Iran: a new anti-Ukrainian front?

Since its first days, the full-scale invasion of the Russian occupation armies into Ukraine demonstrated many weaknesses of both the Russian army, heretofore considered the world’s second army and the Russian political and military leadership, previously considered one of the most authoritative in the world. Initial statements about plans of capturing Kyiv and completing the so-called “special military operation” in a few days gradually turned into piles of destroyed Russian military equipment on the outskirts of Kyiv, and tens of thousands of dead or missing Russian soldiers.

Five months after the war started, Russia asked third-world countries for help for the first time. And, as it turned out later, such aid came from Iran, a state that, after February 24, lost its primacy to Russia in the list of countries with the most significant number of Western sanctions, while remaining committed to its friendly relations with the aggressor country. In mid-July 2022, news about negotiations between Moscow and Tehranappeared for the first time. Negotiations resulted in the supply of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will also be used on the territory of Ukraine.

Initially, such statements were denied by both parties, but by the end of August, the world received unconditional confirmation that the deal had taken place. By mid-October, it became clear that Iranian UAVs had a significant impact on the course of hostilities in Ukraine. According to official sources, as of October 19, 2022, about 40% of the energy infrastructure of Ukraine was damaged, a significant part of which was attacked by UAVs of Iranian origin.

In this article, we analyse not only the combat power of Iranian-made UAVs supplied to Russia, but also try to answer several questions that will help you consider all aspects of the distant but no less dangerous anti-Ukrainian front.

It is important to note that despite the absence of official evidence of the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia, Ascolta takes into account all the facts obtained during the study of the UAV wreckage, based on which, in this material, the designation “Iranian UAV” or “Iranian-made UAV” is used. If the Iranian side provides irrefutable evidence of its innocence, these wordings will be changed.

How closely are Iran and Russia connected?

The history of Russian-Iranian relations has both a few military conflicts and many allied treaties. After several wars between the Russian Empire and Persia at the end of the 19th century, Iran lost a number of its northern territories (including the current territories of Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi and Derbent), but retained access to the Caspian Sea. In 1921, the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship was signed, which regularised relations between the two states for 20 years. Later, in 1941, Soviet and British troops, referring to the same friendship treaty, divided Iran into two parts: while the USSR gained control over the North and the Trans-Iranian railway, the UK controlled the South and its largest oil fields. A few months later, in January 1942, the actual occupation of Iranian territories was legalised by the signing of the Treaty of Union between the USSR, the UK and Iran, which stipulated the usage of Iranian territories by the two states. 

After the end of World War II, the United States intervened in the situation, wanting to increase its influence in the Middle East region and minimize the factor of influence of the Soviet Union. In 1946, Iran denied Moscow a previously promised oil concession and also defeated the pro-Soviet rebels of Iranian Azerbaijan. Nine years later, under the leadership of the United States and Great Britain, the Baghdad Pact was concluded with the creation of the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) – for ideological reasons, an absolute opponent of the USSR. 

Relations stabilised only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Moscow supported these events, and the Soviet ambassador became the first foreign ambassador to be welcomed by the new Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini after the victory of the revolution. After the collapse of the USSR, Iranian-Russian relations remained at the proper level, although they were forced to partially freeze after the signing of the Gor-Chernomyrdin memorandum in 1995, according to which Russia suspended the supply of 570 T-72S tanks, more than a thousand infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, as well as spare parts for previously supplied weapons.

By the end of the 1990s, Russia successfully took advantage of the results of a very short-sighted policy of the Ukrainian authorities (when Leonid Kuchma, under frank pressure from US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, refused a contract for the construction of the Bushehr NPP in Iran), which made it possible to strengthen cooperation in the construction of several infrastructure facilities in Iran. With the era of Vladimir Putin, Iranian-Russian relations received a new phase of development and strengthening.

In 2000, Moscow officially announced that it was renouncing its commitments made in 1995 not to supply weapons to Iran. At the same time, the United States began to actively bring charges against Tehran in the development of technologies for uranium enrichment and further plans to create nuclear weapons, provoking the gradual introduction of Western sanctions. In turn, Russia first acts as a mediator between the West and Iran but gradually becomes more and more noticeable on the side of Tehran.

By 2015, Russia and Iran were already united not only by broad cooperation in the defence and energy sectors but also by leading positions in the list of rogue states, in terms of the number of sanctions imposed against them.

How about the USA?

The history of relations between the US and Iran looks no less confusing and consists more of confrontations than friendly relations. The formation of current relations between the two states began to take shape four decades ago – with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the overthrow of Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

For the Western world (the USA and Great Britain), the Islamic Revolution in Iran became one of the main losses: after the 1953 coup (“Operation Ajax”) and the overthrow of the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who tried to nationalise the entire oil industry of Iran, control over oil was established in the country by American and British oil companies.

On September 19, 1954, the Iranian government signed an agreement with the International Petroleum Consortium. Under this agreement, 95% of the shares of the International Petroleum Consortium were owned by 8 companies: 40% by the former AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), later known as British Petroleum; 14% by the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell; 35% by the American Big Five (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil Oil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Gulf Oil Corporation) and 6% for the French Compagnie Francaise des Petroles. Iran received 50% of the net profit. The term of the agreement was determined for 25 years, until the end of 1979 with a subsequent extension until 1994. The agreement effectively eliminated the 1951 decree on the nationalisation of the oil industry. The government of Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was, in fact, pro-American: a weak politician, the Shahanshah handed over all the reins of government in the country to American advisers. Washington believed that it controlled Iran with the help of the SAVAK (Iranian Ministry of State Security) secret police.

However, in February 1979, the Shahinshah’s regime was overthrown. Orthodox representatives of the Shiite clergy, headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, came to power. The new government not only terminated the contract with Western oil companies and nationalised the oil industry, but also, in response to attempts by employees of the US Embassy in Tehran to organize anti-government actions, took 66 diplomats and representatives of special services hostage, holding most of them until the end of 1981.

After that, relations between the United States and Iran remained tense and teetered on the brink of open war. This confrontation repeatedly led to tragic incidents (for example, the plane crash on July 3, 1988, when an IranAir Airbus A300 with 290 passengers on board was shot down by an American missile, launched from the cruiser Vincennes in the Strait of Hormuz; the United States refused to apologise to the families of the victims and pay compensation, although they admitted their involvement in the incident). In 1980-1988, the United States actively supported Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (which claimed the lives of at least 700,000 people).

In the early 90s, a new round of escalation began between the United States and Iran, in connection with Tehran’s accusations of developing nuclear weapons. This topic became decisive in the confrontation between the two states over the next decades.

A significant thaw in relations between Iran and the United States began to manifest itself after Hassan Rouhani came to the presidency of Iran in 2013. In 2015, the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (Nuclear Deal) was adopted, which was signed by Iran and the so-called “5+1” Group (USA, Russia, China, UK, France, and Germany).

According to the plan, Iran offered its consent to limit its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Official Tehran undertook to export to Russia 98% of enriched uranium while keeping no more than 300 kilograms on its territory. Also under the deal was a decision to reduce the number of uranium enrichment centrifuges from 20,000 to 5,000, not to produce highly enriched uranium used for nuclear weapons, and to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the country. In return, Iran would be able to sell oil on the international market and use the global financial system for trade. Also, Iran’s foreign assets worth more than USD 100 bln were unfrozen.

At the same time, even during his election campaign, future US President Donald Trump actively criticized the “nuclear deal”. He explained this by the fact that many restrictions for Iran are temporary and will cease to operate in 10-15 years. At the same time, it is important to note that Israel was also actively opposed to the deal, and connections in Jewish circles were one of the important pillars that Trump relied on during his election campaign.

On May 8, 2018, Trump officially announced the US withdrawal from the “nuclear deal” with Iran. According to him, since the conclusion of the deal, Iran has increased its military budget by 40%, began to create ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, and used the funds unfrozen as a result of the lifting of sanctions to support terrorism.

At the very beginning of 2018, the United States made an attempt to overthrow the regime of the current spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, without success, although for the first time in the Iranian history, protestors used the “Death to Khamenei!” slogans. According to Iranian law, is tantamount to an attempt on Allah (unlike Sunnis, Shiites believe that spiritual power should not belong to elected leaders, but to the elected, that is, direct descendants of Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima Zahra and son-in-law Ali, who are the Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei).

On January 3, 2020, because of a rocket attack on an Iranian military base near Baghdad, Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Al-Quds special unit, which combines the functions of military intelligence and counterintelligence of Iran, was killed (he was considered one of the most influential representatives of the ruling elites). Together with him, the commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (Shiite paramilitary units) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as Soleimani’s son-in-law and a representative of the command of the Hezbollah units, also died. Donald Trump personally ordered the destruction of Soleimani, although, as it later became known, the US military command and CIA chief Gina Haspel were strictly against it. According to Trump, Soleimani was the “terrorist number one” who was responsible for a series of actions – in particular, the assassination of the US ambassador to Iraq and provoking a conflict between the US and Saudi Arabia. Trump also accused Soleimani of organizing attempts to seize the US embassy in Iraq on December 27, 2019.

On January 8, 2020, the Iranian side launched missile attacks on two American targets in Iraq – the Ain al-Assad air base in the west of the country and a military airfield in Erbil province in the north (Operation Shahid Soleimani). The 35 missiles fired hit the target, but Iran reportedly killed 80 American troops, while the US reported none (in this situation, the US information seems more plausible).

After the election of Joe Biden as President, the US resumed negotiations with Iran to return to the “nuclear deal”. In fact, several rounds of negotiations in Vienna did not produce the desired result. As of September 1, 2022, Iran sent its final response to the text proposed by the European Union for the renewal of the agreement. In addition to closing the IAEA’s investigations into uranium enrichment at the three sites, Iran also demanded, in the latest round of talks, a guarantee that the deal would be honoured even if the US pulled out again.

By mid-September, massive protests had gripped Iran following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini after her arrest on charges of violating a strict dress code for Iranian women. A few weeks later, local authorities managed to localise the protests, which led to their complete liquidation. At the same time, on October 21, the Black Reward cyber organization announced that it had hacked into the internal system of one of the state structures and obtained important information about Iran’s nuclear program, which would be published if the authorities did not release detained protesters from prisons shortly. As early as October 23, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced that its subsidiary’s mail server had been hacked as a result of a “foreign” attack.

What are the relations between Iran and Ukraine?

Ukrainian-Iranian relations are more likely to claim the title of nominal than economically or politically in-depth ones. Since 1992, diplomatic relations have been launched between the two states – embassies were opened in Kyiv and Tehran. At the same time, after the declaration of independence by Ukraine in 1991, Iran became one of the first foreign states to recognize such actions. Already in April 1992, during the visit of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to Tehran and a meeting with Iranian President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a Declaration on the Principles of Friendship was signed, which stated that Ukraine and Iran would develop their relations as friendly and equal partners. and be guided by the principles of respect for the sovereignty of both countries.

In 1998, Ukraine and Iran practically agreed on a contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Iranian city of Bushehr (located in the Persian Gulf). True, the United States intervened at the last moment. After US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Kyiv and met with Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine announced its withdrawal from the deal, and Russia received the contract for the construction of the nuclear power plant.

In 2001, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and the head of the Verkhovna Rada, Ivan Plyushch, came to Iran. In 2002, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami visited Ukraine.

In December 2003, a strong earthquake occurred in the city of Bam, located in southeastern Iran, which claimed the lives of more than 26 thousand citizens (about 50 thousand more were injured) and destroyed a significant part of the clay buildings of the historical city. To help eliminate the consequences of the earthquake, Ukraine sent rescuers and doctors to Iran, who set up a mobile hospital on the spot and provided all necessary assistance to the local population. The group was headed by Georgy Roshchin. Later, Leonid Kuchma signed a decree on providing humanitarian aid to Iran.

In 2014, after the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea by Russia, official Tehran spoke out in support of Ukraine and stated that it did not support the actions of the Russian Federation. Also, Iran did not support the full-scale invasion of the Russian occupation forces into Ukraine in 2022. True, during the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution, the Iranian delegation abstained from voting, demonstrating neutrality along with other 33 UN member states.

A serious stunner in relations between the two states occurred in January 2020. On the morning of January 8, the plane of the Ukrainian airline UIA Boeing 737 was shot down by a missile fired by the military from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 167 passengers and 9 crew members were killed. Sometime later, Iran pleaded guilty and sent a delegation to Ukraine to negotiate compensation for the families of the victims, as well as a legal settlement of the consequences of the tragedy. The Iranian authorities declared their readiness to pay compensation of $150,000 to the family of each victim, but the Ukrainian side stated that this amount should be much higher. The negotiation process dragged on for several years.

After the emergence of evidence of the use of Iranian UAVs by the Russian military on the territory of Ukraine, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmitry Kuleba initiated the severance of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Iran.

At the same time, Iran still denies involvement in the transfer of its own UAVs to the Russian side for their purposeful use in the war against Ukraine. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said on October 25 that Tehran is ready to conduct a joint investigation with Ukraine to find evidence of non-participation in the supply of this type of weapon.

When did Iran decide to support Russia?

Despite the escalation of relations between Iran and the US, official Tehran has never shown much support for Russia’s actions, especially in the aggression against Ukraine. On March 2, 2022, during the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution ES‑11/1 on “Aggression against Ukraine”, only five delegations opposed – Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Syria and Eritrea. Meanwhile, Iran became one of 33 states that abstained from voting. The Iranian delegation adhered to similar neutrality during the adoption of other UN resolutions regarding Russian aggression against Ukraine. In particular, Iran has never recognised the annexation of Crimea and has always considered the peninsula to be Ukrainian territory.

In July 2022, Tehran hosted a trilateral summit of the leaders of Russia, Iran and Turkey. One of the key reasons for the meeting was the resumption of communication in the format of the “Astana format” to facilitate the settlement of the situation in Syria. For Putin, this was the first official visit outside the post-Soviet space since February 24th, the start of a full-scale invasion of the Russian occupation forces into the territory of Ukraine (before that, at the end of June he visited Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).

In Tehran, the Russian president held a series of meetings with Iranian leaders – President Ebrahim Raisi and the country’s spiritual leader, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Following the meeting, they focused on the record growth in trade between the two states, as well as on the overall strengthening of bilateral relations. Moreover, against the backdrop of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tehran, Russian Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company NIOC signed a memorandum of understanding and concluded a $40 bln deal, which includes, among other things, the development of two gas and six oil fields. At the same time, there was no mention of any agreements on the provision of weapons, especially for their use in Ukraine.

It is important to note that both Iran and Turkey initially did not support imposing restrictions against Russia, advocating the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine and the start of the negotiation process. Moreover, it was in Tehran that Putin and Erdogan reached interim agreements on the “grain deal”, later finalised in Istanbul and signed on July 22.

At the same time, on July 12, a week before the summit in Tehran, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan officially announced that Iran was preparing to provide Russia with UAVs, as well as send instructors to train in their use. In response to Sullivan’s similar accusation, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein-Amir Abdollahian said that his country is avoiding any actions that could lead to further escalation in Ukraine, including the supply of military equipment: “We have defence agreements with Russia, but we will not help either side of the conflict.”

A few months later, information about the provision of Iranian UAVs to Russia was confirmed by their explicit use on the territory of Ukraine. On September 13, the Armed Forces of Ukraine shot down the first UAV of Iranian origin over Kupyansk, Kharkiv region. Almost immediately, the question of what agreements were reached between Russia and Iran, whose official representatives still deny providing their UAVs to the Russian side, came to the fore.

What did Iran get in return?

After confirming the presence of Iranian UAVs in Russian service and their active usage in Ukraine, many Ukrainian politicians and experts agreed that the deal was reached on a commercial basis. Sources of American media stated that Russia had bought about 300 UAVs of Iranian production. At the same time, frankly, Tehran’s exclusively commercial interest was in doubt since it is quite difficult to call Iran a poor country despite many sanctions.

At the same time, it is important to pay attention to one more detail. Jake Sullivan’s statement came a few days before US President Joe Biden’s scheduled visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia. During it he was going to discuss the possible coordination of regional states in their opposition to Iran. This also applied to initiatives to create joint missile defence and air defence systems in the region against Tehran, whose UAVs, along with cruise and ballistic missiles, become a serious threat to its regional opponents.

In this situation, it is proposed to consider two important points. Firstly, after the US withdrew from the “nuclear deal”, the escalation of relations between Washington and Tehran reached a new level. At the same time, Iran, apparently, has chosen a strategy of constructive communication and sober thinking in the negotiation process with the West. This approach markedly changed the attitude of the democratic world towards official Tehran: the European states remained committed to the “nuclear deal” and preferred to continue the negotiation process. Thus, the stable image of a “terrorist state” that was actively formed around Iran by American efforts, albeit slowly but quite confidently, began to disperse. Tehran has significantly strengthened the diplomatic front and learned to respond to external challenges by raising or lowering rates, depending on the situation. This approach has been repeatedly demonstrated both in the negotiation process with the United States and in political processes at the regional level.

Secondly, Iran is a powerful regional player: in 2019, thanks to the initiatives of Iran and with the support of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, an agreement was signed on the status of the Caspian Sea, as a result of which the United States lost the opportunity to influence the Caspian. In 2016, Iran contributed to the withdrawal of Pakistan from the sphere of influence of the United States (this led to an aggravation of relations between the United States and Pakistan). In 2019, under the expressive Iranian influence, the Iraqi authorities began to actively distance themselves from the United States, and in early 2020, the Iraqi Majlis demanded that the United States withdraw its troops from the country. Also, Iran is in constant conflict with another US partner in the region – Saudi Arabia. Initially, the religious strife (the Saudis are Sunnis by religion, and the Iranians are Shiites) was aggravated by economic contradictions (the struggle for the oil market) and the struggle for regional leadership. Iran constantly supports anti-Saudi actions in the region (for example, the Houthis movement in Yemen). In addition, Iran is one of the constituent elements of the “Middle East Triangle”, which includes Russia, Iran and Turkey. The triangle is openly anti-American in nature and has led to a serious defeat for the United States in the region (Syria).

Based on this, it can be assumed that by handing over the UAV to Russia, Iran could again demonstrate to the United States its dissatisfaction with Washington’s actions in the Middle East region. At the same time, this option should be considered only theoretically.

What equipment does Iran supply to Russia?

Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in the military sphere has been maintained at a fairly high level since the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of a new order in the Caspian region, cooperation between the two states acquired a strategic character, and Iran became one of the most promising markets for the sale of various types of weapons for Russia. In the early 90s, contracts were signed between the two states for the supply to Tehran, as well as the further maintenance of many types of equipment: T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, aircraft and missiles of various types. True, in 1995 Russia was forced to curtail such cooperation under US pressure.

In connection with the previously mentioned signing of the Gora-Chernomyrdin memorandum, Iran did not receive 570 T-72S tanks, more than a thousand infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, as well as spare parts for previously delivered weapons, which, according to official standards, as of 1995, consisted of 24 MiG-29 fighters, 12 Su-24MK bombers, three Varshavyanka diesel submarines, 422 T-72S tanks, 413 BMP-2s, S-200 air defence systems and more. At the same time, already in 2000, Russia abandoned agreements with the United States and resumed military contracts with Iran. Over the next twenty years, such cooperation only developed and strengthened.

During the last visit of the Russian president to Tehran, following the meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Putin said that at present, an absolutely new level of strategic partnership has been reached between the states, including in the military sphere. At the same time, one of the largest Chinese publications oriented to the Western audience, Global Time, said that Putin’s visit to Tehran was another slap in the face for Biden and his policy towards the region.

Since this article deals directly with Iranian UAVs, which have been actively involved in the bombing of Ukrainian territories for two months, we suggest focusing on the supply of this type of military equipment.

An active discussion of the supply of Iranian UAVs to Russia began at the end of August 2022 – a month and a half after the first US statement and Putin’s visit to Tehran, during which, presumably, certain agreements on this issue could be reached. As early as July 17 (that is before Putin visited Iran), The New York Times, citing its own sources, stated that Moscow could have received 300 drones from Tehran. At the same time, the first official statement about the number of Iranian UAVs in service with the Russian occupation forces was made by Volodymyr Zelensky on October 11, the day after the first mass shelling of Ukrainian territories using those same UAVs. According to Zelensky, Russia has bought 2,400 similar Shahed-136 kamikaze UAVs from Iran.

It is noteworthy that there are no official statements about the purchase or sale of UAVs. Actually, as well as information about the exact number of drones that could appear in service with the Russian occupation forces. At the same time, Western intelligence structures claim to have recorded four flights of Il-76 aircraft, which delivered UAVs from Iran to Russia. In this case, it becomes clear that only a few hundred such UAVs could have been delivered in this way, and this is much less than the Ukrainian president claims.

Currently, it is reliably known about the use of at least two types of Iranian UAVs on the territory of Ukraine. The most famous is the kamikaze drone “Shahed-136” (translated as “observer” or “witness”). With the help of this UAV, mass strikes were carried out on energy infrastructure facilities in different regions of Ukraine on October 10, 2022. It was also used during other mass attacks in Ukraine.

“Shahed-136” was developed in 2020 in Iran as a means of combating air defence systems and artillery installations. With a warhead weight of 50 kg, the Iranian Shaheed can fly up to 1,000 km, although Western intelligence says that in fact, it can cover a distance of no more than a few hundred kilometres. The cruising speed of the UAV reaches 180 km/h. Flight altitude 60-4000 meters. The glider of the apparatus is made according to the “tailless” scheme. With a length of 3 meters, the wingspan is about 2 meters. Drones are launched using special containers that can be mounted on almost any truck. Nothing is known about the drone guidance system. 

After analysing several terrorist attacks committed by this type of Iranian UAVs, as well as studying their wreckage and individual parts, many experts stated that the use of such weapons was quite effective. On October 20, the British edition of The Guardian published an article stating that Shahed-136 drones cost Russia less than their destruction by the Ukrainian military. “Since the price of Iranian Shahed-136 UAVs is between EUR 20,000 and 50,000 per unit, the total cost of failed drone attacks carried out by Russia against Ukraine in recent weeks is estimated by military analysts to be between USD 11.66 and 17. 9 mln,” the message says. At the same time, Ukraine uses MiG-29 aircraft, S-300 cruise missiles, NASAMS systems and small arms to destroy UAVs. In the same material, the figure of USD 27.14 mln is mentioned, which Ukraine had to spend on the destruction of Iranian UAVs in the period from September 13 to October 17.

Shahed-136 technology really surprises both with its primitiveness and effectiveness when used to hit targets. In fact, this drone consists of an Iranian or Chinese-made MADO MD 555 two-stroke gasoline engine, which is an exact copy of the German Limbach L550E engine, a fibre optic body, a wooden propeller and a primitive navigation system. It is worth noting that a similar engine is installed on other Iranian UAVs, for example, Ababil, IAI Searcher, ZALA 421-20 and Qods Mohajer. That is, it can be noted that this engine is used by all major UAV manufacturing companies in Iran. 

In 2014, photographs of the engine and its components were presented for the production of UAVs and published on one of the Iranian Internet forums. Amongst, there were photos of UAVs with wooden propellers. 

Interestingly, that according to the information from the Ukrainian military, microprocessors made in South Korea and Malaysia and bought with a deception of sanctions were discovered in Shahed-136 drones.

The second type of UAVs, less actively used on the territory of Ukraine, is the Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drone for multispectral surveillance, with the ability to carry up to four high-precision guided munitions.

According to official data, “Mohajer-6” is built on a two-beam scheme with a pusher propeller. The takeoff weight is 670 kg, and the payload is 100 kg. Anti-tank missiles can be mounted on four hardpoints, which are used on a fire-and-forget basis. It has a fixed tricycle chassis. It is launched and recovered by takeoff/landing on the runway. Equipped with an autopilot system capable of automatic takeoff and landing. In addition, the manufacturer describes it as capable of being equipped with electronic support, communications jamming, or electronic warfare payloads. 

This type of Iranian UAV is fairly new. Its production, in the configuration that is currently used, began only in 2018, and as of 2022, 210 Mohajer-6 units are reliably known. In addition to Iran itself, these drones are in service with the armies of Iraq, Venezuela, and, more recently, Russia.

In essence, Russian occupying forces are using Mohajer-6s in Ukraine to guide Geran-2 suicide drones on their targets. At the same time, the Mohajer-6 was shot down in early September over the Black Sea carrying the Qaem 5 bomb.

In general, it can be noted that, until recently, the Mohajer-6 was a practically unexplored type of Iranian-made UAV. A copy shot down in Ukraine, due to the lack of serious damage (it was “landed” in the sea), made it possible to study in some detail all the technologies and components of the drone. At the same time, for the entire period of use of Iranian drones in Ukraine, only one Mohajer-6 was shot down.

Due to the integrity of the received copy, representatives of Ukrainian intelligence noticed one very interesting detail related to the engines for the Mohajer-6 UAV. In addition to the standard engines installed on this type of drone (MADO MD 555), spare parts from a similar engine, but already from the Austrian company Rotax Aircraft Engines, were found in several UAVs shot down over Ukraine. The Austrian company confirmed this information and announced the launch of its own investigation since representatives of the brand “did not give any permission to their distributors to supply military UAV manufacturers to Iran or Russia.”

Later, representatives of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense stated that during the dismantling of the drone, which was shot down over the Black Sea and practically did not suffer, Japanese, Chinese and American cameras, as well as a laser rangefinder, were also found. They also noted that such spare parts can be purchased legally since they are intended for free sale. 

Why UAVs?

According to the statement of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov, a conditional testing ground appeared in Ukraine during the war. It could be used for testing new types of weapons (not to be confused with the propaganda of the Russian Defense Ministry about turning Ukraine into a testing ground for Western weapons!). UAVs of various types are also actively used in the war on both sides. With their help, enemy positions are determined and targeted, and then the adjustment of artillery fire is carried out. Moreover, according to the statements of the Russian side, not only aerial drones are used in Ukraine, but also underwater ones.

At the end of October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked Western allies to provide Kyiv with a thousand drones, which once again demonstrated the importance of having this type of equipment for warfare.

From the very beginning of the invasion of the Russian occupation forces into the territory of Ukraine, the most famous UAVs used by the Ukrainian side to strike at the accumulation of enemy equipment were the Turkish Bayraktar TV-2. Widely known for their high efficiency, these UAVs have become one of the symbols of Ukrainian opposition to Russian aggression. Moreover, Haluk Bayraktar, the head of the UAV manufacturing company, said that the company plans to build a plant in Ukraine in two years.

In addition to military and special UAVs capable of hitting large targets, commercial drones are also actively used on the battlefield, originally designed for video filming, as well as the so-called agricultural (technical) drones. Both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries upgrade UAVs with special equipment, allowing them to carry small explosive devices and drop them on a target from a small height.

Many of these drones come from China. Ukrainian soldiers accuse a Chinese manufacturer, DJI, the market leader, of passing important military information to Russia. DJI denies this. Moreover, Western armies also have Chinese drones at their disposal, originally intended for commercial use.

After the start of the use of Geran-2 drones by the Russian occupation forces, which are essentially Iranian Shahed-136 UAVs, but with a changed name, it became clear that this type of weapon is highly effective for the intended purposes. In just a few days, with the help of several dozen such drones, the Russian side disabled about 40% of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure and also demonstrated that the use of this type of weapon is cheaper than protection from it.

It is also important to note that despite the regular statements by the Russian side that the Geran 2 are domestic drones, there is no information in the public domain about the production technology, the enterprise that can assemble such drones or test flights of UAV data. You will not even find a Wikipedia page that provides at least some information about the Geranium 2 drone, although almost every Iranian drone has such a page.

In this situation, it can be stated that the use of Iranian UAVs by Russia for a certain time gave it an advantage and even managed to change the course of hostilities. True, a few weeks later, Ukrainian air defence systems demonstrated high performance in the matter of destroying UAVs.

Nevertheless, the UAV is still one of the most important types of equipment used by both sides during hostilities, and one cannot deny their effectiveness.

How dangerous are Iranian UAVs?

In mid-September, The Wall Street Journal, citing the commander of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel Rodion Kulagin, reported that as a result of attacks by Iranian kamikaze drones, five Ukrainian artillery systems and two armoured personnel carriers were blown up.

On October 10, the first massive rocket attack, imposed by Russian troops, took place and affected Kyiv, Lviv, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Dnipro and other Ukrainian cities. It became one of the largest air attacks Ukraine has suffered since the beginning of the war. More than 100 air strikes were inflicted on the territory of Ukraine.

According to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia launched a total of 86 Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicles that day, 60 per cent of which were shot down by Ukrainian air defence forces.

In a commentary for DW, Israeli military expert David Gendelman explains Russia’s use of Iranian UAVs as a desire to compensate for the shortage of other ammunition. “Loitering ammunition can patrol a certain area for some time and either independently search for a target, or receive instructions from other aircraft – another drone, aircraft or satellite. And after that, strike an immediate blow, ”says Gendelman. “This is – according to him – a classic application of this type of drone. But specifically “Shahed-136” are used in Ukraine in a blind version, without an optical guidance system, immediately flying to the target without patrolling. Their targets are stationary objects of Ukrainian infrastructure, for which there is no need to hunt,” the expert explains.

The danger of Iranian UAVs, among other things, is that their weight – about 200 kilograms – and low flight altitude make drones a much less accessible target for air defence systems: it is difficult for radars to detect them.

As drones typically carry 10 times less payload than missiles, they need many more of them and are not capable of causing the instant destructive effect of a cruise or ballistic missile. At the same time, shooting down 10-20 UAVs for the Ukrainian air defence system is a much more difficult task than destroying a few missiles.

Where does Iran get such weapons?

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 provoked the imposition by the United States of severe economic sanctions and an international arms embargo on Tehran. At the same time, Iran needed the supply of military equipment, as well as spare parts for repairs. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was responsible for the reorganization of the domestic military industry. Under their command, Iran’s military industry was greatly expanded, and when the Ministry of Defense invested significant amounts of money in the missile industry, Iran soon received an arsenal of missiles.

Moreover, regular wars in the Middle East region, as well as the presence of permanent conflicts with Israel and Saudi Arabia, have for many years formed rather aggressive militaristic moods in Iranian society.

The development of domestic UAVs was given no less attention than the development of its own missiles of various types or the enrichment of uranium to create nuclear weapons. Over the past 40 years that Iran has lived under sanctions, the arsenal of its own weapons has been brought to a competitive position in many directions.

Moreover, Iran has never hidden its programs for the development of new types of weapons, on the contrary, it has tried in every possible way to demonstrate it. On November 2, 2012, Brigadier General Hassan Seifi reported that the Iranian army had achieved self-sufficiency in the production of military equipment and that the ability of Iranian scientists had enabled the country to make significant progress in this area. In particular, General Seifi stated: “Unlike Western countries that hide their new weapons and ammunition from everyone, the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not afraid to show off its latest military achievements, and all countries should be aware of Iran’s progress in the production of weapons.” As of 2016, the Iranian Ministry of Defense cooperates with over 3,150 national firms as well as 92 universities.

Back in 2019, the Iranian Ministry of Defense announced the start of the production of air defence laser guns. And already in 2020, Defense Minister Brigadier General Amir Khatami said that his country is capable of producing more than 38 thousand units of military equipment and parts of equipment.

As for UAVs, three main companies are producing them in Iran: Shahed Aviation Industries, Qods Aviation Industry Company and Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).

One of the most famous Iranian drones is Shahed-129. Its production started in 2005 and, thanks to gradual modification, became the basis for the creation of a whole line of Iranian UAVs. There are two opinions about the adventure of this UAV: ​​according to the first, it is an exact copy of the American MQ-1 Predator UAV (which was planted by Iranian air defence forces and taken for study and implementation of technologies). According to a second opinion, the Shahed-129 was copied from an Israeli Hermes 450 UAV that crashed in Iran. In any case, it is important to note that Iran has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to adapt and even improve the technologies of other states in favour of its own army.

In general, Iran has had experience with drones since the war with Iraq in the 1980s. Recently, however, Iranian drones have been used by Iranian proxies in the Middle East. For example, the attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019, which damaged the country’s oil production facilities for several days, was allegedly carried out by the Houthis, against whom the kingdom waged war in Yemen, reportedly included Iranian-made missiles and drones, which were later claimed by Arabia. 

While Iranian drones (such as the Shahed 129) are known to have a destruction range of less than 2,000 km, some Iranian military claims newer models with a range of up to 7,000 km. However, this information has not been officially confirmed. On the other hand, back in 2011, the American RQ-170 Sentinel UAV was captured by Iranian forces, which gave Iran access to sophisticated UAV technology, and already in 2015, they introduced the (identical to the American model) Shahed 171 Simorgh.

In any case, it is definitely not necessary to talk about the lagging behind Iranian technologies from Western ones. In addition to the above types of UAVs, the Iranian army is armed with many types of missiles of its own production, this illustrates high manufacturability and efficiency in use. 

How does the world community react?

Undoubtedly, the world community almost unanimously condemned the actions of Iran and declared that it was inadmissible for Tehran to sell any weapons to Moscow. Back in early October, the United States and Great Britain announced their intention to introduce new sanctions against Iran for the supply of UAVs to Russia. True, as of the beginning of November, there was no official reaction from the West.

On the other hand, before the start of the full-scale invasion of the Russian occupation forces into Ukraine, Iran was the undisputed leader in terms of the number of sanctions imposed by Western countries. A fairly wide list of weapons that the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) have been able to create over the past 40 years demonstrates that Iran has learned to bypass Western sanctions, including through the country’s tritiums.

On October 23, a closed UN meeting was held, during which the majority of the members of the Security Council supported the investigation by UN experts of the use of Iranian drones by Russia against the civilian population and infrastructure of Ukraine. During the meeting, French Permanent Representative to the UN Nicolas de Rivière said: “The facts are clear: Iran has provided drones to Russia, which uses them in its aggressive war and indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets. These facts, which can be recognized as war crimes, are firmly documented.” He stressed that the supply of weapons by Iran is prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015. Paragraph 4 of this document requires prior approval by the Security Council for such deliveries.

At the same time, on October 28, US State Department spokesman Ned Price said that the United States authorities intend to use all tools to combat Iran’s supply of weapons abroad, including drones that Russia uses to bombard Ukrainian cities. “We have instruments that go beyond sanctions and other economic measures. We’re going to do what is ultimately in our best interest,” Price said.

Another important point concerns Israel’s involvement in trying to stop the supply of Iranian drones to Russia. At the end of October, information appeared that Israeli President Isaac Herzog, during his visit to the United States, would pass on intelligence data to US President Joe Biden proving that the Russian occupation forces were using Geranium-2 drones in Ukraine, which are actually Iranian “Shahed-136”.

Herzog’s visit to the United States took place on October 25, and the meeting with his American colleague was on October 26. However, as of early November, no information about evidence of the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia had been provided, at least to the general public.

In this case, two important points should be noted. First, between Iran and the United States, the negotiation process is currently ongoing regarding the resumption of the “nuclear deal”. A few weeks ago, Iran put forward new demands that were not met by the United States. Apparently, the situation with Iranian UAVs and their transfer to Russia can be used as an instrument of pressure on the eve of the next round of negotiations in Vienna.

Secondly, on October 20, Dmitry Polyansky, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, said that in response to the UN investigation into the use of Iranian drones by Russia, Moscow may “reconsider cooperation” with the UN, including not extending the “grain agreement”. It is likely that in this case, too, we can talk about using this factor as an instrument of pressure in the informal negotiation process.

Why does Iran deny involvement in its UAVs?

Despite several pieces of evidence, as well as the confident conviction of most Western states that Iran has transferred its UAVs to Russia and their further use by the Russian occupation forces against Ukraine, official Tehran still denies this fact.

Back in late July, Iran reacted to US accusations of supplying drones to Russia and stated that it does not support Russia’s actions and is not going to support it with weapons.

Later, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollohiyan, in a telephone conversation with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba, stated that Iran is against the war in Ukraine, and “does not support steps that will lead to the continuation and escalation of hostilities.”

On October 17, after a series of massive attacks using UAVs on Ukrainian infrastructure, the Iranian Foreign Ministry once again denied its involvement in the supply of UAVs to Russia. The representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Nasser Kanaani, denied any involvement in such activities though also proposed the creation of a joint commission to investigate the possible use of Iranian equipment by the Russian occupation forces.

Moreover, on October 28 another conversation took place between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Iran, initiated by the Iranian side. There are no details about the conversation itself in open sources, except for the information that the Ukrainian Minister demanded from his Iranian counterpart to stop supplying weapons to Russia.

At the same time, official Tehran’s regular statements suggest two thoughts: either they brazenly lie and try to save their face even in such a stalemate (and almost the entire world community is inclined to such a scenario), or they are interested in an objective investigation that can prove their innocence to the appearance of drones “Geran-2” in Russia.

Could Russia have taken Iranian drones from someone other than Iran?

Iran’s persistent denial of the transfer of UAVs to Russia looks even more strange against the background of the fact that Ukrainian intelligence was able to dismantle practically intact copies of two types of UAVs and found in them several spare parts that are identical to those from Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6.

At the same time, after studying recent events in the Middle East region, it becomes clear that accusations of using Iranian drones by third states while official Tehran denies provision of their UAVs happens not for the first time. For example, in September 2019, Iranian drones and cruise missiles were used to attack oil refineries in Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia, causing severe disruption to global oil markets. Iran also denied its involvement in the transfer of weapons for Yemeni militants, but the samples of the weapons used indicated the usage of the Shahed-136.

Already in 2021, during the Iranian-Israeli conflict, which resulted in attacks on tankers and cargo ships, the Liberian-flagged tanker MT Mercer Street was hit, owned by the Zodiac Maritime company, owned by Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer. The strike killed the Romanian captain of the tanker and a British guard. Iran did not claim responsibility for the strike, but further investigation and examination of the wreckage also indicated the use of the Shahed-136.

Now it is reliably known that the Yemeni Houthis are assembling UAVs from components supplied by Iran under the name “Wa’id”. In 2021, they held an official presentation showing the results of such cooperation with Iran.

It is also known that one of the enterprises that assemble Iranian Shahed drones (that is, Shahed Aviation Industries) was located in the Syrian city of Sayyed-Zeinab, near Damascus. At the same time, on July 21, 2022, The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based human rights society, stated that Israel launched a missile attack on several points in Syria, including near an Iranian enterprise in Sayyed-Zeinab. At the same time, SOHR concluded that as a result of the strike on the enterprise, Russia will not be able to receive Iranian drones.

In this case, it is worth paying attention to two points. Firstly, two days before the liquidation of the enterprise in Sayed-Zeynab, Vladimir Putin visited Tehran, during which he allegedly agreed on the transfer of Iranian UAVs. Secondly, a few weeks after Putin’s visit to Tehran, the American edition of Bloomberg stated that in late July, the Sparta-2 merchant ship, which is under US sanctions, passed the Turkish Bosphorus on its way from Syria to Russia. According to the publication, the ship was transporting military equipment.

In addition to production in Yemen and Syria, it is known that Iran uses Iraq as an intermediary for the transfer of weapons to third countries. So, in April 2022, the British edition of The Guardian stated that Russia received weapons and ammunition from Iraq for the war in Ukraine with the help of smugglers from Iran. Thus, Iran handed over to Russia the Iranian-made Bavar 373 anti-aircraft missile system, and also returned the Russian S-300 air defence system, which Tehran had previously bought from Moscow. On March 26, one of the units of the Popular Mobilization Forces transported hand grenade launchers and anti-tank missiles from Iraq to Iran. The Iranian military sent the cargo by sea to Russia, said the commander of the unit responsible for transporting it across the border. On April 1, the Popular Mobilization Forces transported two Brazilian-made Astros II multiple rocket launchers to Iran. These days, according to The Guardian, three cargo ships capable of carrying military cargo crossed the Caspian Sea from the city of Bandar Anzeli in Iran to Astrakhan in Russia. One ship sailed under the flag of Iran, and two more – under the Russian flag.

It is also known about the production of Iranian drones in Tajikistan. In May 2022, the Minister of Defense of Tajikistan, General Sherali Mirzo, together with the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Muhammad Hussein Bokiri, opened a drone production factory in Tajikistan. In this situation, it is important to pay attention to the fact that at the end of June the Russian president also paid an official visit to Dushanbe, and two weeks later went to Tehran. According to official information, Iranian Ababil 2 UAVs are being assembled in Tajikistan, and not Shahed-136 nor Mohajer-6.

Interestingly, that in one of his YouTube programs Ukrainian journalist Dmitry Gordon accused Uzbekistan of producing Iranian drones and transferring them to Russia. On October 27, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan officially denied this information. Later, Dmitry Gordon issued a new statement in which he admitted that he had mixed up Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan also issued a refutation of this information.

In early September 2022, the commander of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), General Salami, said that Iran is selling domestic military equipment to foreign buyers, among them, there is, including some key world power. Also, according to Salami, they are now teaching them how to use this technique.

In this situation, we can conclude that in addition to Iran, other states using Iranian technologies and spare parts to produce drones in their territories can also act as a supplier of UAVs. At the same time, it should be noted that this removes responsibility from official Tehran only indirectly since such export is hardly possible without its consent.

Personal conclusions

Analysing many facts indicating that the UAVs actively used by the Russian occupation forces in Ukraine have Iranian roots, several theories can be put forward:

The game of internal forces

Considering the complicated relations between different influence groups within Iran, it is possible that the deliveries of Iranian UAVs or components for further assembling were indeed made without the knowledge of official Tehran, but with the active support of one of the influence groups inside the country.

To date, several influence groups can be determined in the Iranian political system.

The first and foremost is the Islamic clergy, which controls all spheres of political, economic and social life.

The second is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The role of the military is so significant that they can often impose their demands on the clergy. So the leadership of the IRGC and their protege, later Iranian President Ali Rafsanjani, did not allow Ayatollah Khomeini to end the war with Iraq in 1983.

The third is the army (the Iranians call it “Atesh”). Its size is 650 thousand people. It is in competitive relations with the IRGC. The American plans repeatedly included the scenario of the removal of the clergy and the IRGC and the bringing to power of the military. The army commander is 70-year-old Major General Ataollah Salehi.

Fourth – pro-Western liberals and those looking to the transformation of Iran into a secular state. The leaders of this movement are former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and former Iranian Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi (in 1989, after the death of Khomeini, the post of prime minister in Iran was eliminated). The liberals are sympathetic to the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson Hassan (declared a US agent in his homeland). In 2016, the liberals were not allowed to participate in the Iranian parliamentary elections.

The fifth force is the conservatives, who on most issues are in solidarity with the clergy, but sometimes they try to be “holier than the ayatollah.” Their informal leader is former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The sixth force (functioning underground, but at the same time having an influence on the masses) are monarchists, supporters of the restoration of the House of Pahlavi. The head of the House of Pahlavi in exile, Shahinshah Reza Pahlavi, lives in the United States and is one of the tools in the information war of American intelligence agencies against the current Iranian regime.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled Iran for thirty years (since July 1989). He is 82 years old, and he underwent two operations to remove malignant tumours, but at the same time, he is trying to influence the situation in the country and in the region.

Khamenei – despite the ultra-clerical nature of the Iranian government – has made several concessions over the past decades. He officially allowed to criticise the authorities in the media, especially for economic miscalculations and corruption. Programs for youth have expanded. The situation with women’s rights has also been expanded. Contrary to popular belief, Iraqi women actively participate in social and political processes. If in 1977 the literacy level among women did not exceed 38%, today this figure is 80%. In 1977, women were 29% of the student population, and today it is nearly 48%. 51% of all students in the country are girls (in medical schools this figure is 73%). There are 8 women in the Majlis of Iran. Women hold the posts of the Minister of Health and the head of the Department of Science and Technology of the Presidential Administration of Iran.

The demographic processes indicate that Iran may soon face the need for an ideological reset: only 10% of the country’s population are people over 45 years old. Young people are often oriented towards the West, and many leave for Western countries searching for work.

Many Iranians understand that Ayatollah Khamenei is likely to pass away soon and there will be a difficult question of succession. There is no figure equal in authority and influence to Khamenei and capable of replacing the ayatollah in his post among the highest Iranian clergy. That is why Western experts are increasingly talking about the possibility of finding such a candidate in the military.

The 125,000-strong IRGC, an elite military-political formation, in fact, the guards of Iran, is the most authoritative institution in the country, capable of competing in influence with the clergy. Formally, the commander of the IRGC is Ayatollah Khamenei. However, the real power lies in the hands of Brigadier General Hossein Salami, born in 1960, a hero of the Iran-Iraq war and former commander of Iran’s air and space forces.

His deputy was Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Al-Quds special unit (combining the functions of military intelligence and counterintelligence of Iran). Soleimani, 62, was far more influential and popular than Salami. According to sources, Salami and Soleimani have been fighting for leadership. Both had the opportunity to claim their rights to rule the state in the event of Khamenei’s death. Obviously, after the death of Soleimani, Salami significantly strengthened his position.

Moreover, one of the widely circulated versions says that the time and place of the arrival of General Qasem Soleimani (at the Ain al-Assad airbase in the west of the country, where the missile attack was carried out, which led to the death of Soleimani) was given to American intelligence by Salami’s people, wanting to get rid of from an unwanted competitor. Although this information is not confirmed officially.

Against the backdrop of internal political aggravation, one should not exclude the possibility that the supply of Iranian weapons to Russia is one of the elements of the struggle for power between different groups of influence. Moreover, on October 25, it became known that Colonel Molashakhi of the IRGC and one of the commanders of the Basij organisation Javad Kiha were killed in Iran. According to some reports, these same people, among other things, were responsible for the supply of Iranian kamikaze drones to the Russian Federation. This situation can also be a confirmation of internal confrontations.

Regional confrontation and bargaining with the West

As mentioned above, Iran is currently in active negotiations with the United States about the possibility of returning to the “nuclear deal”. If agreements are reached, a significant part of the sanctions will be lifted from official Tehran, which will allow it to export oil, as well as increase the level of economic relations with Western states. Of course, this option is unacceptable for several states in the Middle East region, including Israel.

It is worth paying attention to several factors that have a serious impact on the alignment of forces in the Middle East and relations between countries of the region:

1. Iran consistently advocates the elimination of the State of Israel, which it considers “little Satan” (as opposed to “big Satan – the United States”). For this purpose it finances the radical wing of the supporters of the Palestinian Authority and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and Syria; this made it possible for the US to accuse Iran of aiding terrorists;

2. Iran became the main force that contributed to the defeat of the U.S. in Syria; Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is Alawite by religion (one of the currents in Shiism, while the majority of the population of Iran are also Shiites). Nowadays, jointly with the Syrian administration, Iran and its “proxies” control about 70% of the Syrian territory, posing a threat to Israel and American interests in the region;

3. Iran is a powerful regional player. In 2019, thanks to the initiatives of Iran and with the support of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, an agreement was signed on the status of the Caspian Sea. As a result, the United States lost their influence in the Caspian. In 2016, Iran contributed to the withdrawal of Pakistan from the influence of the United States (this led to an aggravation of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan). In 2019, under the expressive Iranian influence, the Iraqi authorities began to actively distance themselves from the United States, and in early 2020, the Iraqi Majlis demanded that the U.S. withdraw its troops from the country;

4. Iran is in constant conflict with Saudi Arabia, another U.S. partner in the region. Originally, the religious conflict (the Saudis are Sunnis by religion, and the Iranians are Shiites) was aggravated by economic contradictions (the struggle for the oil market) and the struggle for regional leadership. Iran constantly supports anti-Saudi actions in the region (for example, the Houthis movement in Yemen);

5. Iran is one of the constituent elements of the “Middle East Triangle”, which includes Russia, Iran and Turkey. The triangle is frankly anti-American and has led to a serious defeat for the United States in the region (Syria).

Based on the above facts, it can be assumed that an attempt to accuse Iran of supplying weapons to Russia, thereby disrupting the “nuclear deal” (which will automatically extend the existing sanctions, and also affect the introduction of new ones), is a well-executed plan of one of the regional players. The only question is who exactly is in charge of this process and has such a high influence inside Iran.

Outright lies

At the same time, most Ukrainian politicians and experts do not rely on a deep analysis of this situation and almost unanimously adhere to the opinion that all Iranian attempts to prove its innocence are a typical lie.

On October 18, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba initiated a break in diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Iran. “Given the massive destruction inflicted by Iranian drones on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, the death and suffering inflicted on our people, and in connection with reports that Iran may continue to supply weapons to Russia, I am submitting a proposal to the President to sever diplomatic relations with Iran,” Kuleba said during a briefing.

On October 22, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky also officially stated that Iran is lying when it claims that it does not supply weapons to Russia. “Iran is supplying them with drones, supplying them with killings of Ukrainians, this is their agreement for money. This is the blood money that Iran earns. They can say: “We didn’t take anything, show financial calculations”… We are talking specifics – Iran handed over the drones used to kill Ukrainians, and they continue to kill. Not one, not two, not five, but hundreds. We know that there are thousands of orders and agreements, but hundreds have definitely been delivered.”

The United States also accuses Iran of lying about the usage of drones in Ukraine, although it is in no hurry to impose new sanctions or use any mechanisms to contain Tehran.

In this situation, it is only important to note the fact that despite the possibility of a more complicated game, or the real non-involvement of official Tehran in the direct supply of weapons to the Russian occupying forces, from drones produced either in Iran itself or using Iranian technologies in third countries, they continue killing civilians in Ukraine, as well as destroying strategic infrastructure.