In the Republic of Belarus, December 2022 passed relatively calmly. But unfortunately, the year 2023 began in much the same way.
The main event of the last month of 2022 was the appointment of a new foreign minister: instead of Vladimir Makei, who died suddenly, Sergey Aleinik became the new head of the foreign policy department (Ascolta wrote about him in detail here), in the past, he was the first deputy minister, ambassador to the Vatican and the UK. By and large, the change of ministers is unlikely to mean a difference in the foreign policy vector of Belarus – a state where the president determines foreign policy. Vladimir Makei could partially adjust the policy in the external direction (until recently, Lukashenko reckoned with Makei’s opinion). But Aleinik is a very cautious person (according to Belarusian experts) and will instead be a simple executor of Lukashenko’s will. However, at the same time, one should not underestimate Aleinik’s close ties with the Holy See (in particular, with Cardinal Pietro Parolin and Monsignor Gallagher), as well as with the British elites. Aleinik is expected to act as an intermediary in a partial settlement of relations between Minsk and London.
This is very well understood in Moscow, and they fear Lukashenko’s hesitation regarding the Union State may be associated with attempts to play on several fronts. Therefore, the traditional visit of Sergey Lavrov to Minsk for a joint meeting of the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia this year was also dedicated to an attempt not only to synchronise watches with the new leadership of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry but also to remind Lukashenko and Aleinik of the importance of the unshakable position of the two states in confronting the West.
Noteworthy was the remark of Alexander Lukashenko during a meeting with Lavrov and Aleinik: “We have questions that we should discuss with you [Lavrov]. You know my attitude towards you. I never hide anything from you. It is essential. Well, to consult on some matters. Therefore, I propose to discuss the main issues, and then we will talk tête-à-tête, as they say, on some topical issues. This is not because we are hiding something from Sergey [Aleinik]. Absolutely not. But there are questions beyond our official events today.”
This situation indicates that Lukashenko is aware of the level of Moscow’s distrust of Aleinik but is trying to balance it, considering all parties’ positions.
Lukashenko is really trying to flirt with the Roman Catholic Church and does not lose hope that Pope Francis and his inner circle (primarily Cardinal Parolin) will be able to agree with Britain on a more tolerant attitude towards the Belarusian regime. Today, surrounded by Lukashenko, the lobbyist for rapprochement with the Vatican is not only Aleinik but also the head of the KGB of Belarus, Ivan Tertel, a Catholic by religion.
Lukashenko’s argument: the Belarusian opposition (both the current and the old one) will not be accepted by the Belarusian people. An attempt at a coup d’etat in the current conditions will not be able to tear Belarus away from Russia and will not be able to bring pro-Western forces to power. The opposition in personnel and managerial terms is feeble. Eliminating Lukashenko will not solve the issue of changing Belarus’s orientation- most citizens support Lukashenko’s policy. The coup could lead to a civil war and the strengthening of Russia’s position (this was already shown in August 2020, when Russia very quickly took advantage of the protests in Belarus and began to dictate its agenda, including to the opposition forces). For the West (primarily London), the current position of Belarus, which boils down to diplomatic games with Russia without a concrete result, should be as beneficial as possible. So far, this position (thanks to the lobbying of the Vatican) resonates with some British elites. According to Ascolta, the concept of “treating Lukashenko like Generalissimo Franco” is promoted by several influential personalities, most notably Prince Michael of Kent and Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury (according to some sources, Welby also announced the theme “should not be reduced to same denominator Russia and Belarus”).
It is interesting that Lukashenko, after the fall of the fragments of the Ukrainian rocket on the territory of Belarus, gave the command not to stir up a scandal. An Ascolta source reports that Lukashenko said in a narrow circle: “This is not the first time he has arrived. People were not hurt, and nothing was destroyed – that’s okay. Neighbours have a war; it happens. After that, the command was given to ignore the very fact of the fall of the rocket and to refrain from diplomatic demarches.
It is also noteworthy that during a meeting with Sergey Lavrov in Minsk, which took place on January 18, Lukashenko said that he was pleasantly surprised by the position of Ukraine, which is being pushed to provocations against Belarus but has so far refrained from doing so.
While conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations with the West, Lukashenko continues to make public attacks on the West. On December 12, while agreeing on the candidacies of 9 heads of local authorities, Lukashenko instructed to develop of foreign enterprises whose owners left the market. “The tasks are not easy. My advice to you: now is the turning point. Someone left there and came. They brought technology and equipment. They invested. But whether we return them back or not is the question. We will develop our competencies ourselves. And we’ll make it. So get your hands on this business right now. From now on, this is your property,” Lukashenko said, which caused another wave of discontent in the West. From the official Minsk point of view, this is “forcing the West to peace.”
Be that as it may, Lukashenko managed to wind through “between the drops” in relations with Putin (with whom he met three times in December), one long phone call on December 2, and an unexpected visit to Belarus by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu). Interestingly, on December 20, Putin personally visited Minsk. According to the statements of the Belarusian opposition, Putin persuaded Lukashenko to enter the war with Ukraine. Lukashenko allegedly refused. However, Ascolta’s sources do not confirm the information of the Belarusian oppositionists. Putin was negotiating on an entirely different range of issues. The entry of Belarus into the war gives Russia practically nothing: the army of Belarus is a maximum of 15 thousand soldiers, primarily 7.5 thousand special forces. Also, a significant moment is Belarusian aviation – about 100 units of aircraft. But the entry of Belarus into the war with Ukraine initially changed the concept of the so-called “Special Military Operation”: Putin will thus sign off on the failure of the so-called “SMO” and the need to attract external resources.
The use of individual Belarusian military units in Russian uniforms and with Russian chevrons is allowed – but at the same time, this trick does not require enormous efforts to convince Lukashenko to accept this type of assistance to Russia. And there will be enough volunteers who want to fight for money on the side of Russia. Also, the use of the territory of Belarus as a springboard for further military aggression against Ukraine does not require additional negotiations and exhortations from Russia – Russia has military bases on the territory of Belarus, and the 1999 Union Treaty allows Russia to use Belarusian territory as a springboard.
According to Ascolta, the main negotiations concerned the possible holding of military exercises and coordinated actions of Russian and Belarusian troops in the event of an invasion of the territory of Belarus by Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian military (according to updated data in Belarus and Russia such expansion is seriously expected in late February – early March 2023, and, according to Minsk and Moscow, it should coincide with the counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia direction). That is, it was not so much about an attack on Ukraine but joint actions against a possible direct clash with NATO.
The second important issue for Russia is joint actions in the face of Western sanctions. Belarus provides partial re-exports of Russian goods and goods essential to the Russian industry, as some loopholes in European legislation leave Belarus with a broader window of opportunity. It is no coincidence that according to the results of 2022, the trade turnover between the countries amounted to $50 billion (in 2021 – $38.43 billion, in 2020 – $28.54 billion).
This situation has also brought significant benefits to Belarus. During a meeting with Lavrov, Lukashenko noted: “It is excellent that we have reached the balance of trade in trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation. Even a little higher – the balance is in favour of Belarus. This suggests that those attempts to strangle us, both Russia and Belarus, have actually failed today. We will definitely survive.”
The third issue is the continuation of the development of integration processes. This is the most challenging issue in this situation, and Lukashenko, going for partial integration, is still being prepared for a complete merger with Russia. Moreover, he is doing everything to strengthen irredentist sentiments among the elites. As a result, the maximum that Putin achieved in December was signing an agreement on a common industrial policy between Russia and Belarus.
The opposition in Belarus aims to split the presidential camp. Previously, having worked more or less successfully, provoking a conflict between Lukashenko and Makei, Lukashenko and Vakulchik, and later between Lukashenko and Sheiman, today, the opposition is trying to create the illusion of political danger that comes from the figure of Natalia Kochanova, the speaker of the upper house of the Belarusian Parliament. Particular attention is paid to Kochanova’s trip to Moscow in November 2022 and the Russian Order of Friendship presentation to Kochanova in April 2022. A campaign immediately began in the Belarusian opposition media, the participants of which proclaimed Kochanova “Lukashenko’s successor” and also started talking about the fact that the “Vitebsk clan”, whose representative is Kochanova, is now seizing power in Minsk.
The truth is that in August 2020, it was Kochanova who organised resistance to opposition forces and actually rallied the elites to defend Lukashenko and the ruling regime. Now the opposition is trying to destroy the link between Lukashenko and Kochanov.
But it’s not that easy. It seems that Lukashenko deliberately built the “Vitebsk clan”, headed by Kochanova. The head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus, Igor Sergeenko, the speaker of the lower house of Parliament, Vladimir Andreichenko, and the assistant to the president Alexander Kosints are also referred to as this clan.
The opposition Telegram channel “Seven Boyars of Minsk” wrote: “An important capital of the “Vitebsk” is Lukashenko’s vertical. The three of Sergeenko, Kochanova, Andreichenko and the strategist Kosinets, who joined them, one way or another, appoint and remove from the state allowance 64 senators, 110 “deputies of the tent”, the entire regional and local executive committee vertical, as well as “deputies” of local councils. Kochanova now has two (!) subordinates to the heads of local police departments, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the KGB, the prosecutor’s office, courts and other regional state institutions. Including the heads of military garrisons, directors of municipal enterprises and other hosts. The leadership position of the local nomenklatura and future power prospects in the vertical table of ranks depend on Kochanova’s group. It is the “Vitebsk” people who give them the right to dispose of people’s property, determine their share in schematic income, pay official salaries, black bonuses, and distribute other benefits to the fifty-thousandth vertical “brigade” named after Lukashenko.”
And further: “According to experts, the Vitebsk clan of Kochanova operates state and private assets of $116 billion” (which is an evident exaggeration of at least ten times).
It seems that Lukashenko understands the game of the opposition. He is in no hurry to quarrel with Kochanova. On the contrary, he restored the influence of Viktor Sheiman and partly of Valery Vakulchik. Lukashenko decided to strike at the opposition by proposing to consider a bill on the complete rehabilitation of participants in political actions in 2020 (which may contribute to the outflow of some people from Svetlana Tikhanovskaya). In fact, Lukashenko has built a system of balances and balances in which the Vitebsk Group occupies an important, but not unambiguously, leading position.
It is possible that during 2023 Lukashenko will independently prepare the operation “Successor” but on the principle of “leave to stay.” He weighs the risks very well, remembering the fate of Nursultan Nazarbayev. But at the same time, he also understands that the future of Nazarbayev was predetermined by several factors absent in Belarus. According to Lukashenko, you need to find the “right person” and get the “right guarantees.” He is eyeing Kochanova and (it is possible) will be ready to transfer presidential powers to her – but only so that she approves unpopular decisions. He can transfer power to Kochanova only if there is no way to resist Putin’s pressure to strengthen integration processes.
Lukashenko himself wants to avoid becoming a person who dismantles Belarusian statehood and eliminates independence. But he may well delegate these powers to Kochanova. It is worth noting that in a recent interview, Lukashenko said that the position of president in Belarus was not created for a woman, and it is unlikely that the people will support a woman’s candidacy. Such a phrase was either released specifically to test public opinion or so that from time to time, it would be possible to appeal to the fact that it was a woman who led to the elimination of independence. Currently, both options are rhetorical.
In this regard, it is very interesting that on December 30, 2022, Lukashenko signed several laws, particularly amendments to the law “On the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus”. The law establishes one parliamentary session instead of two – from September to June. At the same time, extraordinary sessions will be convened not by the Head of State but by the chairmen of the chambers. The rights of the Parliament to hear the Prosecutor General, the chairmen of the State Control Committee and the National Bank and to take measures to develop local self-government have been secured.
It is also stipulated that the President of Belarus, who has terminated the exercise of his powers, is a member of the Council of the Republic for life with his consent. The functions of the Chairman of the Council of the Republic include the exercise of the powers of the President in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Head of State.
It is important that, in this way, Lukashenko himself emphasises the possibility of nominating Kochanova as his successor. But do not forget that this law conflicts with the April (2021) decree of Lukashenko, according to which, in the event of the violent overthrow of the president, his powers are transferred to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus (General Alexander Volfovich). A collision could give rise to a war between Kochanova and Volfovich, between the apparatchiks and the security forces. In addition, several powers of the Parliament, which were transferred to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, were excluded, including the election of judges of the Constitutional Court and members of the Central Election Commission, the approval of the main directions of domestic and foreign policy, military doctrine.
It is very interesting that Lukashenko also signed the law “On amendments to the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On the status of a deputy of the House of Representatives, a member of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus”. Following the updated law, the powers of deputies of the House of Representatives and members of the Council of the Republic will be terminated if they have foreign citizenship, as well as documents from foreign states that entitle them to benefits and other benefits (previously, it was enough to hand over such documents to the personnel service). This law may become a “hook” for Kochanova, who also has Russian citizenship (which is no secret for most citizens of Belarus).
That is, a situation is being created in which Kochanova, with one stroke of the pen, can become Lukashenko’s successor, or she can lose her post – everything will depend on her behaviour.
A critical bill submitted to Parliament is the law on political parties. Lukashenko demands from deputies that only those parties whose activities comply with the basic principles of domestic and foreign policy work in the country’s political field. That is, the emergence of opposition political forces in the event of the adoption of this law will be prohibited by law. In essence, Lukashenko is building a “Chinese” model in which the parties existing in China cannot contradict the general line of the Chinese Communist Party but only complement and develop certain areas in the country’s social and political life.
In the near future, profound personnel changes should be expected in Belarus, the contours of which are still quite challenging to predict.
