooms them to the role of extras. Russia in Moldova made an erroneous bet on Dodon on the principle of “he is his own” and did not allow strengthening alternative forces concerning Dodon and Voronin – first of all, we are talking about the left-wing projects of Renato Usatii and Mark Tkachuk. Supporters of the odious businessman Ilan Shor immediately went over to the camp of the winners – the result of 5.74% barely made it possible for the Shor party to overcome the barrier and enter the parliament while slightly worsening its previous indicator.
Having concentrated the entire vertical of power in her hands, Sandu made a relatively sharp turn of Moldova towards the West: she defiantly refused to take part in the summit of the heads of the CIS, sending Natalia Gavrilitsa instead (Sandu said that since Gavrilitsa has more powers under the Constitution and she is responsible for the economic bloc, then, of course, she had to go to the summit, although almost all the presidents of the CIS member states were present at the meeting). Later, Sandu refused to go to the EAEU summit (according to her, the procedure was not completed, and the level of Moldova’s participation in this association was not determined – “Dodon signed something, why should we go to the summit of an organisation that does not have proper enrollment according to Moldovan legislation?”).
Meanwhile, Sandu declared her readiness and the need to meet with Vladimir Putin, but she avoided this meeting. Moreover, the official Moldovan authorities provoked Russia in every possible way, hitting sensitive points. In addition to the participation of President Sandu in the “Crimean Platform”, Moldova demonstratively honoured the veterans of the Romanian troops who fought against the Red Army during World War II and shut the Eternal Flame under the pretext of an energy crisis. Furthermore, at the level of officials in Chisinau, they again started talking about the need to withdraw Russian troops from Pridnestrovie and the final liquidation of the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
In response to Sandu’s policy, in 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, at the opening of a meeting of heads of security and intelligence agencies of the CIS states, criticized the United States and the EU, accusing them of putting pressure on Moldova and that “the president of this country is directly prohibited from even talk about the desire to have normal relations with the Russian Federation.”
Ukrainian factor for Moldova
The figure of Maia Sandu has been repeatedly compared with Vladimir Zelensky, noting the similarity of the political paths of the two presidents. Sandu, like Zelensky, represents the younger generation in politics (she is only five years older than her Ukrainian counterpart). Her coming to power was marked by a complete breakdown of the established political system in the country. Sandu managed to concentrate all the instruments of power in her hands: she received a mono-majority in parliament, her speaker, and her prime minister.
At the same time, after the elections, Sandu’s team faced several political and economic challenges related to relations with neighbours in the post-Soviet space.
In July 2021, the Ukrainian special services abducted the fugitive judge Nikolay Chaus from the territory of Moldova, who, accused of corruption, had been hiding in Moldova from Ukrainian justice for five years. The critical point was that in June, Moldova finally denied Chaus the right to refugee status, and he was subject to deportation to the territory of Ukraine. Furthermore, Chaus had many compromising materials on ex-president Petro Poroshenko and his entourage, and various Ukrainian intelligence agencies fought for the right to receive this information as a priority. As a result, Chaus was kidnapped and ended up in the territory of Ukraine: he was tortured and exposed to psychotropic drugs, destroying him as a person. This story received serious publicity in Moldova – the opposition demanded a harsh reaction from Sandu, including breaking off relations with Ukraine.
However, at the end of July 2021, Sandu met with President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the parties removed the burning issues. Moreover, on August 23-24, Sandu took part in the Crimean Platform forum initiated by Ukraine, which irritated the Russian side.
Also in August 2021, the parties announced the restoration of a 22-kilometre section of the railway on the territory of Ukraine and a 1-kilometre section on the territory of Moldova between the Berezino-Basarabeasca stations and the launch of a railway connection both along the existing section from Belgorod-Dnestrovsky to the port of Izmail and the port Reni – bypassing the unrecognised PMR.
Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sandu has shown all kinds of support for Kyiv and Zelensky. In April 2022, at the suggestion of Sandu, any symbols promoting the war were officially banned in Moldova: first of all, we are talking about the symbols “V”, “Z”, and black and orange ribbons. Moldova also provides humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and sheltered about half a million Ukrainian refugees during the hostilities.
At the same time, in June 2022, the heads of state and governments of 27 EU countries decided to provide Ukraine and Moldova with a European perspective and recognise them as EU candidate countries. It is noteworthy that along with Ukraine and Moldova, the candidacy of Georgia was also considered. Still, as a result, it was rejected (at the same time, on the issue of supporting Ukraine, Georgia continues to demonstrate its “neutrality”).
In November 2022, Russian pranksters Lexus and Vovan (according to Ascolta, they are a GRU project) published a recording of a telephone conversation with Maia Sandu, during which they introduced themselves as Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmygal. During the discussion, Sandu stated that she was ready to transfer part of the territories of Moldova (the village of Giurgiulesti) to Ukraine for several years. In Russia, this information was immediately presented as an EU plan to create a transit state from Moldova for the operational deployment of NATO troops to the East. It is noteworthy that at the same time, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said that the EU would involve the Balkan countries, Moldova and Ukraine, in a project to increase military mobility for the rapid deployment of NATO forces – that confirmed such rumours.
Energetical dependency
By the beginning of October 2021, it became clear that the Gavrilitsa government was facing serious economic problems. On September 30, the contract between Moldova and Gazprom for gas supply expired. For 15 years, Moldova has been buying Russian gas at about $250 per thousand cubic meters. It was possible to continue the contract for October, but at the same time, taking advantage of the sharp rise in gas prices on world markets, Gazprom raised the price to $790 per thousand cubic meters. As a result, the price has more than tripled.
In the summer of 2021, Maia Sandu said neither she nor the government was going to negotiate with the Russian side on gas prices and contract extensions. Sandu stated that this issue should be a matter of interaction between economic structures, Gazprom and Moldovagaz. At the same time, realising that in political terms, any disagreements on the energy issue will mostly affect the Russian side (as 50% + 1 share of the Moldovagaz corporation belongs to Gazprom, and the aggravation of the situation on the energy market would allow, ideologically, to charge all problems with heating in winter in Russia).
The opposition heavily criticised Sandu. On October 13, ex-Prime Minister of Moldova Zinaida Greceanii, during the Third Eurasian Women’s Forum in St. Petersburg, called on Sandu to abandon political games and focus on energy. “No matter how we spin it, Gazprom is our only supplier, and if we get gas through Romania or from other sources, it will still be Russian gas,” Grechany said.
On October 13, the government declared a state of emergency in the energy sector – according to the Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development Andrej Spinu, this was done so that the enterprises of the energy sector would seriously prepare for possible catastrophic scenarios. The state enterprises could take measures to ensure energy resources and the protection of citizens in the cold season. To save gas, several enterprises switched to fuel oil or coal. In addition, the population was warned about the forced increase in tariffs for utilities. The final figure was not announced, but experts pointed to the possibility of increasing energy prices for the population by 30-35%.
Initially, Moldova counted on the support of strategic allies, especially since Romania and Ukraine expressed their readiness to help Moldova with gas. Volodymyr Zelensky ordered to supply gas for the needs of the Moldovan economy. Still, it turned out that this was a negligible amount, and even then, it was provided on credit. On October 25, 2021, the state-owned company Energocom signed a contract with the Polish company PGNIG to supply 1 million cubic meters of natural gas. Moldova purchased another 1 million m3 of gas from Vitol (Netherlands). On October 15, MEPs Eugen Tomac and Rares Bogdan, who are in Chisinau, said that in the event of a failure of negotiations on gas with the Russian Gazprom, Romania would be able to help Moldova only with fuel oil and a small part of the gas, which could be transferred through the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline (the gas pipeline became fully operational only at the beginning of October 2021). The European Commission stated that it would be able to allocate only 60 million euros to Moldova for the purchase of gas, which, again, did not resolve the issue. According to government estimates, Moldova needs at least 3 billion m3 of gas.
Under such conditions, Sandu and Gavrilitsa authorised Andrey Spina (Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development) to negotiate a new gas price with Russia’s Gazprom. That is, the government was directly involved in the negotiation process, although it denied such a possibility back in the summer.
“Under normal conditions, the government and the president should not participate in negotiations between two commercial enterprises – Moldovagaz and Gazprom. However, when prices began to rise to unacceptable levels, it became clear that the government should deal with this issue because it is severe. Therefore, I called Mr Kozak several times; we discussed these issues, so the Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development went to Russia. On the other hand, both the prime minister and I talked with our partners in other countries to look for a solution, gas was needed today, but we did not receive the entire volume,” Sandu explained.
The first two rounds of negotiations ended inconclusively. And only after Maia Sandu’s talks with Dmitry Kozak, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, did the situation change: Gazprom’s management announced that negotiations with Moldova had made significant progress. On October 29, in St. Petersburg, it was announced that the contract between Gazprom and Moldova would be extended for five years. According to the agreement, Moldova will buy gas for $450 per thousand cubic meters. Gas supplies will begin on November 1 “on mutually beneficial terms.”
Interestingly, Maia Sandu gave an interview to the Russian journal Kommersant immediately after signing the contract. She pointed out that gas supplies would be made exclusively through the Ukrainian gas pipeline, and there was no talk of any operation of the Iasi-Ungheni gas pipeline.
In several publications (in particular, the Financial Times), there was information that the price of signing a contract with Gazprom was that Sandu, in a conversation with Kozak, promised to correct Moldova’s agreement on the creation of a free trade area with the EU. It was also about a possible accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which means rejecting the agreement on a free trade area with the European Union. However, Sandu herself said: “There were no such talks in the gas negotiations.”
Despite the compromised settlement of the situation with gas supplies, in 2022, Moldova faced increased protest moods in society, primarily due to rising prices for utilities, food, fuel and other energy resources. The opposition tried to take advantage of this factor by organising a series of rallies. So, in September, numerous rallies were held demanding the government’s resignation. Nevertheless, in mid-October, the Moldovan authorities introduced severe restrictions on holding rallies (any mass actions blocking traffic lanes, highways or access roads to public institutions were prohibited. Also, protests can be held exclusively on weekends and last no more than four hours).
Already in early November, protests were held under anti-presidential slogans. People demanded that Sandu resign and “stop the genocide.” Realising that the opposition organised such actions, the Moldovan authorities stepped up the fight against Russian influence and banned broadcasting six Russian-language TV channels. Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilitsa explained this by “ensuring the security of the information space.” Also, the United States imposed sanctions against the former leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), Vladimir Plahotniuc and the fugitive MP Ilan Shor, who is accused of organising rallies and trying to overthrow the government in Moldova. Later, the United Kingdom joined the sanctions.
The Russian lobby in Moldova
Despite the absolute defeat of the pro-Russian forces in Moldova in 2020, they gradually began to regain their positions two years later, trying to regain influence on the political processes in the country. For the same purpose, mass protests are organised in Moldova, which, having their leaders among the local opposition, are still closely connected with the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and its leader, General Igor Maslov.
It is noteworthy that after the defeat of Dodon in the presidential elections of 2020, long-term head of the Department Vladimir Chernov lost his post. Igor Maslov, who is responsible for Moldova and Transnistria, took his place. At the same time, according to Ascolta, new curators are behind the actions of the Moldovan opposition, claiming leadership positions both in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation and in the relevant departments of the FSB of the Russian Federation.
Currently, the Moldovan opposition (focused on Russia) is built around three central figures: the former President of Moldova, Igor Dodon, the oligarch and leader of the Shor party, Ilan Shor, and the businessman and mayor (mayor) of Chisinau, Ion Ceban.
Igor Dodon comes from the Party of Communists of Moldova (PCRM) Vladimir Voronin. In 2011, after an intra-party split, he left the PCRM and headed the Party of Socialists (PSRM). The break occurred against the backdrop of a struggle for Russian patronage. At that time, Moscow understood that the communists were losing their influence, and it was necessary to look for an alternative.
In 2016, Dodon was elected President of the Republic of Moldova. As the head of the PSRM, he often visited Moscow, actively promoting the idea of Moldova’s entry into the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, inside the country, he could not get a controlled majority in parliament, which significantly limited his opportunities (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). Moreover, the parliamentary democratic majority repeatedly suspended Dodon from office after he refused to approve specific laws.
The independent journalistic organisation RISE Moldova (apparently having close contacts with Western intelligence communities), which studies the political processes in Moldova and Romania, published several materials demonstrating Dodon’s close ties with the Moscow office of Igor Maslov and his subordinates. Thus, according to RISE Moldova, the schedule of Dodon’s trips and meetings in Moscow indicates that he flew there during important domestic political events in Moldova. In 2016 alone, before being elected President of Moldova in December, Igor Dodon visited Moscow at least ten times.
Already in 2020, RISE Moldova, in cooperation with the Dossier Center, prepared and published the project “Kremlinovich”, demonstrating who precisely in the Kremlin (in the so-called “Moldovan department”) supervised Dodon and other Moldovan politicians, as well as with whom from Dodon’s entourage, during the 2020 election campaign, a group of political technologists who came from Russia interacted.
The name of the project, “Kremlinovich”, derived from the nickname of Dodon. This was the name of the user account from which Dodon communicated in the secret chat of the BBM messenger installed on the BlackBerry phone. His interlocutors were politicians, people from business, government, the expert community (non-governmental organisations) and the authority partnership of Moldova. In total, several investigations were published, which indicated direct facts of the involvement of Russian structures in the political activities of Dodon.
Thus, the material “Curators of Moldova from the FSB” provides evidence that during the period when Igor Dodon took office as President of Moldova, the deputy head of the Department of Operational Information (GOI) of the Fifth Directorate of the FSB, General Dmitry Milyutin, the chief curator of Moldova from the FSB, was in Chisinau. Also, the statement of the leader of the Moldovan party “Our Party” Renato Usatii, is mentioned, in 2020 said at a briefing that the head of the 11th department of the DPI FSB, Valery Solokha, participated in pressure on Usatii’s supporters, who refused to support Dodon’s re-election for a second presidential term in 2020.
According to RISE Moldova, the Russian political technologists who helped Dodon prepared a document presenting a brief strategy for the work of the PSRM campaign headquarters in 2019. The record was also addressed to the curator of the FSB for Moldova, Dmitry Milyutin. That is, the strategic plans of Russian political strategists to conduct election campaigns of the Party of Socialists in Moldova were available to the FSB general.
The investigation notes that Dodon’s campaign headquarters was supervised by Olga Grak, a political strategist from Kaliningrad (included in the US sanctions list for participating in the Kremlin’s operations in Moldova). It is noteworthy that Grac also led the election campaign of the mayor (mayor) of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, in 2019. Interestingly, in November 2019, as President of the country, Dodon published a video he shot from the office of the Party of Socialists, where a group of about 30 people rejoiced at the victory of socialist Ion Ceban in the mayoral elections. Olga Grak also later advised another group of Russian political technologists who worked at the headquarters of Ilan Shor’s Shor party in the 2020 presidential and 2021 parliamentary elections.
In November 2022, the RISE Moldova organisation published an investigation, “Rubles for Dodon”, which cites the facts of close ties between the ex-president of Moldova and several politicians and security officials from the Russian Federation. The journalists published six bank payments from Russia to the account of the Dodon’s NGO (“The Moldovan-Russian Business Union”) for almost 5 million lei (about $300 thousand). Moreover, practically every tranche is accompanied by anti-Western or pro-Russian statements by the ex-president of Moldova and his associates:
- On October 5, 2021, Dodon, as a member of parliament and head of the Party of Socialists, published the call of the socialists to the head of the EU Delegation in Chisinau and other foreign diplomats “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country”. On the same day, a tranche of 2.8 million rubles (about 700 thousand lei) is received from the account of the organisation “Delovaya Rossiya” to the account of the “Moldovan-Russian Business Union”. The website of Delovaya Rossiya notes that the business ambassador of the organisation in Moldova and Pridnestrovie is the son of the ex-Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and a business partner of the Dodon family, Igor Chaika.
- On November 30, 2021, the website of the Party of Socialists published news with quotes from Dodon that “the party in power (PDS) is rapidly losing credibility.” On the same day, Igor Chaika donates more than 2.8 million rubles (about 700 thousand lei) to Delovaya Rossiya.
- On December 1, 2021, Dodon came out with another criticism of the Moldovan authorities. In a few days, another tranche of 2.8 million rubles (about 700 thousand lei) goes to MRDS from Delovaya Rossiya’s account.
Later, the US included Igor Chaika in the sanctions list because in the Kremlin’s operations, “the companies of Chaika were used as a cover for transferring money to the political parties of Moldova collaborating with the Kremlin”.
As early as January 2022, Igor Dodon’s NGO “Moldovan-Russian Business Union” will have a deputy head: a Russian citizen Vadim Yurchenko. According to representatives of Moldovan and Western law enforcement agencies, Yurchenko is an FSB officer from the “apparatus of seconded employees.”
- On February 22, 2022, 6.1 million rubles (1.4 million lei) came to the account of the Dodon’s NGO from Russia. On the same day, in the Chisinau branch of the Russian state news agency Sputnik, an official press conference was held by the founders of the Moldovan-Russian Business Union with a presentation of the organisation, which has existed for more than six months. Two days later, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, on the website of the Moldovan-Russian business union, Dodon continues to support Putin openly, persistently urging the Moldovan authorities to engage in dialogue with the Kremlin on trade cooperation and Russian gas prices, and the NGO news feed publishes accusations of Ukraine in the food crisis in Moldova.
Another prominent representative of the Russian lobby in Moldova is the young (born in 1987) oligarch and politician of Israeli origin, Ilan Shor. Ilan inherited part of his fortune from his father, Miron Shor. The basis of his business was duty-free shops and real estate received from the National Confederation of Trade Unions.
During April-November 2014, Shor served as chairman of the board of directors of Banca de Economii (BEM), after which, due to “financial fraud”, the state lost a controlling stake in the bank. According to the Kroll-1 report, in addition to BEM, Shor also influenced the owners of Unibank and Banca Sociala. This allowed him to become an accomplice in what was later called the “steal of the century” scheme, which resulted in 13.7 billion lei ($1 billion) being taken offshore from the three banks in question between 2012 and 2014.
Essentially, the scheme was to provide loans without any obvious business rationale. A carousel scheme was applied: loans in one bank were paid for with loans from other banks. However, a week before the 2014 parliamentary elections, more than $750 million was withdrawn from the three banks mentioned above in three days. The day after the financial transactions (November 27, 2014), a Klassica Force minibus (owned by Ilan Shor) carrying 12 bags of bank files was hijacked and burned. Also, reports of several transactions were withdrawn from bank computers. As a result, all three banks declared bankruptcy and were placed under the special management of the National Bank of Moldova. Sometime later, the Moldovan government, headed by Prime Minister Iurie Leanche, secretly decided to allocate emergency loans of $870 million from the state reserve to save banks. This action caused a deficit of about 12% of the Moldovan economy.
Despite several pieces of evidence and accusations, Shor decided not to stop and amplify his success by going into politics. So, in May 2015, during his arrest and the investigation of the “theft of the century” by the prosecutor’s office, being accused of fraud and money laundering, Shor was able to register as a candidate for primar (mayor) of the city of Orhei from the Socio-political movement “Ravnopravie”, which later was renamed “Party Shor”. This helped him avoid house arrest and participate in the election campaign. Moreover, Ilan Shor won the elections and became the primar (mayor) of Orhei.
To divert attention from his figure, Ilan Shor testified against former Prime Minister Vladimir Filat and businessman Vyacheslav Platon, whom he accused of organising the “theft of the century.” So, Filat received nine years in prison, and Platon was arrested in Kyiv and subsequently handed over to the Moldovan authorities. He was accused of complicity in the theft of the century and sentenced to 18 years in prison.
Shor himself, although he was sentenced to 7 and a half years in prison for money laundering in 2017, once again skillfully took advantage of loopholes in the legislation and took part in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Moreover, the national integrity body even issued him a “certificate of integrity”. Having entered the Parliament, Shor headed the faction of his party. However, after the socialists and deputies of the ACUM bloc united in a coalition, appointed the leader of the parliament and approved the government headed by Maia Sandu, thus removing the democrats from power, Ilan Shor left Moldova and moved to Israel.
Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office stated that he “illegally crossed the border, avoiding customs and border control”, and the Cahul Court of Appeal, which is considering the case of Ilan Shor’s involvement in the withdrawal and money laundering, issued a warrant for his arrest and put him on the wanted list.
After his move to Israel, Shor continued to influence Moldovan politics, actively funding his party and promoting Russian interests. As a result of such activities, in 2022, Shor, his wife Sarah Shor (Russian singer Jasmine), the Shor party and several Russian citizens were included in the sanctions list for interfering in the electoral process of Moldova in the interests of Russia. According to the US, in the last convocation of parliament in 2021, the Shor party acted in the interests of Russia. Shor also cooperates with the Kremlin to destabilise the situation in Moldova.
On December 9, 2022, the UK imposed personal sanctions against two Moldovan oligarchs: the leader of the Shor party, Ilan Shor, and the former head of the Democratic Party, Vladimir Plahotniuc, banning them from entering the country and freezing their assets.
The Washington Post calls Ilan Shor “the Kremlin’s leading figure in undermining power” in Chisinau, citing intelligence documents and interviews with politicians from Ukraine, Moldova and the West. The publication claims that the FSB allocated tens of millions of dollars from the largest state-owned companies in Russia to develop an agent network among Moldovan politicians and turn the political course towards Moscow. Also, referring to official documents and statements, The Washington Post writes that Russia sent a group of political technologists to Moldova, acting as advisers to Ilan Shor. And according to the documents, the FSB oversaw an agreement in which a Russian oligarch acquired one of Shor’s main assets to hide him from the Moldovan authorities.
Also, Chisinau’s mayor, Ion Ceban, is referred to as the Russian lobby in Moldova. Another native of the Party of Communists of Moldova (PCRM), like Dodon, joined the PSRM and entered the parliament in the 2014 elections. Then he gave up his parliamentary mandate in favour of the post of Chisinau municipal councillor. After the 2016 presidential election, which was won by the Socialist leader Igor Dodon, Ion Ceban became his press secretary and adviser on domestic policy.
In 2018, after the mayor of Chisinau, Dorin Chirtoaca, resigned amid allegations of abuse of office in the “paid parking” case, early elections were held in the Moldovan capital, in which Ion Ceban made it to the second round, but ultimately lost to Andrei Nestase, who received 52.57% of the votes. Subsequently, the court declared the election results invalid. Nevertheless, Cheban obtained the post of mayor of Chisinau later.
Despite declaring centrist and even pro-European views, Ion Ceban is often associated with the Russian lobby. Therefore, he focuses on connections with Romania and holds many meetings or events with Romanian politicians. At the same time, the Romanian Center for European Politics (CRPE), in its study, explains why politicians are willing to meet with Ion Ceban, who uses this for his political PR in Moldova. The main reason, according to CRPE, is that “Romania has always relied on controversial politicians, such as the former leader of the Democratic Party, Vladimir Plahotniuc.” CRPE indirectly links Ceban to the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc.
In 2022, the conflict between Ceban and the ruling party of Moldova, “Action and Solidarity”, escalated noticeably. In November 2022, Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Spinu sued Ceban, accusing him of refusing to turn off street lighting and being kept in Russia. In response to the allegations, Cheban said that the ruling Action and Solidarity party is doing everything to denigrate him and his team. Cheban also said that in the Action and Solidarity party, which led the whole country to beg, the main goal was to keep warm seats at any cost, and noted that for this reason, attacks on the city hall and he personally would continue.
It is worth noting that the decision of the US Treasury to impose sanctions on several individuals and legal entities from Moldova and Russia also mentions the party created by Ion Ceban. According to the US authorities, this connection is seen through the former FSB officer and political strategist Yury Gudilin. During the 2020 presidential election campaign and 2021 parliamentary one, Gudilin worked closely with the PSRM and its then-leader Igor Dodon. “Although attempts to influence elections in Moldova in 2020 and 2021 failed, the Kremlin continues to organise efforts to return a pro-Russian government to power. Recognising the loss of popular support for the old pro-Russian political elite in Moldova, Gudilin’s team offered support to the opposition political group “National Alternative Movement”). These influence efforts are closely coordinated with Moscow’s use of the energy factor as a political weapon against the Moldovan authorities.
Thus, in the opposition camp of Moldova, a Russian trace is traced, whose actions are aimed at the struggle for power and the restoration of former positions in a small but strategically important state of the northern Balkans.
Conclusions and forecasts
The situation in Moldova is explosive and complicated by many concomitant factors impacting the state’s domestic and foreign policy.
The protests in Moldova are also traced to the interests of Vladimir Plahotniuc, considered the country’s richest man. Three years after fleeing Moldova, he said that he “allowed demonstrating his ‘skills’ to the ACUM coalition with the PSRM, and then to ‘Harvard’”, and now he is returning to politics to rectify the situation. Even though, along with Dodon, Shor and Ceban, Plahotniuc fell under US sanctions; one should not attribute him to the pro-Russian camp. As a businessman and politician, he felt all the consequences of the Russian lobby in Moldova, which turned out to be ineffective in 2019. According to Ascolta, which requires additional confirmation, Plahotniuc may return to Moldovan politics as a conductor of Turkish interests. His stay in Turkey after fleeing from Moldova apparently contributed to the definition of new foreign policy guidelines.
In addition to the active confrontation between the American and Russian lobbies, one should maintain sight of the factor of Romanian interests, which actively influences the situation in the region. At the same time, one should not get hung up on the accusations of Bucharest of expansionist ambitions towards Moldova. Indeed, many representatives of the top leadership of Moldova have Romanian citizenship, which is not prohibited by local law (in fact, like many representatives of the opposition, they have Russian citizenship). Still, in this case, it is more worth discussing Moldova’s desire to become part of Romania (the European Union) rather than vice versa. Moreover, such a policy is actively promoted at the level of President Sandu.
The populist statements of the ex-president of Romania, Ion Iliescu, voiced by him back in the early 2000s, about the need to annex Moldova to Romania, have long lost their relevance. Moreover, the incumbent President, Klaus Iohannis, is pursuing a much more pragmatic policy and understands that such ideas will not only bring severe problems for the EU and NATO but will also be a blow to the Romanian economy (the population of Moldova is 2.5 million people (although some sources speak of the much smaller figure) with a GDP of $4.5 thousand. On the other hand, the population of Romania is 20 million people with a GDP of $16 thousand).
It is worth noting that back in 2010, the Plan of Moldovan-Romanian actions in the field of internal affairs was adopted, according to which Romania can assist in ensuring “public order in Moldova”. This plan gives Romania the right to introduce its armed or police forces into the territory of Moldova under the pretext of protecting it from external threats. In the current situation, Russia or Transnistria can be considered threats. Moreover, after the fall of the S-300 missile on Moldovan territory, such a plan becomes more and more relevant. Given that Romania is a member of NATO, implementing this plan will help strengthen the presence of Bucharest in Moldova (with a possible further absorption and unification of the two states), as well as expand NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe.
It is worth paying attention to the outright threats of the Russian side. At the beginning of February 2023, in an interview, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Moldova could become a “new Ukraine”: “Now Moldova is being looked at for this role, primarily because they were able to install a president who is rushing into NATO, has Romanian citizenship, is ready to unite with Romania and is ready for almost anything,” Lavrov said. His statement can be considered a warning to Moldova about the undesirability of pursuing a strict anti-Russian policy and full integration into NATO or the EU.
Also, one should not discard the Turkish factor, which is actively manifested in the South of Moldova. The territories inhabited by the Gagauz – Christian Turks – are an open area of influence of Turkey and Erdogan personally. The Turkish trace can also be traced in financing the elections of the başkan (the highest official in Gagauzia) and is closely monitoring the situation in the autonomous territorial entity on the territory of Moldova. Moreover, on the eve of the presidential elections, in case of any threat within Moldova, we should expect an immediate reaction from the Turkish side.
An equally important factor in Moldovan politics is the still unresolved situation with the unrecognised Transnistrian Republic, which is under the control of the Russian Federation, and about 1,500 Russian military personnel are still based on its territory.
In fact, we are talking about a very explosive set of contradictions, conflicts and agreements, creating a time bomb in Eastern Europe. And it is hardly worth counting on the settlement of the situation by securing the interests of one of the parties.
